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By William C. Berman 
THE POLITICS OF CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE 
TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION 
Among the most important domestic develop­
ments in the United States during the presidency 
of Harry S. Truman was the emergence of the civil 
rights movement as a significant factor in political 
affairs. The genesis of this challenge to the institu­
tional framework of a racist society had, of course, 
preceded the Truman era; but it was in the period 
immediately following World War ITthat the move­
ment gathered sufficient strength and momentum 
to pose a serious threat to the unity of the Demo­
cratic party. 
The Democrats had first been confronted with 
civil rights as a political issue in the 1930s when 
large numbers of Negro voters living in urban 
areas of the North joined the party in order to 
lend support to Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal. 
The presence of blacks in the party encouraged 
some northern Democratic liberals to advocate 
passage of civil rights legislation, a move that was 
bitterly resented and vehemently opposed by con­
gressmen from the South, and one that produced 
serious conflict within the party. 
President Roosevelt, afraid of offending the 
southerners, attempted at first to sidestep the issue; 
but in June of 1941, Negro pressure compelled 
him to issue an executive order creating a Federal 
Fair Employment Practice Committee — a step that 
clearly announced the arrival of a new political 
situation and signified the capability of black vot­
ers to play a role in, and exert powerful pressure 
on, national politics. 
President Truman inherited the unresolved civil 
rights conflict of the preceding administration with­
out also falling heir to the good will and affection 
that most blacks had for his predecessor; and by 
1948, it became clear that Truman would need 
Negro votes if he was to remain in the White 
House. It was in response to this need that his 
administration's civil rights program evolved. 
In his reconstruction and analysis of the origins 
and development of that program, Mr. Berman 
examines its impact on the internal politics of the 
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PREFACE 
Among the most significant domestic developments in the 
years Harry Truman served as president was the emergence 
of the civil rights movement. The genesis of this challenge 
to the institutional framework of a racist society had, of 
course, antedated the Truman era; but during the immedi­
ate pos1>-World War II period, the incipient civil rights 
movement was gathering sufficient strength and momentum 
to pose a serious threat to the cohesiveness of the Demo­
cratic party. Thus, the issue of the politics of civil rights in 
the Truman administration relates the growing political 
x Preface 
influence of American Negroes to the structure of the Dem­
ocratic party. 
The politics of civil rights first arose as an issue in the 
1930's when large numbers of black voters, living in north­
ern urban areas, joined the Democratic party to support 
Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal. Their presence in the party 
sparked some northern Democratic liberals into advocating 
passage of civil rights legislation, a move which was bitterly 
resented, and actively opposed, by congressmen from the 
South. Thereafter, the intraparty conflict between propo­
nents and opponents of this legislation slowly grew in in­
tensity. President Roosevelt, who was afraid of offending 
southern congressmen, tried to sidestep the issue. But in 
June, 1941, Negro pressure compelled him to issue an execu­
tive order creating a Federal Fair Employment Practices 
Committee. The president's action signified that a new polit­
ical situation had developed: black Americans were now 
capable of playing an influential role in national politics. 
President Harry Truman inherited the unresolved civil 
rights conflict from the Roosevelt administration, without 
at the same time inheriting the good will and affection that 
most Negroes felt for his predecessor. By 1948 it was clear 
that Truman would need their votes in order to retain 
control of the White House. Out of that need emerged the 
Truman administration's civil rights program. The purpose 
of this study is to reconstruct and analyze the origins and 
development of that program, to examine its impact on the 
internal politics of the Democratic party, and to assess and 
to evaluate the contributions which the Truman administra­
tion made on behalf of Negro aspirations for freedom and 
justice. 
The initial encouragement I received from Professor 
Robert Bremner of the Ohio State University History De­
partment has been much appreciated. I am grateful for the 
research assistance and travel grant provided by the Harry 
 xi Preface
S. Truman Library Institute. Dean George Roadman and 
Dr. George Hart of California State College, California, 
Pennsylvania, helped me at an early point in this undertak­
ing. Thanks to their critical reading of the manuscript, Dr. 
James Morrill of the History Department of the University 
of Louisville and Professor William Read of the University 
of Louisville Law School saved me from many errors, stylis­
tic and otherwise. I am of course solely responsible for 
whatever mistakes in judgment or errors in fact that may 
still exist. Generous grants from the Research Committees 
of the University of Louisville and the University of To­
ronto facilitated the final preparation of the manuscript. 
Finally, it must be noted that this work would never have 
been completed without the support and faith of my wife, 
Deborah. The travail was hers, the publication mine. 

The Politics of Civil Rights 
in the Truman Administration 

Chapter 1 
THE RHETORIC OF POLITICS 
For almost two generations following the Civil War, Negro 
voters remained loyal supporters of the Republican party. 
In the 1920's that bond appeared to weaken because of 
Republican neglect and indifference.1 This development was 
borne out in the 1928 presidential election when an unprece­
dented number of Negroes voted for the Democratic party's 
1. Richard B. Sherman, "The Harding Administration and the 
Negro: An Opportunity Lost," Journal of Negro History XLIX 
(1964), 151-68. 
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candidate, New York's Governor Alfred E. Smith.2 Yet 
most Negroes supported Herbert Clark Hoover's bid for the 
presidency. And in 1932, in the depths of the depression, a 
majority of Negroes once more voted for Hoover.3 On this 
occasion, though, Hoover's margin was substantially re­
duced : he carried black wards in Chicago and Cleveland by 
the customary substantial Republican margins but lost the 
black vote in Manhattan, Pittsburgh, Detroit, and Kansas 
City, Missouri, to his victorious opponent, Governor Frank­
lin Roosevelt of New York.4 In 1936 Negroes deserted the 
Republican party en masse to vote for Roosevelt.5 Despite 
the strong effort made by Wendell Willkie in 1940 to bring 
black voters back to the Republican party, Roosevelt re­
tained their support in his successful third-term campaign.8 
The 1940 election demonstrated clearly that the Negro vote 
had become part of the Roosevelt political coalition. 
Negroes voted for Roosevelt in 1936 and 1940 largely 
because their economic deprivation, stemming from unem­
ployment and discrimination, had been lessened through the 
work of such New Deal agencies as the Works Progress 
Administration and the Farm Security Administration. The 
favorable treatment accorded Negroes by these agencies 
2. Henry Lee Moon, Balance of Power: The Negro Vote (Garden 
City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1948), pp. 18-34; also see David Burner, The 
Politics of Provincialism: The Democratic Party in Transition, 
1918-1932 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), pp. 237-39. 
3. Moon, Balance of Power, pp. 18-34; also see Samuel Lubell, 
White and Black: Test of a Nation (New York: Harper & Row, 
1966), p. 57. 
4. Moon, Balance of Power, pp. 18-34. 
5. For an examination of the issue in the context of the Republican 
campaign of 1936, see Donald McCoy, Landon of Kansas (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1966), pp. 311-12. 
6. Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma (New York: Harper & 
Bros., 1944), p. 496. 
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was evidence enough that for the first time in the twentieth 
century, government had taken on "meaning and substance 
for the Negro masses." 7 
Perhaps the most important action taken by the Roose­
velt administration in the field of civil rights, prior to the 
period of defense mobilization, was initiated by Attorney 
General Frank Murphy. On February 3, 1939, he authorized 
the establishment of a Civil Rights Section within the Jus­
tice Department as a means of defending the civil rights of 
all citizens. This step was necessary, Murphy felt, because: 
In a democracy, an important function of the law en­
forcement branch of government is the aggressive protec­
tion of fundamental rights inherent in a free people. 
In America these guarantees are contained in ex­
pressed provisions of the Constitution and in acts of 
Congress. It is the purpose of the Department of Justice 
to pursue a program of vigilant action in the prosecution 
of infringement of these rights. 
It must be borne in mind that the authority of the 
Federal Government in this field is somewhat limited by 
the fact that many of the constitutional guarantees are 
not guarantees against infringement by individuals or 
groups of individuals.8 
The Justice Department subsequently instituted suits in the 
federal courts to expand the federal government's jurisdic­
tion in the field of civil rights. For example, it petitioned the 
7. Crisis, XLVII (1940), 18. 
8. Quoted in Robert K. Carr, Federal Protection of Civil Rights: 
Quest for a Sword (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1947), p. 
2; see J. Woodford Howard, Jr., Mr. Justice Murphy: A Political 
Biography (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 
206, for the following: "In retrospect, creation of the Civil Liberties 
Unit was Murphy's single most significant contribution as Attorney 
General." 
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Supreme Court to declare unconstitutional those statutory 
provisions denying Negroes the right to vote in southern 
primaries." Such a move placed the political power of the 
United States government behind legal attempts to modify 
or nullify laws sanctioning discrimination, particularly as 
they applied to voting rights. 
Although Murphy's order was scrupulously divorced 
from politics, President Roosevelt's Executive Order 8802, 
creating a federal Fair Employment Practices Committee 
(FEPC), was the product of much political controversy.10 
Roosevelt issued his order on June 25, 1941, in the period of 
defense mobilization in an effort to placate A. Philip Ran­
dolph, a leader of the March on Washington movement, who 
was threatening to bring 100,000 black Americans to Wash­
ington to agitate for an FEPC.11 The fact that Roosevelt 
released this executive order had twofold significance: Ne­
groes demonstrated that they could function as an effective 
pressure group; and the government gave notice to the 
country that Negro labor would now be utilized in defense 
production. 
Once northern Negroes obtained jobs in defense plants, 
southern Negroes began to migrate to the North and West 
in order to find similar employment. Between 1941 and 1946 
over a million southern Negroes settled in such cities as 
9. Francis Biddle, In Brief Authority (New York: Doubleday, 
1962), p. 159. 
10. Louis Kesselman, The Social Politics of FEPC: A Study in 
Reform Pressure Movements (Chapel Hill: University of North Caro­
lina Press, 1947), p. 14. 
11. Herbert Garfinkel, When Negroes March (Glencoe, 111.: Free 
Press, 1959), p. 27; for a persuasive analysis suggesting that Roose­
velt really scored a political victory of sorts with this order, see 
Richard Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces: Fighting 
on Two Fronts, 1939-1953 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 
1969), pp. 117-22. 
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Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, and Los Angeles, thereby in­
creasing both numerical strength and political influence of 
northern Negroes, who, according to the 1940 census fig­
ures, had comprised 4 to 5 percent of the potential voters in 
the major industrial states of New York, New Jersey, Penn­
sylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and Illinois.12 This internal migra­
tion was an important political development, the long range 
implications of which did not escape John Temple Graves, a 
southern journalist: 
It means from now on the Democratic party will be com­
peting for what has heretofore belonged to the Republi­
cans. And because the vote represents something near a 
balance of power in balance-of-power states, it means 
also that Northern Negroes may become more important 
than Southern whites in the party of the white South's 
long allegiance.13 
Despite the creation of the Civil Rights Section and the 
establishment of the FEPC, President Roosevelt rarely sup­
ported or endorsed any civil rights legislation.14 Nor was he 
willing to attack rhetorically the manifold forms of discrim­
ination pervading American society.15 Roosevelt pursued 
12. Jasper B. Shannon, "Presidential Politics in the South," Jour­
nal of Politics X (1948), 469-89. 
13. Quoted in Moon, Balance of Power, p. 22. 
14. There was an exception however: on the day of his death, April 
12, 1945, he publicly endorsed a bill calling for the creation of a 
permanent Fair Employment Practices Commission; see Louis Ru­
chames, Race, Jobs, and Politics (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1953), p. 126. 
15. It must be noted that at a press conference on February 13, 
1942, Roosevelt attacked the poll tax; see Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., 
The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 13 vols. 
(New York: Harper & Co., 1950), XI, 96. 
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this policy of non-involvement in order to avoid open politi­
cal conflict with the majority of congressional Southern 
Democrats, whose votes he needed to assure the success of 
his economic program. In other words, his political alliances 
in Congress made it tactically impossible for him to become 
the spokesman for, let alone the initiator of, a federally 
sponsored civil rights campaign; and thus he capitulated to 
what he construed to be the politics of necessity even while 
the conservative coalition was being organized to thwart his 
New Deal program.18 
Roosevelt's acute awareness of his political situation 
helps to explain why he spurned the pleas of his liberal 
associates to endorse an anti-lynching bill under considera­
tion by the Congress in the middle and late 1930's. However, 
one member of the United States Senate who generally 
embraced Roosevelt's New Deal program but also went be­
yond it to support proposed civil rights legislation was 
Harry S. Truman, the junior senator from Missouri. It was 
no accident that Truman took an active interest in this 
issue. Almost from the beginning of his career as an aspir­
ing politician from Jackson County, Missouri, Truman rec­
ognized the significance and importance of the black vote in 
Kansas City, thanks to Boss Tom Pendergast (Truman's 
benefactor), who had enlarged his base of power in the 
early 1920's by courting and winning the loyalty of Negro 
voters." As Roy Wilkins, onetime journalist for the Negro 
newspaper the Kansas City Call, and later a power in na­
tional civil rights politics, suggests: "Truman was politi­
16. Frank Freidel, FDR and the South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1965), pp. 71-102; for additional information 
see James T. Patterson's Congressional Conservatism and the New 
Deal (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967), pp. 156-67. 
17. Lyle Dorsett, The Pendergast Machine (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1968), p. 82. 
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cally astute on the race question before he ever came to 
Washington, because the Pendergast machine was politi­
cally astute." 18 
When Truman ran for a local office in his home town of 
Independence, Missouri, in 1924, the Kansas City chapter of 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP) refused to endorse him (perhaps because 
of the rumor that he had been briefly affiliated with the Ku 
Klux Klan);19 but in 1926—as a beneficiary of Pendergast 
votes and patronage—he received strong Negro backing in 
his campaign for a county-wide judgeship.20 
Grateful for the assistance which the Negro electorate 
gave him in his successful 1934 senatorial campaign, Tru­
man joined the liberal bloc in the Senate whenever a civil 
rights question arose. It was good politics because the black 
vote in Missouri represented approximately 130,000 ballots, 
strategically concentrated in its two largest cities, St. Louis 
and Kansas City.21 The strength of the Negro bloc was such 
that, as Truman knew, candidates for public office in Jack­
son County, as well as the state, would be politically handi­
capped if that support was denied.22 
Yet Truman's position was not all that unambiguous—he 
represented a state with southern prejudices and values, 
and, therefore, he had to step delicately in regard to the 
civil rights issue. His own political and personal ambiva­
18. Cited in the unpublished comments of Alonzo Hamby, deliv­
ered at the American Historical Association meeting in New York on 
December 29, 1966. 
19. Franklin D. Mitchell, Embattled Democracy: Missouri Politics, 
1919-19S2 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1968), p. 182. 
20. Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces, p. 136. 
21. Myrdal, An American Dilemma, p. 488. 
22. For an interesting analysis of how the Missouri Democratic 
party moved to capture that black vote, see Mitchell, Embattled 
Democracy, pp. 124-39. 
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lence on the matter was apparently revealed in a remark 
he made to a southern senator about the 1938 anti-lynchmg 
bill: "You know I am against this bill, but if it comes to a 
vote, I'll have to vote for it. All my sympathies are with you 
but the Negro vote in Kansas City and St. Louis is too im­
portant." 23 
Although Truman was prepared to cast his vote for anti­
lynching legislation, he never had the opportunity, as a 
southern filibuster frustrated all attempts to bring the bill 
to a floor vote. Nevertheless, during the Seventy-fifth Con­
gress, Truman joined northern liberals by signing cloture 
petitions and endorsing motions to close debate on an anti­
lynching bill.24 Even though cloture was not obtained, his 
signature on those petitions suggests that he favored such 
legislation. During the Seventy-sixth Congress, in 1940, he 
supported an amendment to the Selective Service Act to 
prevent discrimination against members of minority groups 
who wished to volunteer for service in the armed forces.25 
Here, then, was the extent to which Truman was able to 
create a civil rights voting record while serving his first 
term in the Senate. 
Combining that slight civil rights record with a strong 
endorsement of New Deal economic legislation, Harry Tru­
man appeared ready in 1940 to seek reelection, which first 
required him to win renomination in the Democratic pri­
mary. His chances were not particularly good because Tom 
Pendergast—the man most responsible for his earlier suc­
cess in politics—had lost control of Jackson County, the 
county which had provided Truman with his margin of 
23. Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics (New York: 
Doubleday & Co., Anchor Books, 1956), p. 8. 
24. Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 1038, LXXXIII, 
1166, 2007. 
25. Ibid., 76th Cong., 2d Sess., 1010, LXXXVI, 10895. 
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victory in 1934.26 Truman, furthermore, failed to obtain the 
endorsement of President Roosevelt, who privately sup­
ported Governor Lloyd Stark in the Democratic party sena­
torial primary.27 It was rumored that the president, think­
ing Truman's party position was weak, offered him a 
federal sinecure as an inducement to withdraw quietly from 
the race.28 
Thus faced with bleak prospects, Truman entered the 
fray knowing that his political future could conceivably rest 
on whatever decision the voters made in the primary. He 
campaigned indefatigably throughout the state; entered 
into, and withdrew from, alliances in an attempt to build a 
working coalition to defeat Governor Stark and the other 
candidate, Maurice Milligan; and defended his record with 
the vigor and salty humor for which he later became fa­
mous. Thanks to the assistance of Robert Hannegan, who 
organized the St. Louis Negro vote on his behalf, Truman 
squeezed out a tight primary victory over his two 
opponents.29 In the general election Truman won by a mar­
gin of 44,000 votes. 
In light of later developments, one of the more significant 
civil rights pronouncements Truman made during that elec­
tion year was delivered on June 15, 1940, at Sedalia, Mis­
souri : 
I believe in the brotherhood of man; not merely the 
brotherhood of white men; but the brotherhood of all 
26. Pendergast had been indicted and convicted by the federal 
government of falsifying his income tax returns, thereby terminating 
his political hold over Kansas City; see Maurice Milligan, Missouri 
Waltz (New York: Charles Scribners & Sons, 1948), p. 166. 
27. Cabell Phillips, The Truman Presidency: The History of a 
Triumphant Succession (New York: Macmillan, 1966), p. 30. 
28. Ibid. 
29. Ibid. 
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men before the law. I believe in the Constitution and the 
Declaration of Independence. In giving to the Negroes 
the rights that are theirs, we are only acting in accord 
with ideas of a true democracy. If any class or race can be 
permanently set apart from, or pushed down below the 
rest in political and civil rights, so may any class or race 
when it shall incur the displeasure of its more powerful 
associates, and we may say farewell to the principles on 
which we commit our safety.30 
By limiting his speech to a discussion of the principle of 
equality, he skirted any programmatic commitment which 
might have threatened the Jim Crow structure of his native 
state. The Sedalia address was a quiet affirmation of his 
devotion to the cause of political democracy and was evi­
dence of his respect for the power of the black vote in 
Missouri. 
A fuller exposition of Truman's civil rights views was 
contained in a speech he gave to the National Colored Demo­
cratic Association in Chicago on July 14,1940: 
I wish to make it clear that I am not appealing for 
social equality of the Negro. The Negro himself knows 
better than that, and the highest types of Negro leaders 
say quite frankly that they prefer the society of their own 
people. Negroes want justice, not social relations. 
We all know the Negro is here to stay and in no way 
can be removed from our political and economic life and 
we should recognize his inalienable rights as specified in 
our Constitution. Can any man claim protection of our 
laws if he denies that protection to others? 31 
This speech, when measured against typical southern utter­
ances on civil rights, is a model of sobriety and good taste. 
30. Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 1940, LXXXVI, 
Appendix 4546. 
31. Ibid., Appendix 5367-69. 
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Truman at least recognized that there was considerable 
disparity between the professed beliefs of the American 
people and their actual behavior. Moreover, he understood 
that the lessening of this disparity required the acceptance 
and the steady application of the legal principle of equal 
justice under the law. Again, as at Sedalia, he neglected to 
offer any concrete recommendations to implement such a 
principle. A more specific commitment from him could have 
alienated many of his white Missouri constituents. 
During Truman's second term in the Senate, he became 
nationally prominent through his chairmanship of the Sen­
ate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense 
Program.32 In the early months of his chairmanship, he was 
unexpectedly embroiled in a dispute with the NAACP having 
to do with the subject of racial discrimination in the defense 
program. The issue arose after a small group of liberal 
senators, led by Senator Robert F. Wagner of New York, 
introduced Senate Resolution 75 calling for the creation of 
an autonomous committee to investigate precisely the prob­
lem the Truman committee would have preferred to ig­
nore.33 Although S.R. 75 was later approved by a subcom­
mittee of the Senate Education and Labor committee on 
April 24, 1941, its opponents, mostly Southern Democrats 
working on behalf of Senator James F. Byrnes of South 
Carolina, successfully tabled it in full committee; they 
wanted the Truman committee to handle the matter, 
thereby assuring that no meaningful investigation would 
take place.84 Then, suddenly, at a time when the March on 
32. Phillips, The Truman Presidency, pp. 34-37. 
33. A brief description of Wagner's work on behalf of S.R. 75 can 
be found in J. Joseph Huthmacher, Senator Robert Wagner and the 
Rise of Urban Liberalism (New York: Atheneum, 1968), p. 275. 
34. NAACP press release, July 3, 1941, Folder S.R. 71, Box 359, 
NAACP Papers, Library of Congress (hereafter cited as L.C.). 
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Washington movement was emerging as a possible threat to 
the administration, the Truman committee announced that 
hearings on the subject of racial discrimination in defense 
industries would be scheduled in late June or early July.35 
The NAACP at once charged that the proposed hearings 
represented "a frenzied and hasty attempt to dodge a real 
investigation into discrimination against the Negro in na­
tional defense work." 36 
Aware of the possible disengenuousness of the Truman 
move and still hoping to salvage the objectives of S.R. 75, 
Walter White, executive secretary of the NAACP, wrote 
President Roosevelt on July 7 (a copy of the letter having 
also been sent to Senator Truman) suggesting the need for 
a brief delay in the Truman hearings.37 Such a delay, White 
felt, would provide time to lay the groundwork for a more 
thorough and substantial investigation into the problem, by 
allowing for the appearance of many more witnesses than 
the several contemplated by the committee. In seeming com­
pliance with White's request, Hugh Fulton, chief counsel of 
the Truman committee, wired White that "at your sugges­
tion committee hearings on race discrimination have been 
postponed but no definite date has been determined for 
hearings." So much, then, for the fate of S.R. 75.38 
Shortly thereafter, in what could be construed as an act 
of political fence-mending at home, a Truman subcommittee 
stopped in Kansas City and St. Louis to investigate racial 
discrimination in defense-related employment.39 In both cit­
35. Ibid. 
36. Ibid. 
37. Walter White to Franklin Roosevelt, July 7, 1941, Folder 
S.R. 71, Box 359, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
38. Telegram to Walter White from Hugh Fulton, July 11, 1941. 
Folder S.R. 71, Box 359, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
39. Roy Wilkins to Ira Lewis, September 10, 1941, Folder S.R. 71, 
Box 359, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
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ies black delegations were courteously received and their 
various complaints carefully noted. But the true character 
and spirit of the investigation is best captured in a short 
paragraph contained in a letter Roy Wilkins, assistant sec­
retary of the NAACP, wrote to Ira Lewis, president of the 
Pittsburgh Courier Publishing Company, concerning the 
hearing in St. Louis: 
After the hearing was concluded, word filtered back to 
a member of the Negro committee through a sympathetic 
white connection that one of the secretaries of the com­
mittee had made the remark that the Truman committee 
was "accepting the Negro complaints, but did not intend 
to do anything about them; and if anybody thought the 
committee was going to help black bastards into $100-a­
week jobs, they were sadly mistaken." 40 
In his letter Wilkins further observed that "we have felt all 
along that the Truman committee was not going to do very 
much on this matter. . . . This remark in St. Louis, if true, 
would seem to indicate that the committee does not take the 
whole business very seriously." 41 (Harry Vaughn, a Tru­
man aide, was subsequently identified as the individual re­
sponsible for the remark Wilkins quoted in his letter.) 42 
During the same period (1941-44), Truman also gave his 
unqualified support to all legislation designed to finance the 
activities of the PEPC. In 1941 he introduced a bill calling for 
a combat command for Negro General Benjamin Davis; in 
1942 he voted for cloture to terminate debate on the polftax 
filibuster; and in 1943 he supported a resolution "that 
would have provided for an investigation of the effect of 
40. Ibid. 
41. Ibid. 
42. Walter White to Chester Stovall, September 11, 1941, Polder 
S.R. 71, Box 359, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
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segregation on the opportunities of Negroes in the armed 
services." 43 It must also be noted that on August 25, 1942, 
Truman voted against an anti-poll tax amendment to the 
soldier's vote bill for national elections; the amendment 
carried by a vote of 33 to 20 (with 43 senators present but 
not voting), and was thus included in the bill that became 
the law of the land.44 Here was an occasion when Truman 
had a direct opportunity to vote against the poll tax but 
refused to do so. Joining Senator Alben Barkley of Ken­
tucky, a fellow border-state politician, and many southern­
ers, he obviously voted in support of the political biases of 
his fellow white Missourians. Whether Truman's vote was a 
reflection of their views or his own prejudices, or both, is 
difficult to determine. 
The 1944 Democratic national convention took place in 
the middle of Senator Truman's second term. That conven­
tion was for Senator Truman an example of political seren­
dipity at work. As the convention approached, Truman was 
asked by James F. Byrnes, wartime defense mobilizer, to 
nominate him as Roosevelt's vice-presidential running 
mate.45 Truman was assured by Byrnes that his candidacy 
had received the approval and blessing of President Roose­
velt.46 In reality Byrnes stood little chance of obtaining the 
nomination because his racist views were unacceptable to 
the strong liberal bloc still committed to Henry Wallace, the 
incumbent vice-president. But unbeknown to Wallace's fer­
vent supporters, their hopes for his renomination had been 
undermined by the big city bosses—particularly Edward J. 
43. Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces, p. 136. 
44. Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 1942, Vol. 
LXXXVIII, Part 5, p. 6971. 
45. Phillips, The Truman Presidency, p. 39. 
46. Ibid. 
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Flynn of the Bronx—and other leaders of the party, includ­
ing Robert Hannegan, now the chairman of the Democratic 
National Committee and a Truman man.*7 They helped con­
vince Roosevelt before the convention started that his elec­
tion chances would be jeopardized if Wallace remained on 
the ticket. Roosevelt had to find a suitable replacement for 
Wallace, that is, someone who would not antagonize the 
party liberals and yet could calm southern fears about the 
race question. 
After some deliberation Roosevelt chose Truman because 
his views and record, unlike those of Wallace and Byrnes, 
could best preserve party harmony and unity. As a member 
of the centrist faction of the Democratic party, Truman was 
a New Dealer by necessity and a political moderate by 
inclination: hence, his selection would be in the best interest 
of the party. Truman did not really want the nomination; 
he was very happy in his role as senator, his life was 
uncomplicated, and he and his family enjoyed their privacy 
in the hectic political surroundings of Washington. It was 
only after Roosevelt had informed Truman that his refusal 
to co-operate could lead to "the breakup of the Democratic 
party in the middle of a war" that he consented to join the 
ticket.48 As Samuel Lubell suggests, echoing Roosevelt's own 
fear, it was the nomination of Truman or someone like him 
which may have prevented the dissolution of the Democratic 
party into two permanently warring groups.49 
Conversely, Wallace's reputation as a militant advocate 
of racial justice played a major role in his defeat in 1944. 
(He had not established a liberal record in race relations in 
47. Edward J. Flynn, You're the Boss (New York: Viking Press, 
1947), p. 181; Phillips, The Truman Presidency, pp. 41-42. 
48. Phillips, The Truman Presidency, p. 47. 
49. Lubell, The Future of American Politics, p. 21. 
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the years he served as secretary of agriculture;50 but by 
1944 his evolving views had made him a threat to the 
South.) When Wallace addressed the convention to second 
the nomination of Roosevelt, he did not equivocate on this 
issue. He said: 
The future belongs to those who go down the line un­
swervingly for the liberal principles of both political de­
mocracy and economic democracy regardless of race, 
color, or religion. In a political, educational and economic 
sense there must be no inferior races. The poll tax must 
go. Equal educational opportunities must come. The fu­
ture must bring equal wages for equal work regardless of 
sex and race.51 
Such strong opinion further intensified the South's hatred 
for him, thereby making his political demise that much 
more predictable once the roll call of the states began. It 
was no surprise, then, that Truman received the nomination 
by an overwhelming margin. 
Although the South was delighted with Truman's nomi­
nation, black delegates to the convention were most un­
happy with what had happened; in every delegation caucus, 
so it was reported, they had been Wallace's strongest sup­
porters.52 As a reflection of obvious Negro disappointment 
with the results of the convention, Negro newspapers caus­
ticly appraised the new vice-presidential nominee. The Nor­
folk Journal and Guide wrote: "Senator Truman is a con­
servative Democrat, who, it appears, was given the 
50. Allen P. Kifer, "The Negro Under the New Deal," (Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1961), pp. 223-25; for a strong 
defense of Wallace's civil rights record in the years he served in the 
Roosevelt cabinet, see Curtis D. MacDougal, Gideon's Army, 3 vols. 
(New York: Marzani & Munsell, 1965), III, 656-61. 
51. Pittsburgh Courier, July 29, 1944, p. 6. 
52. Ibid. 
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nomination for Vice Presidency for reasons of political 
expediency." 53 The Pittsburgh Courier opined that "Tru­
man is a long way from being a Henry Wallace," and that 
his nomination was an "appeasement of the South which 
must rank in cowardice and shortsightedness with the in­
eptitude shown by Chamberlain at Munich." s* 
To counteract the disillusionment and bitterness which 
could have quickly spread through the ranks of Negro Demo­
crats, Senator Truman allowed himself to be interviewed 
on August 3, 1944, by a journalist from the widely circu­
lated and influential Pittsburgh Courier. Among the state­
ments made by Truman was: 
I have always been for equality of opportunity in work, 
working conditions and political rights. I think the Negro 
in the armed forces ought to have the same treatment and 
opportunities as every other member of the armed forces. 
I think this should also be true of Negro women in the 
armed forces. . .  . I have a record for fair play toward 
my Negro fellow citizens that will stand examination. 
When asked whether he had heard Wallace's convention 
speech, Truman commented that he had not, but "no honest 
American can disagree with Henry Wallace. What he said 
was gospel." 55 
In a later interview, this time with Morris Milgram, 
national secretary of the Worker's Defense League, Truman 
discussed the race issue in an unabashedly candid manner. 
He asserted that if Negroes sat down to eat in a drugstore 
in Independence, Missouri, "they would be booted out" be­
cause the management of these places had the right to 
refuse to serve anyone they pleased; that Negroes in St. 
53. Aug. 5, 1944, p. 6. 
54. Pittsburgh Courier, July 29, 1944, p. 1. 
55. Ibid., Aug. 5, 1944, p. 1. 
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Louis had started a "push day once a week" to shove white 
people out of the bars there; and that such a day also 
existed in Washington, which explained why his daughter 
was not allowed to go downtown on the street car on Thurs­
day anymore. "It is not safe," Truman declared, "they push 
people off the street cars." ^ Apparently, Milgram had 
touched a sensitive nerve, giving Truman an opportunity to 
express his abhorrence of the theory and practice of social 
equality. At the time this interview was published, Truman 
denied having made these remarks.57 
As the campaign progressed, it became evident that Tru­
man's presence on the Democratic ticket was inspiring little 
or no confidence among black Americans, who still were 
lamenting the loss of Henry Wallace. A survey of Negro 
editorial opinion indicated that a number of Negro newspa­
pers, including the Pittsburgh Courier and the Kansas City 
Call, had endorsed the Republican Dewey-Bricker ticket 
because, among other reasons, they resented the selection of 
Truman as Roosevelt's running mate and, further, feared 
the prospect that Roosevelt, if elected, would not serve out a 
fourth term.58 The Courier even went so far as to present 
sworn affidavits that Truman had been a member of the Ku 
Klux Klan for a brief period in 1922.59 This report must 
have pleased the Republican party, since it was busily pro­
moting a whispering campaign in Harlem to the effect that 
"Roosevelt is old and may die and you will then have a KKK 
man in the White House." 60 The Republicans may have been 
exploiting a canard, but unless Truman handled the matter 
56. Ibid., Oct. 21, 1944, pp. 1, 4.

57. Ibid., Oct. 28,1944, p. 1.

58. Ibid., Nov. 4, 1944, pp. 1, 5.

59. Ibid., pp. 5-6.

60. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Nov. 11, 1944, p. 1.
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forthrightly, the Democratic party could have been seri­
ously embarrassed on the eve of the election. 
The issue exploded with dramatic suddenness in the late 
stages of the 1944 campaign, at a time when Truman was in 
Los Angeles campaigning for the party's ticket. While 
there, he endorsed Hal Styles, a local Democratic candidate 
for Congress, who, though he had liberal credentials, had 
been a one-time member of the Klan.61 Though Truman was 
apparently aware of Styles's past, he still offered him his 
support and claimed that he was "one of ours." 62 Immedi­
ately after this pronouncement from the senator, David 0. 
Selznick, a powerful West Coast movie mogul, wired Walter 
White on October 17, demanding to know how he could still 
support the national Democratic ticket in light of Truman's 
endorsement.63 Obviously troubled by the Selznick telegram, 
White asked Truman on October 19 to explain his support 
for Styles and, further, to respond to the remarks of Gover­
nor Chauncey Sparks of Alabama which had been quoted in 
the Birmingham News of July 23. The Sparks quote, which 
White included in his telegram, read as follows: "I think the 
South has won a substantial victory in securing the defeat 
of Vice President Wallace. I find him (Senator Truman) 
safe on states rights and the right of the state to control 
qualifications of its electors. In the matter of race relations 
Senator Truman told me he is the son of an unreconstructed 
rebel mother. I think the South has won a victory." M 
On October 30 Truman dispatched a telegram to White in 
61. Telegram to Walter White from David 0. Selznick, October 17, 
1944, Truman Folder (1944), Box 359, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
62. Ibid. 
63. Ibid. 
64. Telegram to Harry Truman from Walter White, October 19, 
1944, Truman Polder (1944), Box 359, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
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which he defended his voting record on civil rights, argued 
that he had been misquoted, and stated that Styles himself 
had had the support of many liberals in Southern California. 
About the issue of the Klan, Truman suggested that the 
matter had been raised by Republicans merely for the pur­
pose of partisan politics, and thus the charges were without 
foundation. He assured White that "the Klan fought me and 
I fought the Klan. The Klan is repugnant to every policy 
and every principle I have advocated and struggled for all 
my life." 65 Interestingly, Truman ignored White's request 
for a comment on the remarks of Governor Sparks of Ala­
bama. 
During the last weekend of the campaign, Truman pub­
licly confronted his critics. Speaking at a Liberal party rally 
in New York on October 31, 1944, where he was joined by 
Vice-President Wallace, Truman affirmed that "in support­
ing the President in these broad programs for human lib­
erty and tolerance, no man in the United States Senate has a 
more consistent voting record than myself." That record, he 
noted, included a vote for cloture in order to terminate a 
southern filibuster against a proposed anti-lynching law, 
support for federal legislation to outlaw the poll tax, and an 
endorsement for FEPC appropriations.66 
On election day Roosevelt won a fourth term with the 
help he received from Negro voters. Yet that support was 
not so generously given as in the past; some blacks, includ­
ing such prominent spokesmen and leaders as W. E. B. 
DuBois, Channing Tobias, William Hastie, and Charles 
Johnson, had been upset by Roosevelt's failure to support 
Wallace for renomination and by his reluctance to press for 
65. Telegram to Walter White from Harry Truman, October 30, 
1944, Truman Folder (1944), Box 359, NAACP Papers, L.C.; also see 
New York Times, Oct. 27, 1944. 
66. Senatorial Speech File, Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman 
Library (hereafter cited as HSTL). 
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more than a token civil rights plank in the 1944 Democratic 
party platform.67 However strong their reservations might 
have been, they still voted for Roosevelt, as did many 
hundreds of thousands of other Negroes. Here, perhaps, 
was the margin of difference between success and failure. It 
has been estimated that if there had been a shift of 303,414 
votes in fifteen non-southern states, Governor Thomas E. 
Dewey would have captured the 175 electoral votes he 
needed to win the presidency; in eight of those fifteen 
states, it was the Negro vote which placed them in the 
victory column of the Democratic party.68 
Upon the death of Franklin Roosevelt on April 12, 1945, 
Harry S. Truman became president, thereby inheriting 
many of Roosevelt's unresolved domestic problems, not the 
least of which was civil rights. At his first presidential press 
conference on April 17, 1945, he was queried about his civil 
rights position by a representative of the Negro Newspaper 
Publishers Association. 
Q: Mr. President, probably as much as any group, the 
passing of President Roosevelt is very keenly felt by the 
Negroes in America, as they looked upon him as sort of a 
symbol of justice and equal opportunity. I wonder if you 
would comment on the things that they were so specifi­
cally interested in and felt they knew where the President 
stood: on the fair employment practice, the right to vote 
without being hampered by poll taxes, and all that ? 
A: I will give you some advice. All you need to do is 
read the Senate record of one Harry S. Truman.69 
67. Moon, Balance of Power, p. 34. 
68. Ibid., p. 35. 
69. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 19i5, 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 
10-11; for editorial opinion critical of Truman's civil rights views at 
the time of his elevation to the presidency, see the Pittsburgh Courier, 
Apr. 21, 1945, p. 6; and Norfolk Journal and Guide, Apr. 21, 1945, p. 
10. 
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And to Walter White, who pledged him his aid, Truman 
wrote, "I have received a great heritage from my lamented 
predecessor. I shall strive to attain the ideals for which he 
fought and am strengthened by the assurance of your sup­
port in that effort." 70 
A significant aspect of Truman's record, which has al­
ready been indicated, was his endorsement of PEPC, one of 
the most controversial of the federal wartime agencies, FEPC 
had been created by Executive Orders 8802 in 1941 and 
9346 in 1943, and was financed until 1944 out of the Presi­
dent's Emergency Fund. The president's authority to grant 
funds to specific executive agencies without congressional 
approval had been curtailed, however, with the attachment 
of the Russell Amendment of 1944 to the Independent 
Offices Appropriation Act of 1945.71 This amendment was 
designed to destroy the executive autonomy of FEPC, as well 
as other governmental agencies created by executive order, 
since it required the president to seek congressional appro­
priations for all executive expenditures. Unless the presi­
dent could wheedle funds from a recalcitrant Congress to 
support such agencies as FEPC, they soon would be faced 
with extinction. Congress, after much debate, did appropri­
ate $500,000 for the FEPC in 1944, but in 1945 the agency's 
future was seriously threatened when all of the funds Presi­
dent Roosevelt had requested for its operation were deleted 
by the House Appropriations Committee from the Wartime 
Agencies Appropriations Bill.72 Only after a series of House 
70. Harry Truman to Walter White, April 26, 1945, Truman 
Folder (3), Box 359, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
71. United States Civil Rights Commission Report 3, Employment 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 
173. 
72. Ibid., p. 122. 
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and Senate compromises—which drastically reduced the 
Roosevelt request—did the FEPC receive the token sum of 
$250,000 to continue its work for no longer than one addi­
tional year, since the bill, which became law on July 13, 
1945, stipulated "that in no case shall this fund be available 
for expenditure beyond June 30, 1946." " Clearly, then, 
Congress had sounded the death knell for the wartime FEPC 
by passing the Wartime Agencies Appropriations Bill for 
the fiscal year 1946. 
To his credit, President Truman tried to reverse the 
decision of the Appropriations Committee; but having 
failed to win his way in the House, he accepted, without 
demur, the ultimate compromise the House and Senate 
made with respect to the wartime agency.74 On the other 
hand, Truman did endorse all congressional efforts to create 
a permanent FEPC; his views on this matter were contained 
in a letter of June 5, 1945, sent to Congressman Adolph 
Sabath, chairman of the House Rules Committee and a 
friend of FEPC. The president declared: "To abandon at this 
time the fundamental principle upon which the FEP com­
mittee was established is unthinkable. . . . The principle 
and policy of fair employment practice should be estab­
lished permanently as a part of our national law." 7S On the 
same day, Truman also wrote to Senator Dennis Chavez, the 
leader of the FEPC bloc in the Senate, informing him that 
"as soon as it becomes appropriate in the Senate, let me 
73. Ibid., p. 129. 
74. Will Maslow, "FEPC—A Case History in Parliamentary Ma­
neuver," University of Chicago Law Review XIII (1946), 407-45. 
75. Harry S. Truman to Adolph Sabath, June 5, 1945, Truman 
Papers, OF 40, HSTL; on June 1, 1945, White had written Truman 
asking him to request a vote from Sabath: Walter White to Harry 
Truman, June 1, 1945, Truman Folder (3), Box 359, NAACP Papers, 
L.C. 
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know and I shall send you a similar letter." 76 Yet, in spite of 
this presidential endorsement, the House Rules Committee 
by a tie vote succeeded in blocking, on June 12, 1945, all 
attempts to obtain a floor vote on a permanent PEPC bill 
which had been introduced by Congresswoman Mary Nor­
ton, a Democrat from New Jersey. 
Although the House had pigeonholed a permanent PEPC 
bill, the president stood to gain additional political support 
from liberals who had been favorably impressed with his 
June 5 letter to Congressman Sabath; and according to a 
White House mail analysis, the several thousand messages 
he received in reference to the letter indicated that it "had 
established him as a liberal in the eyes of liberals. Prior to 
the letter, letter writers asked him to follow in President 
Roosevelt's footsteps. Afterward, they praised him for his 
independent and courageous stand." " 
Whether Truman deserved these plaudits of liberals is 
another question. Louis Ruchames, a historian of FEPC, sug­
gests otherwise: 
In passing, it may be mentioned that although the Presi­
dent's letter was acclaimed as an important contribution 
to the struggle for an FEPC appropriation and for the 
creation of a permanent FEPC, the hosannahs which 
greeted it were not entirely merited. Although it did urge 
passage of permanent FEPC legislation, it made no re­
quest for an appropriation for the existing FEPC which 
was then fighting for its life. One wonders whether it was 
the President's intention to speak out on behalf of a bill 
which had little chance of passing and at the same time 
do nothing to secure the funds for the existing FEPC, 
which would have been materially aided by his efforts. 
76. Harry S. Truman to Dennis Chavez, June 5, 1945, Truman 
Papers, OF 40, HSTL. 
77. Analysis of Presidential Mail on FEPC, Truman Papers, OF 
40, HSTL. 
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Was it perhaps an attempt to curry favor with liberal 
groups in and out of Congress while at the same time not 
antagonizing those who opposed FEPC ?7S 
This hypothesis points up Truman's dilemma vis-a-vis 
FEPC in the last half of 1945. Perhaps Truman could have 
mustered the requisite votes to increase the appropriation 
for the wartime agency, but if he had resolutely battled the 
foes of FEPC, in all probability many moderates in Con­
gress whose support he needed on other issues would have 
deserted him. Yet, by ignoring the issue of a perma­
nent PEPC bill, his uneasy friendship with the liberal bloc 
in Congress would have been threatened. Hoping to avoid 
conflict and preferring the politics of stalemate, Truman 
chose to dodge all firm commitments that might have 
taken him off dead center. For some time to come, he would 
do nothing to upset the precarious political equilibrium 
which had helped to elevate him to the White House. 
As Congress continued to debate the FEPC question, Presi­
dent Truman submitted on September 6, 1945, a twenty-one 
point message to Congress to provide it with guidelines for 
action on pressing social and economic matters, thereby 
facilitating America's transition from a wartime to a con­
sumer-based peacetime economy. Included in the various 
proposals was another suggestion that Congress create a 
permanent FEPC : 
In the reconversion period and thereafter, we should 
make every effort to continue this American ideal. It is 
one of the fundamentals of our political philosophy, and 
it should be an integral part of our economy. 
The FEPC is continuing during the transition period. I 
have already requested that legislation be enacted placing 
78. Ruchames, Race, Jobs, and Politics, p. 126. 
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the FEPC on a permanent basis. I repeat that recom­
mendation.79 
Truman's endorsement of FEPC legislation provoked some 
sharp comments from the Pittsburgh Courier: "President 
Truman asserts that he favors such legislation but there is 
as yet no evidence that he has tried to use any of his great 
power to bring pressure on the recalcitrant Southern Sena­
tors and Representatives who persist in using every device 
at their command to sabotage the measure." 80 Also in the 
same spirit, A. Philip Randolph wrote to Matthew Connelly, 
the president's appointment secretary: "Unless the Presi­
dent takes a hand in mobilizing the administrative forces in 
the House and the Senate behind these bills, the opposition, 
as in the past through filibuster and power politics and 
other devious tactics, will make a farce out of this whole 
thing." 81 Speaking for leading advocates of an FEPC, includ­
ing Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam, William Green, president of 
the American Federation of Labor (AFL), and Rabbi Ste­
phen J. Wise, Randolph sought in September and October, 
1945, to arrange an appointment with the president to dis­
cuss with him the need for prompt White House action on 
behalf of the stalled FEPC legislation. Randolph met with no 
success, for Truman refused to meet with him about such an 
explosive matter.82 
79. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1945, p. 
282. 
80. Pittsburgh Courier, Sept. 22, 1945, p. 6; also see Norfolk 
Journal and Guide, Oct. 6, 1945, p. 1. 
81. A. Philip Randolph to Matthew J. Connelly, October 10, 1945, 
Truman Papers, OF 40, HSTL. Randolph was international president 
of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters and cochairman of the 
National Committee for a Permanent FEPC. 
82. Truman Papers, OF 40, HSTL. Walter White, too, was rebuffed 
in his efforts to speak privately with Truman, presumably about the 
same problem; see Charles G. Ross to Walter White, August 14, 1945, 
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The president was reluctant to embrace a political cause 
that might have damaged him, unless the potential political 
return for such a move promised to be as great, if not 
greater, than the risks involved. But when it was politically 
expedient to act, he did so; e.g., reportedly at the request of 
Negro Congressman William Dawson, he appointed in early 
October, 1945, Irvin C. Mollison, a Chicago lawyer, to a 
judgeship on the United States Customs Court, thereby 
making him the first Negro appointed to a federal judgeship 
within the United States.83 Generally, however, caution and 
prudence characterized the president's behavior on ques­
tions involving race relations in 1945. More specifically, he 
wanted to remain on good terms with Congress, and not 
move beyond the limits of what was politically acceptable or 
permissible as defined by his centrist relationship with both 
factions of the party and the party organization he now 
headed. 
Truman's handling of the Capital Transit Company 
strike illustrates this last point. Members of the Amalgam­
ated Association of Street, Electric, Railway, and Motor 
Coach Employees of America, Division 689, in November 
1945, had called a strike against the Capital Transit Com­
pany of Washington, D.C. According to the president, the 
strike was not authorized since it violated a written con­
tract between the union and the employer that was not due 
to expire until June 30, 1946.84 Hence, on November 21, 
1945, Truman, operating under still existing wartime au­
thority, seized the company to restore transportation facili­
ties for commuters in the District of Columbia. On Novem­
ber 23, 1945, the FEPC, under the chairmanship of Malcolm 
Ross, prepared to issue a directive authorizing the company 
"to cease and desist from practices and policies which have 
83. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Oct. 6, 1945, pp. 1, 8. 
84. Truman Papers, OF 272, HSTL. 
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resulted in the denial of employment to Negroes, because of 
race, as conductors, motormen, bus operators, and traffic 
checkers." S5 On the same day the president received a tele­
gram from Walter White, asking him to put into immediate 
practice the "stated policy of hiring qualified Negroes." 86 
Ignoring White's request, Truman, on November 24, 1945, 
ordered the committee not to issue its directive.87 
This action so angered Charles Houston, a Negro member 
of FEPC, that he resigned from the committee on December 
3, 1945. In his letter of resignation to the president, Hous­
ton asserted that as long as the company was under govern­
mental control "the Federal Manager of the Capital Transit 
system is not only empowered to, but must enforce the 
national policy of non-discrimination in employment."88 
Furthermore, he suggested that there was more at stake in 
this case than the question of fair employment of Negroes 
by the Capital Transit Company: "The failure of the Gov­
ernment to enforce democratic practices and to protect mi­
norities in its own capital makes its expressed concern for 
national minorities abroad somewhat specious, and its in­
terference in the domestic affairs of other countries very 
premature." S9 On December 7, 1945, the president in ac­
cepting Houston's resignation wrote: 
The law requires that when the Government seizes a 
property under such [wartime] circumstances it shall be 
operated under the terms and conditions of employment 
85. Ibid. 
86. Telegram to Harry Truman from Walter White, November 23, 
1945, Truman Papers, OF 272, HSTL. 
87. Truman Papers, OF 40, HSTL; also see Pittsburgh Courier, 
Dec. 8, 1945, pp. 1, 8. 
88. Truman Papers, OF 40, HSTL. 
89. Ibid. 
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which were in effect at the time possession of such plant, 
mine, or facility was so taken. 
The property was not seized for the purpose of enforc­
ing the aims of the FEPC, laudable as these aims are, but 
to guarantee transportation for the citizens of Washing­
ton and vicinity. 
As anxious as I am for Congress to pass legislation for 
a permanent FEPC, I cannot contravene an Act of Con­
gress in order to carry out the present Committee's 
As the Capital Transit issue began to fade away, Presi­
dent Truman issued on December 20,1945, Executive Order 
9664 reducing the operating authority of the FEPC. Execu­
tive Order 9664, which had been drafted by the PEPC agency 
itself, stated: 
As part of its duties the Committee shall investigate, 
make findings and recommendations, and report to the 
President, with respect to discrimination in industries 
engaged in work contributing to the production of mili­
tary supplies or to the effective transition to a peacetime 
91 economy.
Now functioning under a new directive, the FEPC was no 
longer empowered to release "cease and desist" proclama­
tions ; the Truman order had effectively reduced it to a mere 
fact-finding agency. It is safe to assume that Truman had to 
sacrifice FEPC in order to secure the cooperation of the 
South for at least part of his domestic program. Clearly, 
Truman was finding it difficult to reconcile the liberal prin­
ciples espoused and votes taken in the years when he was 
still a senator from Missouri with the more complex politi­
cal realities that confronted him as president. 
90. Ibid. 
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Among those political realities Truman could not ignore 
was the omnipresent conservative Democratic-Republican 
coalition which had effectively throttled most of Truman's 
legislative program. That program had been drafted largely 
to resolve problems created by the demobilization and recon­
version process. By the winter of 1946, however, the coun­
try was plagued by such intense labor-management conflict 
that Truman had no choice but to seek congressional assist­
ance to cope with the emergency.92 But Congress rejected 
the president's recommendations, forcing him to go to the 
people, via radio, on January 3, 1946, to explain to them 
why these "grave problems" were not being adequately han­
dled. One of the problems Truman singled out for discussion 
was FEPC. He suggested in his talk that "a small handful of 
Congressmen in the Rules Committee of the House" had 
prevented the Norton FEPC bill from reaching a vote by the 
Congress.93 
In his State of the Union message of January 21, 1946, 
Truman once more referred to the need for a permanent 
FEPC.94 And he continued to endorse the bill whenever it was 
politic to do so. For example, writing to A. Philip Randolph 
on February 6, 1946, Truman reaffirmed his comitment to 
the principle of a permanent FEPC. "I want you to know," 
wrote the president, "that I regard FEPC legislation as an 
integral part of my re-conversion program and shall con­
tribute my efforts to give the Congress a chance to vote on 
it." 95 On February 28, 1946, a Truman spokesman, Louis 
92. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 19i6 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 
1-8. 
93. Ibid., p. 3. 
94. New York Times, Jan. 22, 1946, p. 17. 
95. Harry Truman to A. Philip Randolph, February 6, 1946, OP 
40, HSTL; also see Norfolk Journal and Guide, Feb. 23, 1946, pp. 1-2. 
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Schwellenbach, secretary of labor, appeared before a huge 
FEPC rally at Madison Square Garden to endorse the Norton 
bill, which was then tied up in a House committee.96 
In spite of his many public commitments to FEPC, the 
president rarely exerted pressure on Congress to act on this 
legislation. Throughout January and February, 1946, only 
once did Truman indirectly criticize the Senate filibuster 
which made it impossible to obtain a floor vote on a perma­
nent PEPC bill that had successfully cleared committee.97 
And, more important, he failed to rally support for the 
projected cloture vote designed to terminate the debate on 
this issue, a move which would have surely angered the 
South.98 Thus, aware of the realities of power on Capitol 
Hill, Truman simply refused to climb into the political 
arena on behalf of such a potentially divisive cause. In other 
words, Truman preferred to stand on the sidelines where he 
could play the role of benevolent spectator rather than run 
the risk of doing battle for what he felt was a losing effort. 
While avoiding a bruising fight, he could still make certain 
ritualistic gestures on behalf of a good cause. A speech here 
and a letter there would assure him of some liberal support 
and gratitude for his efforts. In this manner he could keep 
his lines of communication open with all factions while 
retaining a free hand to do exactly as he pleased in any 
given situation. 
As the Senate prepared to vote on cloture, Roy Wilkins, 
assistant secretary of the NAACP, wrote Robert Hannegan, 
the chairman of the Democratic National Committee, that 
"the Democratic party has promised the passage of an FEPC 
bill and if the party permits a minority of its members in 
96. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Mar. 9, 1946, pp. 1-2. 
97. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 19%6, p. 94. 
98. See I. F. Stone, "Where There Is No Vision,'' Nation CLXII 
(1946), 111-19. 
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the Senate to prevent this bill from even being considered 
by the Senate, it is certain that the failure will be noted in 
the 1946 and 1948 elections." " On February 9, 1946, the 
advocates of cloture, needing support from at least two-
thirds of all those members of the Senate present and vot­
ing, lost their battle. Forty-eight senators, including 22 
Democrats, 25 Republicans, and 1 Progressive (Robert M. 
La Follette, Jr., of Wisconsin), voted for cloture; 36 sena­
tors, including 28 Democrats and 8 Republicans, rejected 
it.100 
If Truman appeared to be almost as politically cautious 
as Roosevelt, for somewhat similar reasons, his liberal rhet­
oric served to distinguish him from his immediate prede­
cessor. Truman never hesitated to pronounce his steadfast 
loyalty to the ideas of justice and equality. For instance, 
speaking spontaneously to a group of Negro newspaper 
editors at the White House on March 1, 1946, the president 
remarked: 
There are things that are necessary today of course—it is 
a pity that they have to be done—but there are certain 
things that are necessary to be done to give us the Bill of 
Rights as it is written in the Constitution of the United 
States. We want to see equal opportunity for everybody, 
regardless of race, creed or color.10x 
Nevertheless, because of political pressure or personal 
whim, Truman sometimes reaffirmed an equivocal stand 
which he had taken as a Senator, as is indicated by his 
99. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Feb. 16,1946, p. 2. 
100. Congressional Record, 79th Cong., Vol. XCII, part 1, p. 1219; 
also see Maslow, "FEPC—A Case History in Parliamentary Maneu­
ver," pp. 407-45. 
101. Transcript of Press Conference, March 1, 1946, Records of the 
White House Official Reporter, Truman Papers, HSTL. 
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remarks about poll tax legislation. Discussing the matter on 
April 6,1946, in Chicago, he suggested that poll tax legisla­
tion was a question of state responsibility.102 However, at a 
White House press conference on April 11, 1946, Truman, 
attempting to blunt possible public criticism of his April 6 
comment, modified his earlier remark by suggesting that 
there was a legitimate need for both state and federal action 
on the problem of the poll tax and FEPC—as far as he was 
concerned, state and federal action complemented each 
other.103 The sudden change from the April 6 position to the 
one of April 11 indicates that Truman wanted to avoid—if 
possible—alienating liberal public opinion. 
But because a de facto political coalition—essentially con­
servative in character—controlled Congress, the Truman 
administration had no hope or intention of rescuing FEPC 
from oblivion. This organization, one of the uniquely suc­
cessful creations of the wartime period, finally had to be 
dissolved. On May 18, 1946, President Truman informed 
Malcolm Ross, the committee's chairman, that funds were 
no longer available to sustain further activity.104 Conse­
quently, on June 28, 1946, Ross and his fellow committee 
members submitted their resignations to the president. Ac­
companying this letter was a report which summarized and 
analyzed the committee's activity subsequent to the period 
of its first published statement of 1943.105 
The committee's letter, published as the preface to its 
survey, Final Report, declared that "in the majority of 
102. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 19i6, p. 
185. 
103. Ibid., pp. 192-93. 
104. Truman Papers, OF 40, HSTL. 
105. United States Fair Employment Practice Committee, Final 
Report (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 
1946). 
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cases discriminatory practices by employers and unions can 
be reduced or eliminated by simple negotiation when the 
work of the negotiator is backed up by firm and explicit 
national policy." "However," the letter continued, "execu­
tive authority is not enough to insure compliance in the face 
of stubborn opposition. Only legislative authority will in­
sure compliance in the small number of cases in which 
employers or unions or both refuse after negotiation to 
abide by the national policy of nondiscrimination." The 
committee's findings further indicated that in the period 
following V-J Day the wartime gains of Negro, Mexi­
can-American, and Jewish workers "are being dissipated 
through an unchecked revival of discriminatory practices." 
In the committee's opinion only federal legislation could pre­
vent a complete collapse of those humane employment stand­
ards that had been established because of the emergency.106 
The chief executive, in accepting the committee's letter and 
report, stated: "The degree of effectiveness which FEPC was 
able to attain has shown once and for all that it is possible 
to equalize job opportunity by governmental action, and 
thus eventually to eliminate the influence of prejudice in the 
field of employment." 107 
Following the demise of FEPC, the president felt that, "in 
the absence of FEP statute, . . . steps should be taken to 
insure compliance with this policy of nondiscrimination in 
Federal service and by government contractors." 108 On July 
22, 1946, in an attempt to initiate some action on this mat­
106. Ibid., p. v-vi. 
107. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1946, p. 
334. At the time Truman penned this reply, his administration, 
specifically, the Veterans Bureau and the Department of Agriculture, 
was discriminating against Negroes; see Pittsburgh Courier, May 18, 
1946, p. 6. 
108. Memorandum to David K. Niles from Harry S. Truman, July 
22, 1946, Philleo Nash Files, Box 21, HSTL. 
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ter, Truman authorized David Niles, his administrative as­
sistant on minority problems, to prod the various federal 
agencies into investigating all alleged charges of discrim­
ination and to rectify all legitimate grievances.109 There is 
no record to indicate that the president's instructions were 
implemented, nor is there any evidence to suggest that 
Truman himself inquired why a report from Niles was not 
forthcoming. It can be assumed that owing to the indiffer­
ence of Mr. Niles, or to his own lack of concern, Truman 
failed to challenge discriminatory employment practices 
carried on by the government.110 
Truman did score a political triumph of sorts (that was 
related to civil rights) with his successful "purge" of Rep­
resentative Roger Slaughter of Missouri's Fifth Congres­
sional District, i.e., Kansas City and environs. As a member 
of the House Rules Committee, Slaughter had broken a tie 
vote on the Norton FEPC bill by voting with the opposition, 
thus preventing the bill from reaching a floor vote.111 Appar­
ently this act so incensed the president that on July 18, 
1946, at a White House press conference, he proclaimed his 
opposition to Slaughter's renomination in the Democratic 
primary. "If Slaughter is right, then I am wrong," said the 
irate president, who then announced that he and James 
Pendergast, the heir to Tom Pendergast's political estate, 
would support Enos A. Axtell, a political unknown, for the 
109. Philleo Nash Files, Box 21, HSTL. 
110. Presidential Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure These 
Rights (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1947), p. 57; see also letter 
from Henry A. Wallace to Louis Schwellenbach, secretary of labor, in 
the New York Times, Aug. 21, 1946, p. 48. At the annual convention of 
the NAACP, meeting in Cincinnati on June 29, 1946, a resolution was 
passed attacking the segregationist policy of the Veterans Bureau "as 
one of the most disappointing developments of the post war era" 
(1946 Resolutions File, Box 335, NAACP Papers, L.C.). 
111. Crisis LIII (1946), 265. 
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Democratic nomination.112 Axtell, thanks to the public sup­
port of the president and the efforts of Pendergast, won the 
primary by 2,300 votes; of Axtell's 12,168 votes, nearly 
7,000 came from black wards.113 His victory, however, was 
sullied by evidence of voter irregularities and fraud stem­
ming from the unscrupulous activity of the Pendergast ma­
chine working in his behalf. He was defeated by his Repub­
lican opponent, A. L. Reeves, in the November general 
election.114 
In summary it can be said that throughout his first year 
in office, President Truman, according to an editorial in the 
Pittsburgh Courier, had manifested "friendship for the 
Negro people" but "had produced but little in racial 
advancement." 115 Other than to nominate Negro judge Wil­
liam Hastie as the governor of the Virgin Islands, appoint 
Irwin C. Mollison to a judgeship, and occasionally proclaim 
his support of FEPC legislation, Truman evinced no willing­
ness to fight for the principles he espoused. With the excep­
tion of the Slaughter case, which really had local rather 
than national significance, he avoided, with political skill 
and verbal dexterity, any direct confrontation with civil 
rights issues that could have split his party and further 
undermined his position as party leader. 
Meanwhile, a burgeoning social crisis was beginning to 
grip America. Responsible and politically conscious Negro 
leaders were asking in the spring and summer of 1946 that 
the president of the United States take cognizance of, and 
do something about, the rapidly deteriorating racial situa­
112. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 19i6, pp. 
351-51. 
113. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Sept. 21, 1946, p. 5. 
114. Milligan, Missouri Waltz, p. 258. 
115. Pittsburgh Courier, Apr. 20, 1946, p. 4. 
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tion, north and south, as indicated by the fresh outbreak of 
lynching and other forms of violence. 
President Truman was to answer this plea with a sur­
prising display of executive initiative that in time was des­
tined to create even more complex problems and difficult 
choices for him. Suddenly, because of the complex interac­
tion of international with domestic pressures, the White 
House was to be touched by one of the great currents of the 
twentieth century: an incipient domestic counterpart of 
"the revolution of rising expectations." 

Chapter 2 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS COMMITTEE 
DELIVERS ITS REPORT 
During World War II the civil rights movement slowly 
gathered the strength and momentum needed to challenge a 
Jim Crow society. Such breakthroughs as the establishment 
of FEPC had given Negroes reason to hope that perhaps life 
for them in America might take a turn for the better. With 
that hope acting as a goad, black Americans had become 
increasingly militant and outspoken in their demands for 
racial justice and equality of treatment and opportunity in 
and out of the armed forces.1 
1. H. C. Brearley, "The Negro's New Belligerancy," Phylon V 
(1944), 339-45; for an excellent analysis of the problem of Negro mo­
rale and developing militancy in the World War II period, see Richard 
Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces, pp. 105-32. 
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Of some importance in furthering this development was 
the role of Negro newspapers; by directing a barrage of 
criticism against forces in American society bent on pre­
serving the status quo in race relations, they stimulated and 
encouraged the black community to adopt a more aggressive 
attitude.2 Proclaiming a need for a "Double Victory"—that 
is, a victory against Nazism and on the home front as 
well—these newspapers, led by the Pittsburgh Courier, 
turned the "Four Freedoms" slogan of Franklin Roosevelt 
into an ideological weapon to be used against the supporters 
of domestic racism.3 Declared the Chicago Defender: "We 
pledge ourselves to fight segregation, discrimination and all 
forms of racial bigotry and Hitlerism, which impede our 
war effort and give aid and comfort to the enemy." 4 "War 
on two fronts" had become the new call to arms, the tocsin 
which sounded in black America between 1941 and 1945. 
A counterattack soon developed. White critics of Negro 
militancy challenged the "Double Victory" proposition, with 
some arguing that the war had to be won first before 
changes could be effected, others committing themselves to 
holding the line at all costs. Given this polarization of feel­
ing between the races, it is not surprising that racial ten­
sion and conflict quickly spread throughout American so­
ciety, culminating in 1943 in the ugly race riots in Detroit.5 
In the South conflict fed on rumors about the existence of 
armed bands of young blacks and of "Eleanor Clubs" al­
2. Lester M. Jones, "The Editorial Policy of the Negro Newspapers 
of 1917-1918 As Compared with That of 1941-1942," Journal of 
Negro History XXIX (1944), 24-31. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Chicago Defender, Sept. 26, 1942. 
5. Langston Hughes, Fight for Freedom (New York: W. W. Nor­
ton, 1962), pp. 95-98. 
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legedly founded by Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt for the purpose 
of removing Negro domestics from white kitchens.6 
With the racial cauldron bubbling, Virginius Dabney, 
editor of the Richmond Times Dispatch, and known for his 
racial moderation, wrote in January, 1943: 
A small group of Negro agitators and another small 
group of white rabble rousers are pushing this country 
closer and closer to an interracial explosion which may 
make the race riots of the first World War and its after­
math seem mild by comparison. Unless saner councils 
prevail, we may have the worst internal clashes since 
Reconstruction, with hundreds if not thousands, killed 
and amicable race relations set back for decades. 
Among the "Negro extremists" singled out by Dabney were 
A. Philip Randolph and the leadership of the NAACP.7 
It was in this context of increased racial tension that in 
1943 Jonathan Daniels, a White House administrative as­
sistant, and Howard Odum, a noted sociologist from the 
University of North Carolina, approached President Roose­
velt and urged him "to create a commission of race relation 
experts to advise him on what steps the government should 
take to improve matters." 8 The president rejected the idea 
on the grounds that the war had to be won before there 
could be planning in the future; later, after the Detroit 
riots, he appointed Daniels to gather information from all 
government departments about what they were doing to 
6. Howard Odum, Race and Rumors of Race (Chapel Hill: Univer­
sity of North Carolina Press, 1943), pp. 73-90. 
7. Virginius Dabney, "Nearer and Nearer the Precipice," Atlantic 
Monthly CLXXI (1943), 94-100. 
8. Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces, pp. 129-30. 
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improve race relations.9 There, for the time being, matters 
stood. 
Racial violence, often producing bloodshed and death, 
extended into the immediate postwar period. An already 
tense situation had been further exacerbated by the return 
of black veterans who were demanding the right to register 
and vote in Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia.10 Their ef­
forts were repeatedly frustrated and their rights denied by 
a revived Ku Klux Klan, and more respectable proponents of 
white supremacy, determined to prevent even a token liber­
alization of southern political institutions.11 
An extreme example of what was happening to Negroes 
in the South took place in Batesburgh, South Carolina. 
There, on February 13, 1946, Issac Woodward, a newly 
discharged black veteran, still in military uniform, was 
removed from a bus after a verbal tiff with the driver and 
was assaulted and blinded by the chief of police of that 
town.12 News of this crime received wide publicity, which in 
turn eventually produced demands for a federal investiga­
tion. The Justice Department brought an indictment 
against the alleged perpetrator of this deed, but he was 
9. Ibid., pp. 130-31. 
10. The impetus for this drive for greater enfranchisement had 
been provided by the landmark decision of the Supreme Court in 
Smith v. Allwright, 1944. The Court ruled that the white primary—a 
key institutional prop of the Jim Crow political system—no longer 
could be constitutionally justified, thereby removing one of the major 
legal obstacles preventing Negroes from voting in primary elections; 
for a discussion of the political implications of this case, see V. 0. 
Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Random 
House, Carvelle Edition, 1962), pp. 624-28. 
11. McWilliams, Brothers under the Skin, pp. 29-35. 
12. Florence Murry, ed., The Negro Handbook, 1949 (New York: 
Macmillan, 1949), p. 102. 
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acquitted in federal court in Columbia, South Carolina, on 
grounds of self-defense.13 
Another incident occurred in Columbia, Tennessee, on 
February 24 and 25, 1946. In that two-day period, the 
Negro population of the town was terrorized by the Ku 
Klux Klan, the local police, and National Guardsmen." 
Twenty-eight Negroes were arrested on the charge of at­
tempted murder; two others were shot and killed while they 
were in jail.16 So deplorable was the situation that the 
NAACP, which had actively intervened in the case, sought an 
appointment with President Truman in order to discuss 
developments in Columbia with him. He failed to comply 
with this request, but Attorney General Tom Clark agreed 
to investigate the case.16 A grand jury was later impaneled, 
but no indictment was presented against those white 
officials who had patently violated the civil rights of these 
black citizens. After months of tortuous litigation, sup­
ported by the NAACP in the person of the Negro attorney 
Thurgood Marshall, the twenty-eight people were freed of 
the charges brought against them.17 Meanwhile, a national 
emergency committee was created to protest the Columbia 
incident. Headed by Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt and Dr. Chan­
ning Tobias, it would in time evolve into the National 
Emergency Committee against Mob Violence, a broadly 
based and influential liberal pressure group destined to play 
13. Ibid., p. 103; also see the Issac Woodward File, Box 62, 
NAACP Papers, L.C. 
14. Hughes, Fight For Freedom, pp. 102-6. 
15. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Mar. 16, 1946, p. 1. 
16. Hughes, Fight For Freedom, pp. 102-6. Also see telegram to 
David Niles from Walter White, March 28, 1946, Department of 
Justice Polder, Box 342, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
17. Boxes 333, 342, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
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an important, though short-lived, role in the civil rights 
drama of 1946.18 
While violence in the South continued, the efforts of Ne­
groes to obtain their political rights received the warm 
support of President Truman. He made this quite explicit in 
a message sent to the annual convention of the NAACP on 
June 26, 1946: "The ballot is both a right and a privilege. 
The right to use it must be protected and its use by everyone 
encouraged. Lastly, every veteran and every citizen, what­
ever his origins, must be protected from all forms of organ­
ized terrorism." 19 How to provide that protection and in 
what form would soon become a matter of highest govern­
mental concern. 
The nightriders of the South were to bring the issue of 
violence to the doors of the White House more quickly than 
the President may have wanted. On July 25, 1946, two 
Negro couples in the company of a white farmer (who was 
transporting them to work on his farm) were shot to death 
by an armed mob near Monroe, Georgia.20 Evidently one of 
the Negroes, Roger Malcom, had earlier stabbed his white 
farm employer because the latter had made advances to 
Malcom's wife.21 It was after Malcom had been released 
from jail on bond that the murders took place. Harold 
Hinton, a New York Times reporter, discovered that the Ku 
Klux Klan, fearing that returning Negro veterans "were 
getting out of their place," committed the murders because 
"one of the men had come back from the war a bad 
18. See Minutes of Executive Committee against Mob Violence, 
August 21, 1946, Box 332, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
19. New York Times, June 27, 1946, p. 19. 
20. To Secure These Rights, p. 22. Also see Box 236, NAACP 
Papers, L.C. 
21. New York Times, Aug. 4, 1946, p. 7E. 
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Negro." 22 The presumed killers were later tried and acquit­
ted of the charge.23 
This act of vigilante violence, when coupled with a num­
ber of earlier incidents, aroused the American liberal con­
science. Allied Negro and white liberal organizations be­
sieged President Truman with demands that he authorize 
the Justice Department to arrest and indict the individuals 
responsible for the Monroe murders.24 In addition, he was 
asked by the president of the Negro Newspaper Publishers 
Association to seek congressional action on anti-lynching 
legislation so as "to restore and preserve law and order in 
America." 25 On July 30, 1946, fifty women from the NAACP 
picketed the White House while carrying banners which 
read: "Speak! Speak! Mr. President!" and "Where is 
Democracy?" 26 
Responding to the pressure created by the news of the 
Monroe murders, President Truman released on July 30, 
1946, a statement through the office of Attorney General 
Tom Clark, informing the country that he was horrified by 
the Monroe murders and that he had instructed the Justice 
Department to investigate "this or any other crime of op­
pression, and to ascertain if any Federal statute can be 
applied to the apprehension and prosecution of the 
criminals." 27 The president added emphasis to his July 30 
statement when he remarked at his press conference of 
22. Ibid., Sept. 1, 1946, p. 4E. 
23. The Negro Handbook, 1949, p. 94. For a listing of fourteen 
major acts of violence directed at Negroes in 1946, see Pittsburgh 
Courier, Aug. 17, 1946, p. 1. 
24. New York Times, July 31, 1946, p. 28; by November, 19"46, 
30,000 pieces of mail had been received by the Justice Department on 
this case (New York Times, Nov. 14, 1946, p. 33). 
25. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Aug. 3, 1946, p. 1. 
26. New York Times, July 31, 1946, p. 48. 
27. Ibid. 
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August 1, 1946, that as a senator he had always voted for 
proposed anti-lynching legislation;2S and when questioned 
once more about the Monroe case at his August 9 press 
conference, Truman indicated that the Justice Department 
investigation was moving ahead "with all possible en­
ergy." 29 
Despite the administration's willingness to prosecute the 
Monroe murderers, the Justice Department actually lacked 
the jurisdiction to deal with such crimes. Title 18 of the 
federal criminal code contained only three sections, 51, 52, 
and 441, making it possible for the Justice Department to 
function as a defender and protector of individual civil 
rights.30 Section 51 secured against state interference all 
civil rights created by federal statute, e.g., social security 
and labor's right to organize for collective bargaining.31 It 
did not provide the federal government with the proper 
statutory authority to protect the individual or members of 
a racial minority from mob activity or violence. As Attor­
ney General Tom Clark himself noted: "While such attacks 
may amount to a deprivation of freedom of speech or other 
rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, these rights are 
rights protected only against official action, not private 
action." S2 
Section 52 was also of limited utility, having application 
only in those cases where it could be shown that federal or 
state officials willfully misused their power of office to de­
28. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 19i6, p. 
368. 
29. Ibid., p. 409. 
30. To Secure These Rights, pp. 116-17. 
31. Ibid., p. 118. 
32. From an address by Attorney General Tom C. Clark delivered 
to the Chicago Bar Association on June 21, 1946: Philleo Nash Files, 
Box 21, HSTL. 
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prive individuals of rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights 
and the Fourteenth Amendment.33 To prove that a federal 
or state official had deliberately compromised the rights of 
private citizens was an immensely difficult task, complicated 
even more by a 1945 Supreme Court decision which declared 
that a person could not be prosecuted under Section 52 
unless there was evidence that he was aware of a specific 
federal right and had acted willfully to deprive his victim of 
it.34 Thus Section 52 failed to protect the individual against 
mob activity unless it could be demonstrated that an official 
in some way played a part in mob action. Section 441 was 
limited to antipeonage cases.35 Clearly, then, these statutes, 
even when broadly construed, could frustrate even the best-
intentioned federal official, leaving him without the requi­
site legal tools to protect the civil rights of both Negroes and 
whites. 
Yet the growing political strength of northern Negroes 
required that something be done to cope with the likelihood 
of further violence in the South. In mid-August, 1946, At­
torney General Clark announced that he would seek action 
on an anti-lynching bill in the next session of Congress.36 It 
was already too late for the administration to move for such 
a measure in the Seventy-ninth Congress, then preparing 
33. To Secure These Rights, p. 118; compounding the difficulties of 
the Justice Department was the Supreme Court's 1945 ruling in 
Screws v. United States, which further narrowed the legal grounds on 
which alleged violators of Section 52 could be prosecuted. In the 
Screws Case, the Court said that a person could not be prosecuted 
under Section 52 unless there was evidence that he knew of the 
existence of a specific federal right and wilfully intended to deprive 
his victim of that right (see United States Commission on Civil 
Rights, Report 5, Justice [Washington: United States Government 
Printing Office, 1961], pp. 45-51). 
34. To Secure These Rights, p. 118. 
35. Ibid. 
36. Pittsburgh Courier, Aug. 24, 1946, pp. 1, 4. 
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for its preelection adjournment. Furthermore, this Con­
gress had already refused to enact FEPC and anti-poll tax 
legislation, a fact President Truman could not ignore. In 
addition, his personal unpopularity was such that he could 
ill afford to offend the political sensibilities of the Southern 
Democrats, whose support he might need on other issues in 
the new Eightieth Congress. The postponement of anti­
lynching recommendations might give him a chance to find 
a fresh solution to the difficult political problem of placating 
aroused Negroes and their white liberal supporters, includ­
ing Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, without giving umbrage to the 
South. 
An opportunity presented itself on September 19, 1946, 
the day the president met at the White House with the 
National Emergency Committee against Mob Violence, 
whose chief spokesman was Walter White, executive secre­
tary of the NAACP.37 The committee delivered to the presi­
dent a petition requesting that he call a special session of 
Congress to consider laws against mob violence, to concen­
trate efforts to apprehend lynchers, and to "rouse the Amer­
ican people by radio, press and other media to oppose ac­
tively every form of violence." 38 In addition, members of 
the committee, including Dr. Channing Tobias of the 
Phelps-Stokes Fund and James Carey of the CIO, apprized 
the president of the details of racial violence occurring in 
the South and informed him that hate literature of all sorts 
was spreading across the country. At the conclusion of the 
37. Walter White, A Man Called White (New York: Viking Press, 
1948), pp. 331-32. Included in the group that was scheduled to meet 
with Truman was Franklin Eoosevelt, Jr. He, however, could not 
attend, a point which White brought to Truman's attention the day 
after their meeting; see telegram to White from Roosevelt, September 
19, 1946, Box 367, NAACP Papers, L.C.; and White to Truman, 
September 20, 1946, Box 367, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
38. White, A Man Called White, pp. 330-31. 
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committee's report of these recent developments, the presi­
dent exclaimed, "My God! I had no idea that it was as 
terrible as that! We have to do something. . . . Everybody 
seems to believe that the President by himself can do any­
thing he wishes on such matters as this, but the President is 
helpless unless he is backed by public opinion." 39 David K. 
Niles, a Truman administrative assistant, then suggested 
that a committee be created to investigate the problem and 
to recommend a program of corrective action. When Walter 
White remarked that Congress might not be amenable to 
such a proposal, the president replied that he would act by 
creating the committee by executive order and finance it out 
of the president's contingent fund.40 
Walter White and his associates were quite pleased with 
what appeared to be the president's spontaneous offer to 
create a civil rights committee, but, in fact, Truman and 
Niles had planned beforehand to introduce this proposal at 
a propitious moment of the September meeting.41 (It is 
possible that Henry Wallace's forced resignation from the 
cabinet on September 20, 1946—a move tentatively agreed 
upon before Truman's meeting with White's group— 
spurred the administration into making that promise; 
and it is also possible that Mrs. Roosevelt's close friendship 
with Walter White and her active support of his cause had 
something to do with the decision.) Here was an ingenious 
solution that would serve Truman's political needs by allow­
39. Ibid. 
40. Pittsburgh Courier, Oct. 5, 1946, pp. 1, 4. 
41. Author's interview with Philleo Nash on June 29, 1962. This 
proposal sounds very much like the one advanced in 1943 by Jonathan 
Daniels and Howard Odum, which President Roosevelt rejected. Niles 
had been a member of the White House during this period, and he may 
have picked up the idea of creating a civil rights committee either 
from Daniels or Philleo Nash, who had worked with Daniels on 
questions affecting race relations and the federal government. 
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ing him through symbolic action to improve his standing 
among northern liberals while, conversely, avoiding the al­
ienation of the South. After all, Truman's pledge to create 
this committee was not a commitment in advance to any 
legislative program the committee might recommend.42 
The president's unwillingness to antagonize the South 
was revealed in a discussion he had with representatives of 
the National Conference on Lynching on September 23, 
1946. When Paul Robeson, the committee's spokesman, re­
quested that the chief executive issue a formal statement 
protesting lynching, and also support a definite legislative 
and educational program to end mob violence, Truman indi­
cated the political situation made it difficult to issue a state­
ment of his views at that time. In order to obtain passage of 
an anti-lynching law, suggested the president, political tim­
ing was important.43 
Despite Truman's reluctance to initiate legislative action 
on civil rights, he continued to speak out in favor of the 
principle of equal justice under the law. In a message sent 
on September 24, 1946, to an Urban League convention at 
St. Louis, the president stated that "if the civil rights of 
even one citizen are abused, government has failed to dis­
charge one of its primary responsibilities." He further de­
clared that "we as a people must not, and I say to you we 
42. White was well aware of this possibility; hence, he wrote 
Truman on September 20, 1946, that "with respect to the proposal 
made by Mr. Niles . . . , I hope this will not be considered a substitute 
for stronger federal legislation against violence, nor handled in such 
way as to give the Congress an excuse for postponement of action. I 
mention this because it should be in our thinking" (Box 367, NAACP 
Papers, L.C.). 
43. New York Times, Sept. 24, 1946, p. 60. This committee pre­
sented to the president a letter from Albert Einstein suggesting that 
"security against lynching is one of the most urgent tasks of our 
generation"; see Fiske University Bulletin, Race Relations IV, No. 3 
(1946) 78; and Norfolk Journal and Guide, Sept. 28, 1946, pp. 1-2. 
 53 The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration
shall not, remain indifferent in the face of acts of intimida­
tion and violence in our American communities." "4 
The first sign that the administration was taking its "pri­
mary responsibilities" more seriously, following the Tru­
man message to the Urban League, appeared in a letter sent 
from Attorney General Tom Clark to the president on Octo­
ber 11, 1946. He suggested that Truman issue an executive 
order entitled "Establishing the President's Committee on 
Civil Rights" and emphasized that "the work of the pro­
posed committee would, in my opinion, be of utmost value in 
the task of preserving and implementing our civil rights." 45 
As work went on both at the White House and the Justice 
Department on the format and framework of the proposed 
committee, the country was preparing for the 1946 congres­
sional election. By this time, because of incessant labor-
management conflict, the growing shortage of meat (held 
back from market by cattlemen who were hoping to drive 
up prices), and erratic leadership from the White House, 
Truman's political standing had fallen considerably.46 The 
Republican opportunities to capture Congress had not 
seemed so bright in years. Among the groups which began 
to fall away from the Democratic party was the Negro bloc. 
Negro leaders in Philadelphia were predicting before the 
election that there would be sizable black support for Re­
publican candidates because it appeared that Mrs. Roosevelt 
no longer had a voice in Democratic party councils; because 
the White House lacked interest in FEPC; because in the 
highest councils of government there were too many "deep 
44. New York Times, Sept. 25, 1946, p. 38. 
45. Tom C. Clark to Harry S. Truman, October 11, 1946, Truman 
Papers, OF 596A, HSTL. 
46. Allen J. Matusow, Farm Policies and Politics in the Truman 
Years (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 
61-62. 
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Southerners" (men like Secretary of State James Brynes 
and George Allen, head of the Reconstruction Finance Cor­
poration) who "could not have sympathy for Negro prob­
lems and aspirations"; and, finally, because there was the 
problem of "Bilboism." 47 Senator Theodore Bilbo, a viru­
lent racist from Mississippi, had heaped so much calumny 
on Negroes from his protected perch in the Senate that they 
were going to pull the Republican lever in the hope that a 
newly constituted Republican majority in the Senate might 
strip him of his Senate seat. (With the convening of the 
Eightieth Congress, Bilbo's seat was challenged, but before 
the Senate could resolve the issue, Bilbo died.) 48 
The trend away from the Democratic party was con­
firmed on election day, as the Republicans won a congres­
sional victory of landslide proportions. Black journalists 
were pleased with the outcome because they believed the 
removal of the Southern Democrats from key committee 
chairmanships made possible the development of a more 
fluid situation in Congress—conceivably leading to the pas­
sage of some civil rights legislation.49 And Walter White, 
thinking of possible future political developments, sug­
gested that "if . . . the Republicans keep some of the prom­
ises they so eloquently and frequently make to Negroes, the 
present Negro resentment against the Bilbo-Talmadge-Ran­
kin-Byrnes domination of the Democratic Party may de­
velop into a force strong enough to decide who will occupy 
the White House and control Congress in 1948." 50 
47. New York Times, Oct. 18, 1946, p. 13; also see Norfolk Journal 
and Guide, Oct. 26, 1946, p. 1. 
48. Key, Southern Politics, pp. 244-45; also see Bilbo Pile, Box 375, 
NAACP Papers, L.C. 
49. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Nov. 23, 1946, p. 1. 
50. NAACP press release, November 15, 1946, Republican National 
Committee Folder, Box 359, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
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On December 5, 1946, subsequent to the defeat suffered 
by the Democratic party in the 1946 congressional election, 
President Truman issued Executive Order 9008, creating a 
presidential civil rights committee modeled after the Wick­
ersham Committee of the Hoover administration.51 This 
order authorized the committee "to inquire into and to de­
termine whether and in what respect current law-enforce­
ment measures and the authority and means possessed by 
federal, state, and local governments may be strengthened 
and improved to safeguard the civil rights of the people." 
The committee was also directed to include in its written 
report "recommendations with respect to the adoption or 
establishment, by legislation or otherwise, of more adequate 
and effective means and procedures for the protection of 
civil rights. . . ." 52 
The administration had established a prestigious commit­
tee, whose fifteen members had been selected to represent 
industry, labor, the legal profession, higher education, the 
South, the American Negro community, and various reli­
gious denominations. Charles Wilson, the president of Gen­
eral Electric, and formerly executive vice-chairman of the 
War Production Board, was appointed chairman; other 
members were Mrs. Sadie T. Alexander, a lawyer from 
Philadelphia and a member of the board of directors of the 
National Urban League; James Carey, secretary-treasurer 
of the Congress of Industrial Organization; John S. Dickey, 
president of Dartmouth College; Morris Ernst, a lawyer 
and author from New York City; Rabbi Roland Gittlesohn, 
Jewish chaplain of the Fifth Marine Division at Iwo Jima; 
Dr. Frank Graham, president of the University of North 
Carolina; The Reverend Francis Haas, Catholic bishop of 
51. Executive Order 9809, 11 F.R. 14153; Author's interview with 
Philleo Nash on June 29, 1962. 
52. To Secure These Rights, pp. vii-ix. 
56 The Civil Rights Committee Delivers Its Report 
Grand Rapids, Michigan, and former chairman of the Presi­
dent's Committee of Fair Employment Practice; Charles 
Luckman (who never served), president of Lever Brothers; 
Francis P. Matthews, former supreme chairman knight of 
the Knights of Columbus; Franklin Roosevelt, Jr., chair­
man of the Housing Committee of the American Veterans 
Committee; The Reverend Henry Knox Sherrill, presiding 
bishop of the Episcopal church; Boris Shiskin, an economist 
for the American Federation of Labor; Mrs. M. E. Tilly, an 
official of the Women's Society of Christian Service, Meth­
odist Church; Dr. Channing Tobias, director of the Phelps-
Stokes Fund and formerly senior secretary of the National 
Council of the Young Men's Christian Association.53 Later, 
upon the recommendation of the Justice Department, the 
committee selected Professor Robert K. Carr, a Dartmouth 
College political scientist, as its executive secretary.54 It was 
a felicitous choice because Carr had already made an inten­
sive study of the Justice Department's role and responsibil­
ity in the defense of civil rights.55 
The impressive credentials of this committee and the task 
to which it was committed so impressed the Norfolk Journal 
and Guide that it editorially remarked: 
The action of President Truman in naming a committee 
on civil rights is salutary and potentially of great value to 
the welfare of millions of Americans. . . . The commit­
tee may be instrumental in bringing about some construc­
53. Negro Handbook, 1949 (New York: Macmillan, 1949), pp. 
214-15. Four members of this Committee—Mrs. M. E. Tilly, Franklin 
Roosevelt, Jr., Channing Tobias, and Frank Graham—had been recom­
mended by White to David Niles; see White to Niles, September 26, 
1946, Niles Folder, Box 367, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
54. Author's interview with Philleo Nash on June 29,1962. 
55. Robert K. Carr, Federal Protection of Civil Rights: Quest for 
a Sword (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1947), p. 2. 
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tive changes in the laws and thereby providing greater 
protection for millions now denied full civil rights. . . . 
Its very creation by the executive head of the nation's gov­
ernment is alone a constructive step.56 
Political considerations, already mentioned, compelled 
the president to issue his order; but there were other rea­
sons which entered into his decision. As he wrote some 
years later: 
I took this action because of the repeated anti-minority 
incidents immediately after the war in which homes were 
invaded, property was destroyed, and a number of inno­
cent lives were taken. I wanted to get the facts behind 
these incidents of disregard for individual and group 
rights which were reported in the news with alarmingly 
regularity, and to see that the law was strengthened, if 
necessary, so as to offer adequate protection and fair 
treatment to all our citizens.67 
He undoubtedly wanted to see "fair treatment" extended to 
all citizens. It is not likely, however, that he wished to 
upset his working relations with the South in December, 
1946, in order to support such an objective. Yet by estab­
lishing a civil rights committee, Truman inadvertently 
built up political pressure that could spell trouble for him 
in the future. 
President Truman presented his State of the Union ad­
dress to the Eightieth Congress on January 6, 1947, and 
included in his remarks were several references to the racial 
conflict besetting the country in 1946. After pointing out 
that citizens had been deprived of their constitutional 
rights, specifically, their right to vote and to engage in 
56. Dec. 14, 1946, p. 6. 
57. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, 2 vols. (Garden City, N.Y.: Dou­
bleday, 1956), II, 180. 
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lawful callings, Truman declared that "the will to fight 
these crimes should be in the heart of everyone of us." He 
felt the Justice Department was doing its best to protect 
civil rights "to the full extent of the powers conferred upon 
it," but the lack of legal weapons limited its participation. 
Perhaps existing laws could be amended, Truman specu­
lated, to extend "the limit of federal power to protect the 
civil rights of the American people." He then announced 
that the President's Committee on Civil Rights had been 
created "to study and report on the problem of federally 
secured civil rights, with a view to making recommenda­
tions to Congress." 58 
The president's remarks on civil rights made little im­
pression on Congress; the South had no reason to be 
alarmed as long as he did not offer a concrete legislative 
program.59 Two days later, however, Truman sent his eco­
nomic message to Congress, containing a specific proposal 
calling for the enactment of FEPC legislation: 
We must end discrimination in employment or wages 
against certain classes of workers regardless of their 
individual abilities. Discrimination against certain racial 
or religious groups, against men in late middle age and 
against women, not only is repugnant to the principles of 
our democracy, but often creates "artificial labor short­
ages" in the midst of labor surplus. Employers and un­
ions both need to re-examine and revise practices result­
ing in discrimination. I recommend that, at this session, 
the Congress provide permanent Federal legislation deal­
ing with this problem.60 
58. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 19i7 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 9. 
59. New York Times, Jan. 9, 1947, p. 15; also see Norfolk Journal 
and Guide, Jan. 18, 1947, p. 2. 
60. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 19i7, pp. 
31-32. 
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This recommendation, wrote a New York Times reporter, 
"seemed to dispel the relief among Southern Democrats that 
was manifest after delivery of the State of the Union 
message." 61 In all likelihood Truman's pleas for an FEPC 
was designed not to offend the South but, rather, to take the 
issue away from liberal Republicans in the ranks of the 
majority party now controlling the Congress. 
The Republican party, however, had no serious intention 
of committing itself to this cause, as was indicated by the 
remarks of Joseph Martin, the newly designated Speaker of 
the House, to a group of Negro Republican leaders. 
The FEPC plank in the 1944 Republican platform was a 
bid for the Negro vote, and they did not accept the bid. 
They went out and voted for Roosevelt. I'll be frank with 
you. We are not going to pass a FEPC bill, but it has 
nothing to do with the Negro vote. We are supported by 
New England and Middle Western Industrialists who 
would stop their contributions if we passed a law that 
would compel them to stop religious as well as racial 
discrimination in employment. I am not saying that I 
agree with them, but that is the situation we face, so we 
may as well be realistic. We intend to do a lot for the 
Negroes, but we can't afford to pass the FEPC bill. . . . 
We have a number of mavericks in our party who may 
not go along with us on needed labor legislation, so we 
may need some voters from the other side until this issue 
is taken care of. After the labor legislation is out of the 
way, we may be able to pass the poll tax bill.62 
Meanwhile, Thomas Richardson, vice-president of the 
CIO United Public Workers, disclosed on January 10, 1947, 
that nine federal agencies within the administration re­
61. Jan. 9,1947, p. 15. 
62. Pittsburgh Courier, Jan. 4, 1947, p. 6; also see Norfolk Journal 
and Guide, Jan. 4,1947, p. 6. 
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fused to hire Negroes.63 Richardson also revealed that he 
had previously discussed the matter with David Niles of the 
White House staff, who not only confirmed the truth of his 
charges but informed him that his union would be contacted 
about them; according to Richardson, nothing was heard 
from Niles after that meeting.64 
The president paid no heed to Richardson's charges, but 
he was evidently distressed by the deteriorating situation in 
race relations in the country. Speaking to the members of 
his Committee on Civil Rights at its organizational meeting 
at the White House on January 15, 1947, Truman intimated 
that the country might be faced with a period of racial and 
religious hysteria similar to the decade of the 1920's. As he 
indicated: "I don't want to see any race discrimination. I 
don't want to see any religious bigotry break out in this 
country as it did then." Since Truman thought "there are 
certain rights under the Constitution which . . . the Fed­
eral Government has a right to protect," he hoped the com­
mittee would be able to inform him "just exactly how far 
the Attorney General can go legally" in protecting the civil 
rights of citizens in the event of a breakdown of local law 
enforcement.65 
The remarks Truman made during his meeting with this 
committee suggest that he viewed the problem of civil rights 
as something more than a political issue; it was, for him at 
least, a constitutional issue as well.66 Truman firmly believed 
that as president of the United States he was obligated to 
defend the Constitution not only by upholding the laws of 
the land but by strengthening them as well. He understood 
63. New York Times, Jan. 11, 1947, p. 7; and Pittsburgh Courier, 
Feb. 15, 1947, p. 4. 
64. New York Times, Jan. 11, 1947, p. 7. 
65. Truman, Memoirs, II, 182. 
66. Ibid., p. 180. 
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that it was necessary to protect civil rights, if only to 
preserve the integrity of the law. Although he was destined 
to be attacked in the South and elsewhere as a dangerous 
innovator for his seeming disregard of local customs, Tru­
man actually appears to be a traditionalist who decried acts 
of injustice because they violated what he thought consti­
tuted the American heritage of political liberty and fair 
play.67 
On April 9, 1947, Walter White invited the president to 
address an NAACP rally scheduled to be held in front of the 
Lincoln Memorial in late June, and Truman accepted his 
invitation.68 It may well be that he accepted White's offer 
because, in the aftermath of his Truman Doctrine pro­
nouncement of March 12, 1947, such a speech would allow 
him to reaffirm his commitment to the principles of democ­
racy and freedom; to seize the propaganda initiative from 
the Republican-controlled Eightieth Congress; and to con­
vince skeptical liberals that he was truly in earnest about 
such matters. 
Now that the president was committed to talk, he had to 
have an appropriate speech. Truman could have accepted 
advice such as that of David Niles, who suggested that "the 
closing paragraph of the speech, not to exceed one minute, 
should be devoted to civil rights." 69 But probably for the 
reasons already mentioned, Truman decided to use the oc­
casion to make a forthright statement about civil rights; 
hence, Robert Carr and Milton Stewart, of the President's 
Committee on Civil Rights, were drafted to write most of 
the speech he was to read. When the president delivered his 
speech on June 29, 1947, he spoke not only to an actual 
67. Ibid., p. 183. 
68. White, A Man Called White, p. 347. 
69. Memorandum to Matthew J. Connelly from David Niles, June 
16, 1947, Clark Clifford File, HSTL. 
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audience of 10,000—including Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, Chief 
Justice Fred Vinson, Senator Wayne Morse, and Walter 
White—but also to a nationwide audience over the com­
bined facilities of the major radio networks; in addition, 
his speech was carried by short wave to all parts of the 
world.70 
A major theme of the president's speech dealt with the 
new role he envisioned for the federal government in the 
defense of civil rights. He suggested: 
We must keep moving forward with new concepts of 
civil rights to safeguard our heritage. The extension of 
civil rights today means, not protection of the people 
against the government, but protection of the people by 
the government. We must make the Federal Government 
a friendly, vigilant defender of the rights and equalities 
of all Americans. And again I mean all Americans. . . . 
There is much that state and local governments can do in 
providing positive safeguards for civil rights. But we 
cannot, any longer, await the growth of a will to action in 
the slowest state or the most backward community. 
Our national government must show the way. This is a 
difficult and complex undertaking. Federal laws and ad­
ministrative machinery must be improved and expanded. 
We must provide the government with better tools to do 
the job. . . . 
Our immediate task is to remove the last remnants of 
the barriers which stand between millions of our citizens 
and their birthright. . . . We cannot wait another decade 
or another generation to remedy these evils. We must 
work, as never before, to cure them now. The aftermath 
of the war and the desire to keep faith with our Nation's 
historic principles makes the need a pressing one. . . . 
Every man should have the right to a decent home, the 
right to an education, the right to adequate medical care, 
the right to a worthwhile job, the right to an equal share 
70. White, A Man Called White, pp. 330-31. 
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in making public decisions through the ballot, and the 
right to a fair trial in a fair court. We must insure that 
these rights—on equal terms—are enjoyed by every citi­
n 
, zen.
The president also spoke of the growing cold war conflict 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, declaring 
that the promise of American life had to be realized in order 
to strengthen the cause of democracy in a world convulsed 
with crisis and change. He asserted: 
The support of desperate populations of battle ravaged 
countries must be won for the free way of life. We must 
have them as allies in our continuing struggle for the 
peaceful solution of the world's problems. They may sur­
render to the false security offered so temptingly by total­
itarian regimes unless we can prove the superiority of 
democracy. Our case for democracy should be as strong 
as we can make it. It should rest on practical evidence 
that we have been able to put our own house in order.72 
When Truman finished, he turned to Walter White and 
said: "I mean every word of it—and I am going to prove 
that I do mean it." T3 
It was a remarkable speech that Truman delivered. He 
had provided the country with a searching look into the 
current situation in race relations by pointing to the bar­
riers of discrimination, and he had challenged the American 
people to surmount these barriers as quickly as possible. 
Thus, for the first time in the twentieth century, an Ameri­
can president publicly discussed the problem of racial dis­
crimination with frankness and humanity. 
Truman's speech impressed many Negroes, who now felt 
71. Truman Papers, OF 413, HSTL. 
72. Ibid. 
73. White, A Man Called White, pp. 330-31. 
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that he meant business.74 A number of Negro newspapers 
and magazines praised him for his candid approach. The 
Kansas City Call, for example, wrote on July 4, 1947, that 
"Truman so strongly denounced race prejudice and discrim­
ination based upon race, creed, color, and national origin 
that even his enemies were convinced that the Missourian in 
the White House had left behind him Missouri's tradition of 
second-class citizenship for Negroes." The Pittsburgh Cour­
ier said on July 12, 1947, that Truman's words and deeds 
pertaining to civil rights were more impressive than those 
of his predecessor, Franklin Roosevelt, "who enjoyed to a 
far greater degree the affection of colored Americans." The 
Courier also pointed out: 
We cannot recall when the gentleman who now sleeps at 
Hyde Park made such a forthright statement against 
racial discrimination. . . . Here we have a President say­
ing that a revolution in American mores must be worked 
here and now, and this is more remarkable when one 
considers Mr. Truman's origin and antecedents as con­
trasted with those of Mr. Roosevelt. . . . President Tru­
man . . . where colored Americans are concerned, is 
looming, on the record, to greater stature than his prede­
cessor. . . . Mr. Truman deserves high praise for his 
sincerity and forthrightness after a long era of double 
talk and political expediency. 
The August, 1947, issue of the Crisis, the monthly journal 
of the NAACP, referred to the speech itself as "the most 
comprehensive and forthright statement on the rights of 
minorities in a democracy and the duty of the government 
to secure safeguards that has ever been made by a President 
of the United States." 
74. Walter White, "Will the Negro Elect Our Next President?", 
Colliers Magazine CXX (1947), 26. 
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A moderate white southern response to Truman's speech 
appeared in Little Rock's Arkansas Gazette of July 1, 1947: 
". . . Is it in the power of any government to wipe out 
prejudice? Enforcement of laws against 'discrimination' in 
fields where the government had not previously entered 
might only make prejudice more active." Typical, perhaps, 
of a number of newspapers outside of Dixie was the re­
sponse of the St. Louis Star Times of June 30, 1947. It 
agreed with the president's support of freedom and justice 
for all citizens, but questioned Truman's advocacy of FEPC 
contained in his earlier economic message to Congress. 
The president's June 29 speech aroused the hopes of 
American Negroes, but many individuals, such as Walter 
White, waited impatiently for him to do something about 
the situation that he described with such clarity and convic­
tion. Seeking to compel the American government to take a 
stronger political stand against discrimination, the NAACP 
turned to the forum of the United Nations to promote its 
campaign for equality and justice for the Negro citizens of 
the United States. It submitted a petition of grievances, 
drafted in part by the historian W. E. B. Du Bois, to the 
world body on October 23,1947, calling attention to the long 
history of cultural deprivation suffered by the black man in 
America." Included was this statement: 
This protest is a frank and earnest appeal to all the world 
for elemental justice against the treatment which the 
United States has visited upon us for three centuries. 
. . . It is to induce the nations of the world to persuade 
75. Its petition, "A Statement on the Denial of Human Rights to 
Minorities in the Case of Citizens of Negro Descent in the United 
States of America and an Appeal to the United Nations for Redress, 
Prepared for the NAACP," was drafted by Du Bois, with the assist­
ance of Milton Konvitz, Earl B. Dickerson, and Rayford Logan. A 
copy can be found in Box 354, NAACP PAPERS, L.C. 
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this nation to be just to its own people, that we have 
prepared and now present to you this document. . . and 
we firmly believe that the situation pictured here is as 
much your concern as ours.76 
But the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 
meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, on December 4, 1947, re­
jected a Soviet proposal to investigate the charges which 
the NAACP had placed before it.77 
The NAACP action received extensive news coverage not 
only from the American press but from the foreign press as 
well; India, in particular, was deeply concerned.78 That the 
United States government was quite embarrassed by the 
adverse publicity it received from the NAACP petition was 
revealed by Attorney General Tom Clark, who, speaking in 
Boston on October 27, remarked that he was "humiliated" 
by the fact that a group of Americans could not find equita­
ble treatment at home. He then declared that his depart­
ment would move "with as great vigor and force as is 
permitted under the law where States through negligence, 
or for whatever reason, fail . .  . to protect the life and 
liberties of the individual." He also announced the Civil 
Rights Section of the Justice Department would be enlarged 
and strengthened.79 
The NAACP's claim that widespread discrimination was 
indeed a basic fact of life in the United States was rein­
76. Crisis LIV (1947), 362-64. 
77. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Dec. 13, 1947, p. 1. The minutes of 
the NAACP's board of directors meeting of February 9, 1948, con­
tains a letter Mrs. Roosevelt sent to Walter White explaining pre­
cisely what happened and why, when the NAACP petition was pre­
sented to the United Nations Commission; see Minutes of Board of 
Directors, February 9, 1948, Box A-12, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
78. Race Relations V (December, 1947—January, 1948), 78. 
79. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Nov. 8, 1947, pp. 1-2. 
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forced by the report To Secure These Rights, which the 
Committee on Civil Rights submitted to President Truman 
on October 29, 1947.80 Based upon the testimony submitted 
by forty witnesses, correspondence with nearly 250 private 
organizations and individuals, as well as information sup­
plied by twenty-five government agencies and numerous 
state and local public agencies, the report had been carefully 
prepared in order to make it a reliable study of the short­
comings and failings of American democracy.81 
The report itself was divided into four sections: (1) The 
American Heritage: Promise of Freedom and Equality; (2) 
The Record: Short of the Goal; (3) Government Responsi­
bility: Securing These Rights; (4) A Program: The Com­
mittee's Recommendations. 
The first section spelled out four essential rights which 
the committee determined to be characteristic of a free 
society: the right to safety and security of the person; the 
right to freedom of conscience and expression; the right to 
equality; and the right to citizenship and its privileges. 
Here, then, was a yardstick that could measure America's 
achievements and failures against its revolutionary heri­
tage of freedom and justice for all men.82 
Section Two emphasized those incidents of American life 
which, in the committee's judgment, violated the principles 
of a free society discussed in Part One. They included the 
lynchings of 1946 and 1947, constant police brutality di­
rected at Negroes and other minority groups, failure of the 
judiciary to uphold the principle of equal justice under the 
law, and infringement of the physical freedom of 
Japanese-Americans during World War II. The denial of 
80. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 19U7, p. 
479. 
81. To Secure These Rights, p. 178. 
82. Ibid., pp. 3-10. 
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the ballot to Negroes and Indians and the existence of segre­
gated armed forces was further proof that citizenship 
rights had not yet been adequately protected. The committee 
also took care to point out lack of equal opportunity in the 
fields of employment, public and private education, housing, 
medical care, public services, and public accommodations. 
Also condemned was the theory and practice of segregation 
which, the committee insisted, was incompatible with the 
values of a free society. The committee also examined the 
widespread existence of segregation and discrimination in 
Washington, D.C., which it described as a "graphic illustra­
tion of the failure of democracy." 83 
Section Three emphasized the need for the federal gov­
ernment to assume much greater responsibilities as the 
guardian and protector of civil rights. Only the federal 
government, in the committee's opinion, had sufficient 
power and authority to contend with what was a national 
problem requiring a national solution. The justification for 
federal involvement in the defense of civil rights was to be 
found in the powers expressly and implicitly delegated to 
Congress by the Constitution as defined by the Supreme 
Court, especially in the Court's civil rights decisions of the 
1930's and 1940's. The committee suggested also that prece­
dents for further and stronger federal executive action had 
been established by the creation of a civil rights section in 
the Justice Department in 1939. The preparation of amicus 
curiae briefs and the investigation of violations of existing 
civil rights statutes had represented a novel experiment by 
the federal executive branch to safeguard civil rights. But 
without stronger statutory authority, the committee indi­
cated, the federal government would remain severely handi­
83. Ibid., pp. 13-95. 
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capped in its efforts to provide protection for citizens whose 
rights were either threatened or still non-existent.84 
In Section Four the committee presented its "program 
for action" and stressed what it considered to be the several 
imperatives to justify the federal government's immediate 
assumption of much greater responsibility for the protec­
tion of civil rights in American society, namely: the moral 
imperative ("The United States can no longer countenance 
these burdens on its common conscience, these inroads on its 
moral fiber.") ; the economic imperative ("The United 
States can no longer afford this heavy drain upon its human 
wealth, its national competence.") ; and the diplomatic im­
perative ("The United States is not so strong, the final 
triumph of the democratic ideal is not so inevitable that we 
can ignore what the world thinks of us or our record.") 
The "program for action" called specifically for the im­
provement in the administrative machinery dealing with 
civil rights questions; the strengthening of the right to the 
safety and security of the person; the protection and en­
largement of the right to citizenship and its privileges; and 
the fostering of the conditions for equality. Improvement in 
the administrative machinery required the elevation of the 
Civil Rights Section of the Justice Department to the status 
of a full division within the Justice Department; the estab­
lishment of a permanent Commission on Civil Rights, pref­
erably by an act of Congress; and the creation of a Joint 
Standing Committee on Civil Rights in Congress. 
To assure further the safety and security of the person, 
the committee recommended that Congress enact new legis­
lation making it easier for the Justice Department to prose­
cute individual violators of civil rights. This would include 
84. Ibid., pp. 99-135. 
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enlarging the penalties for violations of Sections 51 and 52 
of the Criminal Code and the passage of anti-lynching legis­
lation. 
The protection of the right of citizenship required that, 
in the committee's judgment, Congress or the states abolish 
poll taxes; that Congress pass legislation protecting the 
right of qualified persons to participate in federal primaries 
and general elections; that Congress grant local self-deter­
mination and the right to participate in presidential elec­
tions to the District of Columbia; and that Congress enact 
legislation, followed by administrative action, to end imme­
diately all discrimination and segregation in the organiza­
tion and activities of all branches of the armed services. 
To foster the conditions making for equality in American 
life, the committee deemed it vital that Congress distribute 
federal funds only to those public and private agencies 
which did not practice discrimination or segregation; that 
Congress enact an FEPC law containing legal sanctions; that 
the president not only issue a mandate against discrimina­
tion in government employment but also create adequate 
machinery to enforce it; that the Justice Department initi­
ate a legal attack upon racially restrictive housing cove­
nants; that Congress prohibit discrimination and segrega­
tion in the rendering of all public services by the national 
government; that Congress enact a law prohibiting discrim­
ination and segregation in interstate transportation; and 
that Congress remove the blight of segregation and discrim­
ination from both the District of Columbia and the Canal 
Zone.85 
Charles Wilson and his colleagues handed to President 
Truman a document of great political and social impor­
tance. In all probability To Secure These Rights went far 
85. Ibid., pp. 139-73. 
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beyond anything Truman and his advisers had in mind 
when they initially commissioned an investigation of the 
problems created by the racial violence of 1945 and 1946. 
The report contained more than recommendations to im­
prove law-enforcement procedures for the protection of 
civil rights; it was also an impressively organized, factual 
presentation of what racism was doing to American life and 
democratic institutions. It was a comment on the country's 
history and a challenge to its decency. A number of liberally 
inclined Americans, working temporarily for their govern­
ment, had succeeded in bringing about a confrontation be­
tween politics and morality. As Richard Neustadt, a student 
of the modern American presidency, suggests: "It is hardly 
credible that Truman could have ignored their report, no 
matter what the politics of his own situation." 86 
As soon as the report was released, it became a source of 
controversy in and out of Congress. Democratic Senator 
Scott Lucas from Illinois expressed the opinion that "the 
President's Committee has dealt courageously with some 
fundamentals that the people of this country have got to 
recognize sooner or later and [the] sooner the better"; 
Democratic Congressman Chet Holifield of California said: 
"Everything I saw in it was all right. . .  . It is the most 
valuable and complete report that has been published in the 
field." 87 Republican Representative Charles Eaton of New 
Jersey slighted the work of the committee by suggesting 
86. Richard Neustadt, "Congress and the Fair Deal: A Legislative 
Balance Sheet," in Richard Abrams and Lawrence W. Levine, eds., 
The Shaping of Twentieth Century America (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1965), p. 574. 
87. Robert C. Albright, "Civil Rights Draws Broad Backing," 
Washington Post, Oct. 30, 1947; for a sample of editorial opinion from 
white newspapers, see Norfolk Journal and Guide, Nov. 8, 1947, p. 11; 
and from Negro newspapers, see Norfolk Journal and Guide, Nov. 15, 
1947, p. 11. 
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that "no legislation can change human nature. That has to 
be done by religion and thought." 88 Southern legislators 
were largely quiet, as were a number of possible 1948 Re­
publican presidential candidates. New York's Thomas 
Dewey, Earl Warren of California, Ohio's Robert Taft, and 
Harold Stassen of Minnesota failed to respond to the tele­
grams from the Norfolk Journal and Guide asking them 
their opinion of the report.89 
When President Truman received his copy of the report, 
he remarked that "this committee has given us an American 
charter of human freedom . . . [and] a guide for action."90 
Truman was also aware that To Secure These Rights was a 
political bombshell which had to be either detonated or 
defused. The choice was his alone. It was relatively easy for 
him to assert that the report "will take its place among the 
great papers of freedom," but such rhetoric was no substi­
tute for a hard political decision requiring him to upset the 
political equilibrium within the Democratic party which he 
had used to his advantage since taking office in April, 1945. 
The choice was either to side with the urban liberals by 
sending the report, or a part of it, to Congress, or support 
the South by ignoring its recommendations entirely. Either 
decision would be irrevocable and would profoundly affect 
his 1948 presidential aspirations. 
Truman's unwillingness to discuss the political implica­
tions of the report was manifested at a presidential press 
conference on November 6,1947. 
Q: What happens to the big report of the Civil Rights 
Committee? Does it stay here, or do you send that to 
Congress ? 
88. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Nov. 8, 1947, p. 11. 
89. Ibid., Nov. 15,1947, p. 2. 
90. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1947, p. 
480. 
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A: That report is made to me, and that report can be 
used as a basis for a part of the message on the State of 
the Union, which of course in the long run will be sent to 
Congress. 
Q: In other words, you will use it as a part of your 
message? 
A: I did not say that. I said that it could be used as a 
foundation for part of the message—some of it maybe. I 
have not read it carefully. 
Q: What do you think of it, Mr. President? 
A: I think it is a good report.91 
During the rest of November and early December, 1947, 
the president discussed with officials of his administration 
what policy he should pursue with regard to the report. 
Truman received conflicting advice about the matter from 
his political associates, whose views were probably shaped 
by their own environmental background and political 
predilections.92 On December 9, 1947, he asked Clark Clif­
ford, his special counsel, to confer with Attorney General 
Tom Clark before submitting a recommendation to the 
president.93 
Even as the administration was arriving at a decision 
regarding the fate of the civil rights committee's report, 
other moves on the civil rights front were underway. On 
June 23, 1947, the Supreme Court accepted for review two 
cases involving the issue of whether racially restrictive 
91. Ibid., p. 482. Evidence suggesting that Truman was not entirely 
pleased with what he received and disagreed with some, if not many, 
of the recommendations can be found in Brooks Hays, A Southern 
Moderate Speaks (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1959), p. 33. 
92. Author's interview with Oscar Chapman, June 25, 1962. 
93. Personal memorandum of Clark Clifford, December 9, 1947, 
Clark Clifford Pile, HSTL. 
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housing covenants were enforceable.94 This move immedi­
ately caught the attention of liberals inside and outside of 
the federal government, who thought it would be a good 
idea to have the Justice Department submit an amicus cu­
riae brief on behalf of those Negroes whose cases had come 
before the Court. Because of the efforts of these liberals, the 
Justice Department was soon bombarded with letters and 
other forms of communication asking it to intervene in 
these cases.95 The letters were collected by Solicitor General 
Philip Perlman, who then spoke to Attorney General Tom 
Clark about the matter. Clark, in turn, sought and received 
President Truman's permission to submit a brief. On Octo­
ber 30,1947, the day after To Secure These Rights had been 
turned over to Truman, the attorney general announced at a 
press conference that the Justice Department was planning 
to involve itself in the restrictive covenant cases. It may be 
assumed that the decision to intervene was made largely for 
political reasons, that is, to help Truman secure the Negro 
and white liberal vote for the 1948 presidential election.96 
On December 5, 1947, the Justice Department submitted 
a brief to the Supreme Court in the case of Shelly v. 
Kraemer.97 Here, then, was the first of a series of briefs 
originating in the Solicitor General's Office during the Tru­
man era that in time would profoundly affect American 
jurisprudence and, in turn, American society. In its brief 
the government argued that housing covenants merely 
served to perpetuate "an artificial quarantine of minority 
94. Clement Vose, Caucasians Only (Berkeley: University of Cali­
fornia Press, 1959), p. 157. 
95. Ibid., p. 173. An example of that technique were the letters 
Walter White sent to both Truman and Clark requesting intervention 
in this case; see White to Truman, September 17, 1947, Attorney 
General Folder, Box 374, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
96. Vose, Caucasians Only, p. 173. 
97. Tom C. Clark and Philip Perlman, Prejudice and Property 
(Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1948). 
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groups" and should, therefore, be declared null and void. 
The Court was also told that "this situation cannot be recon­
ciled with the spirit of mutual tolerance and respect for the 
dignity and rights of the individual which give vitality to 
our democratic way of life." 98 And to further emphasize the 
government's interest in this particular case, Perlman par­
ticipated in the oral argument before the Court on January 
15, 1948, where he made good use of the report of the 
President's Committee on Civil Rights in his attack on re­
strictive covenants. It was his contention that their enforce­
ment would hamper the United States "in doing its duty in 
the fields of public health, housing, home finance, and in the 
conduct of foreign affairs." " 
On May 3, 1948, the Supreme Court made known its 
decision in the restrictive covenant cases. With three jus­
tices having earlier disqualified themselves from participat­
ing in the cases, the remaining six justices unanimously 
agreed that racially restrictive housing covenants were not 
enforceable.100 Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Fred 
Vinson declared that the covenants were directed toward a 
group "defined wholly in terms of race and color"; and that 
"among the civil rights intended to be protected from dis­
criminatory state action by the Fourteenth Amendment are 
the rights to acquire, enjoy, own and dispose of 
property." IM Charles Abrams, a knowledgeable and sympa­
thetic friend of urban minorities, later suggested that the 
government's brief was probably decisive in the adjudica­
tion of the restrictive covenant cases.102 
98. ibid. 
99. Vose, Caucasians Only, p. 200. 
100. Ibid., p. 206. 
101. Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
102. Charles Abrams, Forbidden Neighbors: A Study of Prejudice 
in Housing (New York: Harper & Bros., 1955), p. 220. 
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The Justice Department's action in regard to Shelly v. 
Kraemer was a fresh move by the president to convince 
Negroes that he was determined to champion their rights. 
But it would be necessary for Truman to make even more 
dramatic and far-reaching moves in the field of civil rights 
if he was to counter a serious challenge to his liberal flank, 
which developed in the last days of 1947. That challenge 
came from Henry Wallace, who declared in Chicago on 
December 29, 1947, that he would be the presidential candi­
date of the newly formed Progressive party.103 In announc­
ing his candidacy, Wallace reaffirmed the strong position he 
had taken on civil rights at the 1944 Democratic national 
convention. "In speeches in the North and in the South at 
non-segregated meetings I have stated the simple truth that 
segregation and discrimination of any kind or character 
have no place in America." 104 And to emphasize the political 
impact created by the news of Wallace's candidacy, the 
Associated Negro Press reported from Los Angeles that 
"thousands of Negro voters here began lining up behind 
Henry A. Wallace the day after he announced that he would 
run for the Presidency." 105 This demonstration of sympathy 
for Wallace, occurring in one of America's major urban 
centers, indicated that civil rights would play an important 
role in determining who was going to win the 1948 election. 
103. Curtis D. MacDougal, Gideon's Army (New York: Marzani & 
Munsell, 1965), 1,224-305. 
104. New York Times, Dec. 30, 1947, p. 15. Wallace earlier had 
endorsed all of the recommendations contained in To Secure These 
Rights; see NAACP press release, December 19, 1947, Wallace Folder, 
Box 367, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
105. Race Relations V (December, 1947^January 1948), 107; also 
see Norfolk Journal and Guide, Jan. 3, 1948, pp. 1-2. For a measure­
ment of Wallace's political strength see American Institute of Public 
Opinion Poll of June, 1947, in Public Opinion Quarterly XII (1947), 
490. 
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Long before Henry Wallace entered the presidential 
sweepstakes, Harry Truman was doing all he could—short 
of compromising himself in the South—to cultivate Negro 
voters. From August, 1946, to January, 1948, he tried to 
win their support primarily through rhetoric and token 
executive action. In short, Truman publicly condemned dis­
crimination but refused to engage in an overt political 
struggle to end it. Thus it would appear that he followed a 
policy which was largely consistent with the one he pursued 
in his first year in office. 
Yet Truman's position in this later period did not exactly 
conform to the one he had adopted earlier. He was now 
more strongly committed to a defense of civil rights because 
the domestic and international situations required him to 
act in a more forceful manner. Following the defeat of the 
Democratic party in the 1946 election, Truman soon real­
ized that in order to win the 1948 presidential election he 
would need the votes of the many Negroes who lived in the 
key industrial states of the North and the West. And to 
improve his political standing with them, he created the 
Committee on Civil Rights, condemned discrimination in his 
speech to the NAACP rally in June, 1946, and authorized 
governmental intervention in the case of Shelly v. Kraemer. 
Such action, limited as it was, did move Truman beyond his 
earlier, more passive position of 1945-46, and prepared the 
way for more daring innovations in 1948. 
That Truman acted at all was due not only to the chang­
ing domestic situation but to the cold war, which had trans­
formed the civil rights issue into a problem possessing in­
ternational significance. Truman realized that Soviet 
propaganda on this subject needed to be challenged by 
words, if not deeds, in order to protect America's interests 
in the United Nations and around the world. The treatment 
henceforth accorded to millions of underprivileged and 
abused black citizens would more than indirectly affect the 
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outcome of the great power struggle between the United 
States and the Soviet Union.106 
These, then, were the major reasons why Truman advo­
cated the cause of equality and justice in 1947. And as the 
election year approached, Truman made plans to take an 
even more decisive stand on civil rights. He was aware that, 
in the words of Walter White, "the party that wins the 
Negro vote in 1948 will be the one that offers some concrete 
evidence that it intends at least to help him get a square 
deal." 107 Fully aware of the dangers which confronted him, 
Truman headed into the 1948 campaign determined to make 
the most of his opportunities. 
106. Robert Cushman, "Our Civil Rights Become a World Issue,'7 
New York Times Magazine, January 11, 1948. 
107. White, "Will the Negro Elect Our Next President?", p. 26. 
Chapter 3 
PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS OF 
CIVIL RIGHTS: 1948 
The growing personal unpopularity of President Harry 
Truman and national dissatisfaction with his administra­
tion—caused by the problems of mounting inflation and 
labor unrest—helped bring about the defeat of the Demo­
cratic party in the 1946 congressional election. Fearing that 
1946 was a prelude to 1948, a number of Democratic party 
liberals, led by Oscar J. Ewing, acting chairman of the 
Democratic National Committee and director of the Federal 
Security Agency, began meeting informally in December, 
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1946, to devise ways and means of revitalizing the party.1 
Other members of this group included Leon Keyserling, 
associated with the President's Council of Economic Advis­
ers, Charles Murphy, a White House administrative assist­
ant, and Clark Clifford, who had been appointed the pres­
ident's special counsel in mid-1946.2 
Clifford was especially impressed by the argument ad­
vanced by members of the Ewing circle that Truman, if he 
was to win in 1948, would have to develop a coherent politi­
cal program appealing to "labor and the urban 
minorities." 3 Thus, the major task of that group was to put 
together such a program and then, "quietly and unobtru­
sively, . . . try to steer the President in that direction."4 
Evidently, the first victory for Clifford and his associates 
occurred when Truman, after hearing much conflicting ad­
vice, decided to veto the Taft-Hartley bill, thus endearing 
himself to organized labor. 
In mid-November, 1947, Clifford, whose responsibility it 
had been to funnel into the White House the information 
and insights he received from the liberal strategy group, 
delivered to Truman a forty-page memorandum dealing ex­
pressly with the issues and personalities of the 1948 cam­
paign. Included in the memorandum were the following 
points: (1) Governor Thomas Dewey of New York would 
probably be the Republican presidential candidate, and he 
was "resourceful, intelligent, and highly dangerous . . . 
with an extremely efficient group of men around him"; (2) 
1. Author's interview with Oscar J. Ewing on June 27, 1962; also 
see Phillips, Truman Presidency, pp. 162-65; and Irwin Ross, The 
Loneliest Campaign: The Truman Victory of 1948 (New York: New 
American Library, 1968), pp. 18-20. 
2. Ross, The Loneliest Campaign, pp. 19-21. 
3. Ibid., pp. 21-27. 
4. Phillips, Truman Presidency, pp. 197-98. 
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Henry Wallace would be a third-party candidate and would 
draw 5 to 10 percent of the vote in a few "key states which 
could throw the election to the Republicans"; and (3) the 
South, as always, could be "considered safely Democratic." ° 
The Clifford memorandum also presented specific policy 
recommendations which Truman might consider in order to 
deal with the combined threat of Dewey and Wallace. In the 
words of Cabell Phillips: 
The number one priority should be the farmers who were 
enjoying a high rate of prosperity and whose Republican 
moorings were already loosening. The labor vote was 
crucial in most big states, and it almost certainly would 
suffer some inroads from the Wallaceites. The same was 
true of the Negroes, and strong emphasis would be neces­
sary to hold them in line. Jews held the key to New York, 
and the key to the Jewish voters was what the adminis­
tration would do about Palestine.6 
It was Clifford's conviction, then, that the requirements of 
1948 called for the administration to liberalize its domestic 
program. Such a move could revitalize the Roosevelt politi­
cal coalition and, at the same time, minimize the defection 
of voters to Henry Wallace in case he decided to head a 
third-party ticket. 
Among the groups Clifford singled out for special consid­
eration was the Negro bloc, which constituted at least 4 
percent of all potential voters in such important states as 
New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and 
Illinois.7 And because Truman's political needs dictated a 
5. Ibid., p. 198. 
6. Ibid. 
7. Jasper B. Shannon, "Political Obstacles to Civil Rights Legisla­
tion," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sci­
ence CCLXXV (1951), B3-60. 
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fresh commitment to the Negro cause, he was receptive to 
Clifford's advice. Hence, Truman decided to submit a presi­
dential message on civil rights to Congress, a point that was 
indicated by remarks contained in the State of the Union 
address he delivered on January 7,1948: "The recent report 
of the President's Civil Rights Committee points the way to 
corrective action by the Federal Government and by state 
and local governments. Because of the need for effective 
federal actions, I shall send a special message to Congress 
on this important subject." 8 
One week after the president addressed Congress, work 
commenced on that special message. Clark Clifford dele­
gated to his assistant George Elsey the task of writing the 
first draft, and Elsey in turn secured the assistance of 
Professor Robert Carr of Dartmouth College, and formerly 
executive secretary of the President's Committee on Civil 
Rights.9 After numerous consultations with Clifford, Elsey 
and Carr finished the draft and sent it to his office in the 
White House, where, according to Elsey, minor changes 
were made.10 At the same time the draft was being written, 
other members of the White House staff and the Justice 
Department were organizing a different but related proj­
ect : the creation of an omnibus civil rights bill designed to 
complement the president's message.11 
Even before the administration completed preparations 
to send its civil rights message and legislative recommenda­
8. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1948 (Wash­
ington: United States Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 3. For an 
informed discussion of the strategy employed by the administration on 
this as well as other messages, see Ross, The Loneliest Campaign, pp. 
60-61. 
9. Author's interview with George Elsey on June 28, 1962. 
10. Ibid. 
11. See Stephen J. Spingarn File, HSTL. 
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tions to Congress, the civil rights issue became a topic of 
importance on other political fronts. On January 18, 1948, 
Henry Wallace released a seventy-four-point program, in­
cluding demands for anti-poll tax, anti-lynching, and FEPC 
legislation.12 Two days later, Governor Fielding J. Wright 
announced in his inaugural address in Jackson, Mississippi, 
that he would not tolerate any federal action "aimed to 
wreck the South and our institutions." As far as he was 
concerned, "vital principles and eternal truths transcend 
party lines, and the day is now at hand when determined 
action must be taken." 13 To emphasize this point, the Mis­
sissippi state legislature passed a resolution supporting 
Wright's threat of a bolt if the White House pressed for 
civil rights legislation.14 Whether this resolution repre­
sented merely a state uprising or the beginning of a sec­
tional upheaval was not yet clear. 
Mindful of Wallace's potential strength with Negro vot­
ers and not at all intimidated by Governor Wright's rheto­
ric, President Truman dispatched his message to Congress 
on February 2, 1948. Stylistically similar to Truman's ear­
lier NAACP speech, this message was not written to inflame 
passions; its language was dignified and responsible. 
After introducing his theme that the American heritage 
guaranteed equal rights to all citizens, the president pointed 
out that "there is a serious gap between our ideals and some 
of our practices," and "that this gap must be closed." In the 
event the states and local governments were incapable of 
rectifying the situation, the president insisted that "the 
Federal government has a clear duty to see that constitu­
tional guarantees of individual liberties and of equal protec­
12. New York Times, Jan. 19, 1948, p. 48. 
13. Key, Southern Polities, p. 330. 
14. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Jan. 31, 1948, p. 122. 
84 Presidential Politics of Civil Righti: 1948 
tion under the law are not denied or abridged anywhere in 
America."15 Thus, it was imperative, Truman felt, that 
Congress provide the federal executive with the authority 
necessary to protect those rights. Specifically, the president 
requested that Congress: 
1.	 Establish a permanent Commission on Civil Rights, a 
joint Congressional Committee on Civil Rights, and a 
Civil Rights Division in the Department of Justice. 
2.	 Strengthen existing civil rights statutes. 
3.	 Provide Federal protection against lynching. 
4.	 Protect more adequately the right to vote. 
5.	 Establish a Fair Employment Practice Commission 
to prevent unfair discrimination in employment. 
6.	 Prohibit discrimination in interstate transportation 
facilities. 
7.	 Provide home rule and suffrage in Presidential elec­
tions for the residents of the District of Columbia. 
8.	 Provide statehood for Hawaii and Alaska and a 
greater measure of self-government for our island 
possessions. 
9.	 Equalize the opportunities for residents of the United 
States to become naturalized citizens. 
10. Settle the evacuation claims of Japanese-Americans.16 
The president then announced that he was going to release 
an executive order "containing a comprehensive restate­
ment of the federal non-discrimination policy, together with 
appropriate measures to insure compliance," and that he 
had instructed the secretary of defense to have "the remain­
ing instances of discrimination in the armed services elimi­
nated as rapidly as possible." Concluding his message, he 
15. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1948, p. 
122. 
16.	 Ibid., p. 122. 
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suggested that foreign policy requirements necessitated 
congressional action on his ten-point program: 
The position of the United States in the world today 
makes it especially urgent that we adopt these measures 
to secure for all our people their essential rights. . .  . If 
we wish to inspire the peoples of the world whose free­
dom is in jeopardy, if we wish to restore hope to those 
who have already lost their civil liberties, if we wish to 
fulfill the promise that is ours, we must correct the re­
maining imperfections in our practice of democracy. 
We know the way. We need only the will." 
After the message had been read in Congress, the govern­
ment, recognizing its propaganda importance, presented it 
as the story of the day via the Voice of America.18 In short, 
the civil rights message now entered the cold war arena as a 
document of diplomacy. At home it immediately became a 
source of major political controversy. A number of liberals 
were disappointed with the moderate, apparently equivocal 
stand the president had taken on the subject of segregation. 
Willard Shelton, a reporter for the New York newspaper 
PM, noted, for example, that the message generally ignored 
the pervasive influence of segregation in American life and 
that it disregarded almost entirely those recommendations 
of the Civil Rights Committee which called for the radical 
repudiation of Jim Crow.19 Few liberals or moderates were 
as critical of Truman's position as Shelton; most were 
pleased with his courageous stand, especially Negroes such 
as Walter White. 
17. Ibid., p. 126. 
18. Memorandum to Philleo Nash from Rowland Sargeant, Philleo 
Nash Piles, Box 24, HSTL. 
19. Willard Shelton, "Political Aims May Wreck Truman's Civil 
Rights Program," PM, Feb. 3, 1948; also see Norfolk Journal and 
Guide, Feb. 14, 1948, p. 2. 
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On the other hand, the message met with predictable 
disapproval from the South. In Congress, only Florida's 
Senator Claude Pepper spoke approvingly of the president's 
action. More typical of southern congressional opinion were 
the remarks of Mississippi's Congressman John Bell Wil­
liams : 
If it were not for Southern Democrats, Henry Wallace 
would be in the White House today instead of Harry 
Truman. Southern Democrats have always been the best 
friends that President Truman or the Democratic Party 
ever had. May I say . . . that it is a mightly poor way for 
him to evince his gratitude.20 
Congressman Eugene Cox of Georgia stated: "When I read 
his message I wondered if, after all, Henry Wallace is such 
a bad man. The President attacks the people of that section 
of the country whose support he must have if he is to hope 
to be reelected. The whole thing sickens me." 21 And, finally, 
Senator James 0. Eastland demanded that the South refuse 
to give its electoral votes to the Democratic party's candi­
date in order to promote the election of a "distinguished 
Southerner." 22 
Despite Eastland's call for a bolt from the Democratic 
party, it was reported by C. P. Trussel in the New York 
Times that in certain unspecified congressional quarters 
such talk was considered to be "just another Dixie flareup 
which would wind up with Dixie in line." 2S There was a 
good reason, suggested Arthur Krock, why the Trussel re­
port might be worth considering: "Lavish federal bounties, 
20. Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1948, Vol. LXXXVI, 
Part 2, p. 976. 
21. Ibid. 
22. Ibid., pp. 1134-37. 
23. Feb. 4, 1948, p. 1. 
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originating with the New Deal, but happily accepted and 
retained by anti-New Deal Democratic politicians of the 
South have tied their constituents tightly to Democratic 
executive power." 2i 
Still, this southern "flareup" might have been more seri­
ous if the White House's omnibus civil rights bill had been 
introduced in the Congress. Senate minority leader Alben 
Barkley of Kentucky, who received the bill from the White 
House on February 4, refused to sponsor it after he had 
observed the reaction of the Southern Democrats to the 
February 2 message.25 (Barkley himself had not been con­
sulted either about its contents or the designated date for its 
delivery.) 
While the president faced the wrath of the Southern 
Democrats, the Republicans in Congress—fearing that they 
had been outflanked by his message—were now prompted to 
move their civil rights legislation through House and Senate 
committees to take advantage of whatever Democratic 
schism might develop. Republican members of the House 
Judiciary Subcommittee pressed on February 4 for full 
committee action on proposed anti-lynching legislation.2" In 
the upper house, the Senate Labor Committee voted 7-5 to 
24. New York Times, Feb. 5, 1948, p. 2. 
25. Author's interview with Philleo Nash on June 29, 1962. The 
omnibus bill was divided into two sections: (1) Provisions to 
strengthen federal government machinery, specifically, the establish­
ment of a civil rights commission in the executive branch of govern­
ment; the reorganization of civil rights activities in the Department 
of Justice; and the creation of a joint congressional civil rights 
committee. (2) Provisions to strengthen the protection of individual 
rights, specifically, anti-lynching legislation; amendments and supple­
ments to existing civil rights statutes; federal anti-poll tax legisla­
tion; protection of political rights; a federal FEPC; prohibition 
against discrimination and segregation in interstate transportation. 
For a copy of this draft bill, see Stephen J. Spingarn File, HSTL. 
26. New York Times, Feb. 5, 1948, p. 17. 
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bring the Ives FEPC bill to the floor, even though the commit­
tee's chairman, Senator Robert Taft, voted with the south­
ern members to block its discharge.27 This Republican move 
at last convinced Senator James Eastland that "organized 
mongrel minorities control the government. I am going to 
fight it to the last ditch. They are not going to Harlemize the 
country." 28 Eastland's call to arms was answered by a num­
ber of southern politicians, mostly from Mississippi, Ala­
bama, and South Carolina. Mississippi Representative John 
Bell Williams, for instance, warned the administration not 
to "brush off" Dixie's threat of secession.29 But few south­
ern congressmen were prepared to lead such a movement, 
fearing a loss of their patronage claims and seniority privi­
leges, if the president decided to take action against them. 
Hence, most congressmen who favored a bolt requested that 
local and state officials develop and lead the campaign 
against the national leadership of the party.30 
That such a campaign might not sweep the South was 
indicated by the events taking place during the Southern 
Governors' Conference at Wakulla Springs, Florida, from 
February 6 through February 8. A majority of southern 
governors refused to support the resolution submitted by 
Governor Wright of Mississippi and Governor James Fol­
som of Alabama calling for a meeting at Jackson, Missis­
sippi, on March 1 "to formulate plans for activity and adopt 
a course of action."31 Georgia's Governor Marvin E. 
Thompson, though condemning Truman's civil rights mes­
27. Ibid., Feb. 6, 1948, p. 1. Taft later moved to postpone all floor 
action for at least six weeks; see Norfolk Journal and Guide, Mar. 6, 
1948, p. 2. 
28. Ibid., p. 5, 
29. Ibid., p. 17. 
30. Ibid. 
31. Key, Southern Politics, p. 330. 
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sage as "unnecessary" and "unwise," refused to sanction a 
secession from the party. He said: "I cannot join in any 
movement which directly or indirectly would cut the feet 
from under the Democratic party and its leaders, and 
thereby deprive the South of its greatest strength. I will 
support the Democratic party." 32 Governor Millard Cald­
well of Florida endorsed the sentiments expressed by his 
colleague from Georgia, thereby weakening the drive of the 
"bolters" to sweep the South with an anti-party ticket of 
their own.33 On the other hand, the governors' conference 
did not entirely pigeonhole the issue, deciding instead to 
postpone action for forty days while a five-man committee 
headed by South Carolina's Governor Strom Thurmond 
sought to arrange a compromise solution through direct 
consultation with the president.34 
As the various southern governors returned home to 
await the outcome of their ad hoc committee's meeting with 
Truman, the civil rights issue remained loaded with politi­
cal dynamite. Republicans asserted that the president's mes­
sage had been ingeniously designed to appeal to the Negro 
vote in such states as New York, Pennsylvania, and Illi­
nois.35 Ignoring this Republican charge, the White House 
announced on February 10 that "there will be absolutely no 
compromise on any point." 36 Two days later, the president 
further affirmed this point by declaring at his news confer­
ence that he would not discuss the matter with any southern 
group.37 Subsequently, the Thurmond group scheduled a 
32. New York Times, Feb. 7, 1948, p. 9E. 
33. Ibid., Feb. 8, 1948, p. 1. 
34. Key, Southern Politics, p. 17. 
35. New York Times, Feb. 8, 1948, p. 9E. 
36. Ibid., Feb. 10, 1948, p. 1. 
37. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1H8, p. 
138. 
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meeting with Senator J. Howard McGrath, the chairman of 
the Democratic National Committee. 
The response of the Negro press to the February 2 mes­
sage was enthusiastic. Davis Niles, a White House adminis­
trative assistant, indicated as much in a memo he sent to the 
president on February 16: 
Strong favorable language was the rule in the editorials. 
The President was described as the new champion of 
human freedom. The program as a whole was hailed as 
the strongest civil rights program ever put forth by any 
President. The message was referred to as the greatest 
freedom document since the Emancipation Proclamation. 
The language of the message was described as Lincoln­
38 esque.
Such praise could help Truman undermine Henry Wallace's 
appeal to urban voters; otherwise, the Republicans would 
have little trouble capturing the White House. 
Wallace's campaign was beginning to take on serious and 
ominous proportions so far as Democrats were concerned. 
Although Wallace was not yet receiving a significant en­
dorsement from organized labor, he seemed quite capable of 
drawing considerable support in an important urban con­
stituency such as New York. Wallace came to New York on 
February 15 to promote the candidacy of Leo Isacson, the 
Progressive party's nominee for the vacant Twenty-fourth 
Congressional District, located in the Bronx. Speaking on 
behalf of Isacson, Wallace attacked Truman's wavering Pal­
estine position as one which played into the hands of Ameri­
38. Memorandum to the President from David K. Niles, February 
16, 1948, Philleo Nash Files, HSTL. See Norfolk Journal and Guide, 
Feb. 14, 1948, p. 8, for the following: "Mr. Truman received the 
report of his Civil Rights Committee on October 29, 1947. That he has 
so promptly acted on some of its recommendations, and during an 
election year at that, demonstrates that he has honest and deep 
convictions and the courage to give official voice to them." 
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can oil interests;S9 it was an approach especially designed to 
appeal to the many Jewish voters of that district now disen­
changed with Truman's handling of the heated Palestine 
question. Later that day, Wallace discussed civil rights at a 
black rally in Harlem. After pointing out that the presi­
dent's February 2 message had generally ignored the issue 
of segregation in American life, Wallace went on to say that 
"Southern Governors and Senators have no more reason to 
fear action on Mr. Truman's . . . message than we have to 
expect it. They are angry that the President has paid lip 
service to the fundamental democratic principles." 40 
To the surprise of many Democrats, Leo Isacson emerged 
victorious in the February 17 special election, with a vote of 
22,697 as compared with the 12,578 given to his Democratic 
opponent, Karl G. Propper.41 The Progressive party's 
triumph was regarded by some observers as a spectacular 
upset which strongly indicated that President Truman 
lacked strength in big-city New Deal constituencies.42 A few 
days after the election, James A. Hagerty reported the 
results of a New York Times survey which indicated that 
Wallace's political stock had risen in Michigan, Pennsyl­
vania, Illinois, and California, because of Isacson's victory 
in New York.43 The survey concluded with the observation 
that Truman would be hard pressed to win any of these 
states in the fall now that Wallace had demonstrated that 
his party was more than just a potential threat.44 
It was just subsequent to the Isacson election, at a time 
39. New York Times, Feb. 16, 1948, p. 5. Also see Ross, The 
Loneliest Campaign, pp. 65-66. 
40. New York Times, Feb. 16, 1948, p. 5. 
41. MacDougal, Gideon's Army, III, 323. 
42. Ibid., pp. 324-35. 
43. New York Times, February 18, 1948, p. 1. 
44. Ibid., p. 15. 
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when Democratic party officials were "more worried about 
Wallace than a bolt or a half bolt from the south," 45 that 
Truman decided to launch his 1948 election drive. Speaking 
at the traditional Jefferson-Jackson Day banquet in Wash­
ington on February 19, he mentioned the magical name of 
Franklin Roosevelt for the first time since before the 1946 
election, intimating, of course, that his administration was 
the true heir of the New Deal tradition. He further declared 
that the Democratic party was the party of "progressive 
liberalism," the Republican, the party of "reactionary 
conservatism." 46 Truman was now beginning to appropri­
ate the "vital center" of American politics in order to isolate 
Wallace. Meanwhile, he waited for the reaction on his right 
to fizzle out. 
If the hierarchy of the Democratic party thought the 
southern response to the February 2 speech was a "tempest 
in a teapot—a solid front put up for political purposes," " 
they were mistaken, for some southern congressmen were 
really quite serious about a party revolt. On February 19— 
the day Truman delivered his Jefferson-Jackson Day speech 
—52 out of 103 Southern Democrats in the House of Repre­
sentatives, headed by William Colmer of Mississippi, cau­
cused for the purpose of endorsing the efforts of Governor 
Strom Thurmond's committee to seek a compromise with 
the administration on civil rights. While taking steps to 
have representatives attend the Thurmond-McGrath meet­
ing (McGrath having replaced Truman), they also put the 
administration on notice that the party would be facing 
"serious consequences" if a civil rights plank was included 
in the 1948 platform.48 
45. Ibid., Feb. 22, 1948, p. E3. 
46. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 19i8, p. 32. 
47. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Feb. 14, 1948, p. 2. 
48. New York Times, Feb. 20, 1948, p. 1. 
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Even though Southern Democrats such as Senator East-
land had already raised the specter of a bolt, the adminis­
tration stood its ground by refusing to compromise the 
principles ennunciated in the February 2 message. Senator 
J. Howard McGrath made this clear in a meeting with 
Governor Strom Thurmond and other members of the ad 
hoc committee from the Southern Governors' Conference on 
February 23.49 McGrath defended the February 2 message 
as a moderate statement which did not call for the repeal of 
the segregationist system except in the case of interstate 
transportation. At one point in the meeting, however, 
McGrath indicated that something might be arranged to 
allay southern hostilities; he suggested that perhaps the 
1944 Democratic party civil rights plank could serve as the 
model for the 1948 plank.60 Governor Thurmond, the most 
belligerent member of the southern group, was unwilling to 
consider any accommodation with the administration as 
long as it refused to withdraw its civil rights program. 
Following their unsuccessful meeting with McGrath, the 
governors released a four-hundred-word statement declar­
ing that "the South was no longer in the bag." 51 
Actually, a good part of the South was already committed 
to the Truman organization. For instance, Governor R. 
Gregg Cherry of North Carolina announced on February 
28, 1948, that he would support Truman, civil rights pro­
gram or no civil rights program.52 But an active, vocal 
minority of southern politicians refused to hoist the banner 
of party loyalty, preferring instead to go their own way. In 
Virginia, Governor William Tuck asked his legislature on 
February 26 to modify the state election laws in order to 
49. Key, Southern Politics, p. 331. 
50. New York Times, Feb. 24, 1948, p. 14. 
51. Phillips, The Truman Presidency, p. 207. 
52. Key, Southern Politics, p. 331. 
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permit a state party convention to determine, if necessary, 
how the state's electoral votes would be cast in November.53 
In Mississippi, the state Democratic executive committee 
decided on March 1 that its state electors "would stand 
firmly for states rights and therefore against any nominee 
for President or Vice President who refuses to take an open 
and positive stand against civil rights recommendations." 
The committee also instructed the state's delegation to the 
Democratic national convention "to withdraw from the con­
vention if the civil rights program was placed in the party 
platform, and if the party nominees did not give proper 
assurances." 54 
Because the civil rights issue generated an unseasonable 
heat, the political temperature of the country started to rise 
long before the political conventions were scheduled to 
begin. It was in this context that President Truman an­
nounced on March 8, through Senator McGrath, that he 
would be a presidential candidate in 1948.65 McGrath re­
marked : "I have talked to the President with respect to his 
civil rights message. The President's position remains un­
changed since he delivered that message." B6 
Although Truman remained publicly committed to the 
principles he espoused in the February 2 message, he de­
cided to shelve his omnibus civil rights bill rather than 
present it formally to Congress as an administration-spon­
sored measure. He indicated as much at his press confer­
ence on March 11. 
Q: Mr. President, do you plan to send Congress bills to 
carry out your civil rights message? 
53. New York Times, Feb. 27, 1948, p. 1. 
54. Key, Southern Politics, p. 332. 
55. John Redding, Inside the Democratic Party (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1958), p. 103. 
56. New York Times, Mar. 9, 1948, p. 15. 
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A: Congress never feels very happy when the Execu­
tive sends them bills and says "this is it." When I was in 
Congress it was customary for Congress to write its own 
bill. If they request suggestions from me, I will be glad to 
make them.67 
Truman canceled his original plan to send such legislation 
to Capitol Hill because the South was manifesting much 
greater resistance to his February 2 message than he or 
Clifford had anticipated.58 Unwilling to alienate that section 
any more than absolutely necessary, Truman now retreated 
somewhat from his more advanced position in order to 
protect his flank against the possibility of a southern revolt. 
Southerners who were inclined to revolt, of course, failed to 
understand that Truman was engaged in symbolic action, 
that his rhetoric was a substitute for a genuine legislative 
commitment. 
Truman's temporizing with the rebellious southern states 
also extended to the executive branch. In his February 2 
message he had pledged to issue an executive order "con­
taining a comprehensive restatement of the federal non-dis­
crimination policy, together with appropriate measures to 
insure compliance." 59 By the end of March a draft of that 
order was available, but, in the words of George Elsey, it 
was "weasely and unsatisfactory." 60 No moves were under­
way either to strengthen it or to prepare it for release. 
Evidently the southern revolt had frightened Truman and 
his associates, including Oscar Ewing and Senator 
McGrath, into deferring, if not permanently suspending, 
57. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 19i8, p. 
179. 
58. Ross, The Loneliest Campaign, p. 64. 
59. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 19b8, pp. 
122-26. 
60. Ross, The Loneliest Campaign, p. 65. 
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that action.61 Aware of this development, Philleo Nash, a 
White House aide strongly in sympathy with the cause of 
civil rights, suggested to Clarence Mitchell, a Washington 
representative of the NAACP'S national office, that Walter 
White write Truman about the delay in releasing the order 
so as to offset the "negative influences operating around the 
White House." 62 In his letter to White advancing Nash's 
suggestion, Mitchell also mentioned that "Philleo made an 
interesting observation that the present revolt in some re­
spects is not as bad as it was in 1944, but it is hard to get 
some people around here (the White House) to see that."63 
If the February 2 message antagonized some southerners, 
it improved Truman's standing with the black community, a 
point emphasized by the Democratic party executive com­
mittee in its meeting in Washington on March 11. As re­
ported in the New York Times of March 12, "Members from 
the North and Far West, conceding that the Truman admin­
istration had reached the depths, asserted that they saw the 
President's stock picking up." His strong stand on civil 
rights, in the Time's, opinion, had helped to improve his 
position.64 Yet the continuing challenge of Wallace and the 
Republicans would perhaps make it necessary for Truman 
to adopt new and bold programs to convince Negroes that 
his administration really intended to protect their rights. 
How far and how fast he would move with respect to civil 
61. Ibid. 
62. Clarence Mitchell to Walter White, April 5, 1948, Truman 
Executive Order Folder, Box 419, NAACP Papers, L.C. White dis­
patched a letter to Truman on this very issue; see Walter White to 
Harry Truman, April 7, 1948, Truman Executive Order Folder, Box 
419, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
63. Clarence Mitchell to Walter White, April 5, 1948, Truman 
Executive Order Folder, Box 419, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
64. P. 17. 
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rights would be determined by the requirements of the 
forthcoming campaign. 
Several prominent Negroes refused to wait for the presi­
dent's next gambit in this civil rights chess game. Realizing 
that Truman's political ambitions and needs might make 
him vulnerable to pressure, A. Philip Randolph and the 
Reverend Grant Reynolds had organized on October 10, 
1947, a Committee against Jim Crow in Military Service 
and Training.65 In December, 1947, Randolph and Reynolds 
received a promise from the Democratic National Commit­
tee that a statement against a segregated draft act would be 
issued, but no action was taken.66 On February 5, 1948, 
Randolph informed a representative of the Democratic Na­
tional Committee that the Committee against Jim Crow 
wanted the administration to repudiate publicly any legisla­
tion perpetuating military segregation. Randolph was told 
that "careful consideration" would be given his request.67 
On March 22, 1948, Randolph and other concerned citi­
zens met with the president and requested his support for 
anti-segregation amendments to the proposed draft bill. 
During this meeting Randolph informed Truman that his 
(Randolph's) recent travels around the country convinced 
him that "Negroes are in no mood to shoulder guns for 
democracy abroad, while they are denied democracy here at 
home"; he then announced that unless the government took 
decisive action to change the current racial policies of the 
65. The President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Op­
portunity in the Armed Forces (hereafter known as the Fahy Com­
mittee), Box 10, HSTL. 
66. Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces, p. 163. For 
a comprehensive discussion of how segregation and discrimination in 
National Guard units became an issue of national significance at this 
time, see pp. 159-62. 
67. Ibid., p. 163. 
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armed forces, a civil disobedience campaign would be 
launched.68 Truman made it clear that he was not happy 
with those remarks. The conference ended with nothing 
settled. 
The Randolph-Reynolds call for racial reform of the 
armed forces was soon repeated by twenty Negro organiza­
tions which had gathered in New York on March 27, 1948, 
at the request of the NAACP. They released a public state­
ment pointing out that Negro votes could play a "balance of 
power" role in at least seventeen states in a presidential 
election, and that their support required the elimination of 
segregation and discrimination from the armed forces.69 
Once it was evident that no concessions were forthcoming 
from the administration, Randolph and Reynolds decided to 
press the issue before Congress. On March 30, 1948, they 
appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee and 
repeated their threat to lead a civil disobedience campaign 
if Congress refused to pass legislation outlawing segrega­
tion and discrimination in the armed forces. As Randolph 
put it: 
I personally pledge myself to openly counsel, aid and abet 
youth, both white and colored, to quarantine any Jim 
Crow conscription system, whether it bears the label Uni­
versal Military Training or Selective Service. From coast 
to c o a s t . .  . I shall call upon all colored veterans to join 
this Civil Disobedience movement and to recruit their 
younger brothers in an organized refusal to register. 
Randolph further declared, in response to questions from 
Republican Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon, that he would 
counsel such action even if the country were at war, trea­
68. Crisis LV (1948), 140. 
69. Declaration of Negro Voters Folder, Box 376, NAACP Papers, 
L.C. 
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sonable as it seemed to Morse, "on the theory that . .  . we 
are serving a higher law than the law which applies to the 
act of treason.70 
Randolph's threatened use of civil disobedience tactics 
divided the Negro community. Harlem Congressman Adam 
Clayton Powell announced he would support the Randolph 
proposal if Congress passed a draft bill lacking an anti-seg­
regation amendment.71 Blacks polled in New York City indi­
cated that Randolph would receive considerable support for 
his campaign as long as the country remained at peace.72 On 
the other hand, Walter White and the Negro press generally 
opposed this move, while admitting that the grievances 
aired by Randolph and Reynolds were indeed legitimate and 
that the bitterness inside of the Negro community about 
which they spoke did exist.73 
As Randolph continued to press his attack, James Forres­
tal, the secretary of defense, and Lester Granger, the head 
of the National Urban League, were laying the groundwork 
for a "National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs" per­
mitting Negro spokesmen to advise the armed forces how 
they might best overcome their racial problems.74 On April 
26, 1948, Secretary Forrestal and representatives from the 
three services met with a delegation of Negroes, headed by 
Granger. He informed Forrestal and the others that A. 
Philip Randolph had been warmly praised for his efforts by 
"what may easily be a majority of Negroes throughout the 
70. U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings . . on 
Universal Military Training (Washington: United States Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1948), pp. 688-89. 
71. Pittsburgh Courier, Apr. 10, 1948, pp. 1, 4. 
72. Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1948, XCIV, 
4314-18. 
73. Pittsburgh Courier, Apr. 10, 1948, pp. 1, 4. 
74. Ibid. 
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country." 75 Furthermore, Granger asserted, it was neces­
sary to desegregate the armed forces in order to prevent 
irreparable damage to the national interest. Navy and Air 
Force officials present informed Granger and his associates 
that they were formulating plans to eliminate segregation 
and discrimination in their respective branches. But Army 
Secretary Kenneth Royall, who was at the meeting, refused 
to countenance any such move; he strongly endorsed the 
position taken by Chief of Staff General Omar Bradley of 
favoring continued military segregation.76 Disgusted by 
Royall's stand, the Negro delegation refused to serve fur­
ther as Pentagon advisers. The battle for a desegregated de­
fense establishment was now headed for Congress.77 
Meanwhile, anti-Truman elements of the Southern De­
mocracy were making bold moves in the direction of a 
walkout. On March 13, in Washington, seven out of fifteen 
southern governors, upon receiving Strom Thurmond's re­
port of his committee's fruitless negotiations with Chair­
man McGrath, repudiated Truman and his civil rights pro­
gram, called for the restoration of the two-thirds rule in the 
convention, and urged southerners to cast their electoral 
college votes for those candidates who did not support civil 
rights legislation.78 Later, the chairmen of the Mississippi 
and Arkansas state Democratic committees arranged to 
have a states' rights conference assemble in Jackson, Mis­
sissippi, on May 10 to promote further the aims and inter­
ests of "states' rights" Democrats.79 
75. Fahy Papers, Box 11, HSTL. 
76. Ibid. 
77. Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces, pp. 166-67. 
78. Key, Southern Politics, p. 333. 
79. Ibid., p. 335. Senator McGrath was not happy with this devel­
opment; attempting to placate these potential rebels, he remarked 
that "the people simply don't realize that the President has never said 
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Before the states' rights convention opened, a primary 
election was held in Alabama on May 4 to determine 
whether loyal party Democrats, represented by Senator Lis­
ter Hill and Governor James Folsom, could prevent the 
Dixiecrat faction from seizing control of the party ma­
chinery.80 The voters of Alabama, as was indicated by the 
returns of May 4 and June 1, decided that the state electors 
would be pledged to vote against Truman or any other 
so-called civil rights candidate. Half of the elected Alabama 
delegation to the Democratic national convention was com­
mitted to a bolt if the national convention adopted a civil 
rights plank.81 Despite these results, "the administration," 
according to Arthur Krock, "was not worried about the 
Southern uprising." 82 
The May 10 meeting in Jackson, Mississippi, illuminated 
the fact that the rebellion had its deepest roots in Missis­
sippi and South Carolina.83 During the proceedings Gover­
nor Wright of Mississippi and Governor Thurmond of 
South Carolina vehemently attacked Truman and his civil 
rights program. In his remarks Thurmond distorted what 
the President had actually recommended in his February 2 
message by making it appear that Truman had called for 
the abolition of segregation from American life.84 But more 
a single word about invading State's rights. There is not and never 
has been any intention to upset or invade the rights of the States 
under the constitution" (see Norfolk Journal and Guide, May 8, 1948, 
P. 1). 
80. Key, Southern Politics, p. 333. 
81. New York Times, May 6, 1948, p. 3. 
82. Ibid., May 7, 1948, p. 22. 
83. Key, Southern Politics, p. 334. 
84. Ibid. The Dixiecrats were intent on stigmatizing the Truman 
program as a direct threat to the Jim Crow system; see Alexander 
Heard, A Two Party South? (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1952), p. 181. 
102 Presidential Politics of Civil Rights: 1948 
than bombast issued from this meeting: plans were pre­
pared for the calling of a states' rights nominating conven­
tion to meet in Birmingham, Alabama, on July 17, in the 
event the Democratic national convention adopted Truman's 
civil rights program.85 
Throughout the spring of 1948 President Truman re­
fused to discuss publicly the issue of a bolt; and at a press 
conference on May 13 he denied that the administration was 
preparing an executive order to end the practice of discrim­
ination in the federal executive branch.86 By taking this 
position Truman hoped to placate as much of the South as 
possible before the start of the Democratic national conven­
tion. Arthur Krock, writing in the New York Times of June 
8, confirmed that the Truman administration "was fever­
ishly working to prevent a walkout by some Southern 
delegations." 8r What the administration offered them was a 
1948 civil rights plank comparable to the one included in the 
party's 1944 platform. The 1944 plank, which Walter White 
four years earlier had called a splinter, was a rather innocu­
ous statement: 
We believe racial and religious minorities have the right 
to live, develop and vote equally with all citizens and 
share the rights that are guaranteed by our Constitution. 
Congress should exert its full constitutional powers to 
protect those rights.88 
But whether the die-hard Dixiecrats would be satisfied with 
it was not certain. And quite possibly, liberals might not 
find it acceptable either. 
85. Key, Southern Politics, p. 335. 
86. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1948, p. 
254. 
87. P. 24. 
88. Kirk H. Porter and Donald Johnson, National Party Plat­
forms: 1840-1964 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966), p. 
404. 
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While Truman tried to unite the torn factions of the 
Democratic party behind his candidacy, the Republican 
party met in Philadelphia during the third week of June 
and selected Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York and 
Governor Earl Warren of California to carry the party's 
banners. With respect to civil rights, Dewey's record was 
clearly superior to that of any previous New York 
governor.89 In 1945 he helped to push through the legis­
lature a bill creating a State Commission against Discrimi­
nation (a state PEPC law); and throughout his years as 
governor, he appointed Negroes to positions in the state 
government they had never before held.90 
Perhaps the best public expression of Dewey's 1948 civil 
rights views were contained in the civil rights plank of the 
Republican party's 1948 platform: 
Lynching or any other form of mob violence anywhere is 
a disgrace to any civilized state, and we favor the prompt 
enactment of legislation to end this infamy. 
One of the basic principles of this Republic is the 
equality of all individuals in their right to life, liberty 
and the pursuit of happiness. This principle is enunciated 
in the Declaration of Independence and embodied in the 
Constitution of the United States; it was vindicated in 
battle and became the cornerstone of the Republic. This 
right of equal opportunity to work and to advance in life 
should never be limited in any individual because of race, 
religion, or country of origin. We favor the enactment 
and just enforcement of such Federal legislation as it 
may be necessary to maintain this right at all times in 
every part of this Republic. 
We favor the abolition of the poll tax as a requisite to 
voting. 
We are opposed to the ideal of racial segregation in the 
armed forces of the United States.91 
89. Lubell, The Future of American Politics, p. 100. 
90. Moon, Balance of Power, p. 209. 
91. Porter and Johnson, National Party Platforms, pp. 452-53. 
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Although this plank was not as inclusive or as far-reaching 
as the position Truman took in his February 2 message, it 
placed the Republican party on record as opposed to segre­
gation in the armed forces. 
But if Dewey intended to compete for a substantial part 
of the Negro vote, he would find it necessary to publicize his 
commitment to that civil rights plank and to discuss as well 
his achievements in New York State. But such a campaign 
could focus attention on the failure of the Republican Eight­
ieth Congress to pass any civil rights legislation, a point 
which Walter White had already made in his testimony 
delivered to representatives of the resolutions committee of 
the Republican national convention: 
We would be less than honest if we did not say frankly 
that the members of our organizations have been disap­
pointed by the complete failure of the Republican con­
trolled Eightieth Congress to enact any of the civil rights 
legislation pledged in the 1944 platform.92 
If Wallace appeared to be a millstone around Truman's 
neck, then the domestic record of the Eightieth Congress 
was a weight which could sink Dewey. 
After the Republicans left Philadelphia, the Democrats 
prepared to hold their convention in the City of Brotherly 
Love. In the weeks preceding the opening of that conven­
tion, the president continued to extend the olive branch to 
the southern malcontents. On June 22 Truman met with 
Congressman John Rankin of Mississippi and apparently 
persuaded him that a compromise on civil rights could be 
arranged. Following his discussion with the president, Ran­
kin informed the press, "I am not without hope that the 
92. Republican National Committee File, Box 1951, NAACP Pa­
pers, L.C. 
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Democratic convention will reach a satisfactory agreement 
on the civil rights issue. If that convention adopts the same 
plank that was inserted in the platform of 1944, I am 
assured that it will be adhered to." 93 With these remarks 
Kankin seemingly implied that if the 1944 plank was writ­
ten into the 1948 platform, the president would not sponsor 
future civil rights legislation. 
Following the publication of Rankin's comments, Henry 
Wallace, speaking in Washington, charged the president 
with hypocrisy on the civil rights issue. 
If we ever had any hesitancy before, Mr. Rankin has 
dispelled our doubts. We can now say of President Tru­
man's civil rights message that the views in the message 
are not necessarily those of the sponsor. We can go fur­
ther. We can say positively that they are not the views of 
Mr. Truman.94 
Nevertheless, the NAACP, holding its annual convention in 
St. Louis, Missouri, during the last week of June, refused to 
condemn the president. Truman was praised for the stand 
he had taken on civil rights, while Wallace was attacked, 
particularly by Walter White, for his failure to fight dis­
crimination or segregation during the years he had served 
as vice-president and secretary of agriculture and com­
merce.95 It was evident that the leadership of the NAACP 
preferred Truman to Dewey or Wallace. (Apparently, a rift 
that existed in March between Truman and Wallace sup­
porters within the organization had been healed by late 
June.) 96 
93. New York Times, June 23, 1948, p. 14. 
94. Ibid., June 26, 1948, p. 4. 
95. Walter White Folder, Box 376, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
96. New York Times, Mar. 20, 1948. 
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Outwardly unperturbed by Wallace's statement, and 
probably comforted by the support he was receiving from 
the NAACP, Truman, with the help of his aides, pushed on 
with his efforts to achieve a compromise with the South. 
While Truman tried to mend his southern fences, he was 
faced with another revolt, this time from Democrats of 
various political persuasions who were organizing a "Draft 
Eisenhower" movement. The Eisenhower boom was born of 
the despair and fear of many Democrats that Truman's 
nomination would produce a shattering defeat for the party 
in November. Included in this variegated movement were 
liberals such as Senator Claude Pepper of Florida, Walter 
Reuther, president of the United Automobile Workers 
union, Chester Bowles and Wilson Wyatt of Americans for 
Democratic Action, a recently formed private liberal organ­
ization, and southern conservatives such as Senator Richard 
Russell of Georgia and South Carolina's Governor Strom 
Thurmond.97 But their hopes of capturing the convention 
with General Dwight Eisenhower were dashed on July 10, 
1948, when he declared that he would not "accept even if 
nominated." 98 
Earlier, on July 5 fifty members of the "Draft Eisen­
hower" group, who were meeting in Minneapolis, made it 
clear that they were going to fight for the inclusion of 
Truman's civil rights program in the party platform. For 
them: 
The report of the President's Committee on Civil 
Rights is one of the most important measures of moral 
97. MacDougal, Gideon's Army, II, 473-75; for additional material, 
plus a thoughtful evaluation of this phenomenon, see Ross, The 
Loneliest Campaign, pp. 72-75, 112-14. 
98. MacDougal, Gideon's Army, II, 475. 
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strategy devised by the United States of America in mod­
ern times. . . . Its sponsorship will remain a landmark 
in the history of this Democratic administration. 
As active members of the Democratic party and as 
citizens, we support this program. Many of us will be 
delegates to the national convention of our party in Phila­
delphia. The issue of civil rights is in the worthiest tradi­
tion of our party. We hereby declare that we shall ac­
tively seek, at Philadelphia, to make the accomplishment 
of this program a part of our party's platform for 1948." 
This statement was endorsed by "Eisenhower Democrats" 
like Congressman James Roosevelt, Cook County boss Jacob 
Arvey, and a newly arrived liberal spokesman, Hubert 
Humphrey, mayor of Minneapolis; and it also received the 
backing of Truman stalwarts, including former New York 
governor Herbert Lehman, Mayor David Lawrence of Pitts­
burgh, and Boss Edward J. Flynn of the Bronx.100 
Thus, by the time the drafting committee of the Demo­
cratic national convention assembled in Philadelphia on 
July 7 to begin work on the party's platform, it was clear 
that there would be a fight if the liberals pressed their civil 
rights campaign. Pennsylvania's Senator Francis Myers, 
the chairman of the platform committee, would have to deal 
with the problem at first hand; but any civil rights plank 
drafted by his committee for presentation to the convention 
would surely have the backing of the president and his 
advisers through their prior approval. 
Before the platform committee began its work, its mem­
bers received testimony from people representing various 
organizations and points of view. Among those who ad­
dressed them was Walter White, spokesman for not only the 
99. New York Times, July 6, 1948, p. 26. 
100. Ibid. 
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NAACP but twenty other Negro organizations, with a com­
bined membership of 6,084,000. White told the committee 
that the 1944 Democratic civil rights plank would be wholly 
unsatisfactory in 1948 because "human events not only 
within the continental United States but throughout the 
world have moved measurably forward in the past four 
years. The party must move forward or perish." He pointed 
out that Negro voters, numbering as many as three million, 
would be a "vital factor" in some 75 out of 435 congres­
sional districts in at least seventeen border states and 
northern states with a total of 295 electoral college votes. 
"Issues," said White, "instead of party labels will determine 
how these votes will be cast." M1 
White's statement had little impact on the men who had 
the authority and power to decide what would go into the 
party's civil rights plank. To insure compliance with the 
president's will, Clark Clifford, Truman's special counsel, 
came to Philadelphia on July 10 to consult with Senator 
Myers about the language and content of the committee's 
civil rights draft.102 Clifford, it was reported, presented 
Myers with a virtual rewrite of the 1944 plank, containing 
none of the specific recommendations demanded by Walter 
White or the Americans for Democratic Action.103 
But complicating Clifford's task was Hubert Humphrey, 
a member of the drafting committee, who announced that 
he intended to fight for the inclusion of such specific civil 
rights recommendations as an anti-lynching law, abolition 
of the poll tax, an FEPC, and the abolition of segregation in 
101. Box 367, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
102. New York Times, July 12, 1948, p. 31. Members of Myers's 
committee included Senators Scott Lucas of Illinois, Theodore Francis 
Green of Rhode Island, John Sparkman of Alabama, plus Philip 
Perlman, the solicitor general of the United States. 
103. Ibid. For a slightly different description of how the document 
reached Myers, see Ross, The Loneliest Campaign, pp. 120-21. 
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the armed forces.104 But given the preponderant Truman 
majority on this committee, Humphrey was not likely to 
succeed in his attempt to strengthen the plank, unless, of 
course, he was prepared to take the question of the plan to 
the convention floor. As expected, a majority of the plat­
form committee approved a plank articulating the Truman 
position, a move which still failed to placate the most in­
transigent southerners, who wanted not only the restoration 
of the two-thirds rule but a resolution in favor of "states' 
rights" as well. Liberals were offended by the plank's equiv­
ocal language; they wanted specific civil rights propositions, 
not bland generalities. A floor fight was now in prospect. 
On July 14 the civil rights issue precipitated a dramatic 
confrontation between the anti-administration liberals, ad­
ministration supporters, and southern delegates. On behalf 
of the 108 members of the platform committee, Senator 
Myers presented to the convention that version of the civil 
rights plank which a majority of his committee approved: 
The Democratic party is responsible for the great civil 
rights gains made in recent years in eliminating unfair 
and illegal discrimination based on race, creed or color. 
The Democratic party commits itself to continuing its 
efforts to eradicate all racial, religious and economic dis­
crimination. 
We again state our belief that racial and religious 
minorities must have the right to live, the right to work, 
the right to vote, the full and equal protection of the laws, 
on a basis of equality with all citizens as guaranteed by 
the Constitution. 
104. For the role played by Americans for Democratic Action, see 
Clifford Brock, ADA (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1962), p. 97; 
also see Norfolk Journal and Guide, July 17, 1948, p. 2. A shrewd 
account of Humphrey's indecision about leading this fight, and his 
desire to retain organizational roots, can be found in Ross, The 
Loneliest Campaign, pp. 123-24. 
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We again call upon the Congress to exert its full au­
thority to the limit of its constitutional powers to assure 
and protect these rights.105 
After Senator Myers had finished reading the text of the 
platform, other members of the drafting committee submit­
ted their minority resolutions. Dan Moody of Texas, Cecil 
Sims of Tennessee, and Walter Sillers of Mississippi, re­
spectively, presented three different versions of the states' 
rights plank. The Moody plank, the only one of the three to 
receive a roll call vote, read as follows: 
. . . The Democratic Party stands for the principle 
that the Constitution contemplated and established a 
Union of indestructible sovereign states and that under 
the Constitution the general Federal Government and the 
separate states have their separate fields of power and of 
permitted activities. Traditionally it has been and it re­
mains a part of the faith of the Democratic party that the 
Federal Government shall not encroach upon the reserved 
powers of the states by centralization of government and 
otherwise. 
Within the reserved powers of the states, to be exer­
cised subject to the limitations imposed by the Four­
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution on 
the manner of their exercise, is the power to control and 
regulate local affairs and act in the exercise of police 
108 powers.
Congressman Andrew J. Biemiller of Wisconsin, speaking 
for Hubert Humphrey, Esther Murray, and himself, sub­
mitted a liberal civil rights plank to the convention for its 
consideration: 
105. C. Edgar Brown, ed., Democracy at Work (Philadelphia: 
Local Democratic Committee, 1948), p. 167. 
106. Ibid., p. 178. 
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We highly commend President Harry Truman for his 
courageous stand on the issue of civil rights. We call upon 
the Congress to support our President in guaranteeing 
these basic and fundamental principles: The right of full 
and equal political participation, the right to equal oppor­
tunity of employment, the right of security of persons, 
and the right of equal treatment in the service and de­
fense of our Nation.107 
Hubert Humphrey, in defending this substitute plank, 
exhorted the convention: 
Friends, delegates, I do not believe that there can be 
any compromise on the guarantees of the civil rights 
which we have mentioned in the minority report. . . . 
There can be no hedging. The newspaper headlines are 
wrong. 
There will be no hedging, and there will be no watering 
down, if you please, of the instruments and the principles 
of the civil rights program. 
My friends, to those who say that we are rushing this 
issue of civil rights, I say to them, we are 172 years late. 
To those who say that this civil rights program is an 
infringement on states rights, I say this, that the time 
has arrived in America for the Democratic party to get 
out of the shadows of states rights and to walk forth­
rightly into the bright sunshine of human rights. . .  . I 
ask this Convention to say in unmistakable terms that we 
proudly hail and we courageously support our President 
and leader, Harry Truman, in his great fight for civil 
rights in America.108 
Subsequently, a floor vote was held on the Moody resolu­
tion, which was defeated by a vote of 925 nays to 309 yeas, 
as only eleven votes outside of the Solid South were cast for 
it. The Sims and Sillers resolutions were defeated by a voice 
107. Ibid., p. 181. 
108. Ibid., p. 189. 
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vote. Finally, the moment arrived for the crucial vote on the 
Biemiller resolution. As Sam Rayburn, the permanent 
chairman of the 1948 Democratic national convention, was 
about to put it also to a voice vote, a California delegate, 
acting more quickly than Rayburn, requested a roll call.109 
By a vote of 651% to 5821/2 the Biemiller plank was written 
into the platform, largely because of the support it received 
from the big city bosses in New York, Illinois, and Pennsyl­
vania.110 They voted for it out of fear that unless provisions 
were made to hold the black vote, their local and state 
tickets would go down to defeat in the "prospective GOP 
landslide." m Missouri voted against it, as did Rhode Island, 
whose state delegation was controlled by Senator McGrath. 
Outside of the South the administration controlled votes in 
only sixteen states—not enough to defeat the resolution. 
(As Arthur Krock wrote, "Cynical politics was never better 
served than today. The President's spokesmen tried to re­
ject specific endorsement of him and his program in an 
effort to prevent total revolt in the South.") 112 Thus, Tru­
man's efforts to preserve harmony came to naught, for 
immediately after the final civil rights vote was taken, half 
of the Alabama delegation, including Eugene Connor of 
Birmingham, followed by the entire Mississippi delegation, 
walked out of the convention.113 But, other southern dele­
gates refused to join them, preferring instead to remain 
seated despite the convention's stand on civil rights. 
Most southerners refused to bolt, but, incensed by their 
109. Norfolk Journal and Guide, July 24, 1948, p. 2. 
110. Democracy at Work, p. 202. Truman, years later, was to take 
full credit for the action taken by the convention on the civil rights 
plank; see Truman, Memoirs, II, 182. 
111. New York Times, July 15, 1948, p. 8; also see Robert Bendi­
ner, "Rout of the Bourbons," Nation CLXVII (1948), 1-3. 
112. New York Times, July 15, 1948, p. 22. 
113. Key, Southern Politics, p. 335. 
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defeat on the civil rights vote, they overwhelmingly rejected 
Truman as the party's candidate. They supported instead 
Senator Richard Russell of Georgia, who received 263 
southern votes to 13 for Truman. Truman easily won the 
nomination with 947V& votes, with another half-vote going 
to Paul V. McNutt.114 
After nominating Truman, the convention selected Sena­
tor Alben Barkley of Kentucky, a border-state moderate, as 
the party's vice-presidential candidate. He had not been 
Truman's first choice. Truman wanted Supreme Court Jus­
tice William Douglas to be his running mate, perhaps think­
ing that if Douglas were the party's vice-presidential candi­
date, the liberal-labor bloc might be more inclined to work 
for the ticket.115 But Douglas rejected Truman's entreaties, 
thereby opening the way for Leslie Biffle, former secretary 
of the Senate and a backstage power in Democratic circles 
in Washington, to promote the candidacy of Barkley, a 
popular figure in Congress but not in the White House.116 
A feeling of despair gripped the delegates as they pre­
pared to listen to the president's acceptance speech. (It was, 
after all, the judgment of most political pundits that come 
November, Truman was practically a sure loser.) 117 But 
Truman quickly dispelled the convention's gloom with a 
114. New York Times, July 15, 1948, p. 9. Also see James Forres­
tal's Diary, ed. Walter Millis and E. S. Duffield (New York: Viking, 
1951), p. 458, for the following: "He [Truman] made the observation 
that he himself had not wanted to go as far as the Democratic 
platform went on the civil rights issue. He said that he had no animus 
toward the delegates from the Southern states, who had voted against 
the civil rights plank and against his nomination. 'I would have done 
the same thing myself,' [he said], 'if I were in their place and came 
from their states.'" 
115. Jules Abels, Out of the Jaws of Victory (New York: Henry 
Holt& Co., 1959), p. 92. 
116. Author's interview with Oscar Ewing on June 25, 1962. 
117. See Morris Ernst and David Loth, The People Know Best 
(Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1948). 
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fighting talk attacking the record of the Eightieth Congress 
—a Congress which, he said, would be recalled on July 27 
for the purpose of enacting into legislation the high-sound­
ing resolutions contained in the Republican party plat­
form.118 Referring to civil rights, the president commented: 
Everybody knows that I recommended to the Congress 
the civil rights program. I did so because I believe it to be 
my duty under the Constitution. Some members of my 
own party disagreed with me violently on this matter, but 
they stand up and do it openly. People can tell where they 
stand. But the Republicans all professed to be for those 
measures, but the Eightieth Congress did not act. They 
had enough men to do it and they could have had cloture. 
They didn't have to have a filibuster. There are enough 
people in that Congress that would vote for cloture.11' 
Truman neglected to mention that he had not offered to 
cooperate with them in any attempt to secure cloture. 
While Truman lambasted the Republicans, he himself 
was under attack by former Democrats. On July 17 a states' 
rights conference met in Birmingham, Alabama, and se­
lected South Carolina's Governor Strom Thurmond and 
Governor Fielding Wright of Mississippi to head a states' 
rights ticket.120 It was the hope of the conference that this 
ticket would attract enough political support in the form of 
electoral college votes to force the House of Representatives 
to pick the next president.121 In order to throw the election 
into the House, where the South could then bargain with the 
118. For a good account of the strategy that lay behind Truman's 
recalling of Congress, see R. Alton Lee, Truman and Taft-Hartley: A 
Question of Mandate (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 
1966), pp. 120-25. See Ross, The Loneliest Campaign, pp. 133-35. 
119. Democracy at Work, p. 300. 
120. Key, Southern Politics, p. 335. 
121. Abel, Out of the Jaws of Victory, p. 147. 
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various candidates on the civil rights issue, the Dixiecrats 
needed strong backing not only in the deep South but in 
those border states where white supremacist politics was no 
longer quite so fashionable. Hence, Thurmond, in the course 
of the conference, attacked lynching and advocated state 
abolition of the poll tax in an attempt to persuade southern 
moderates that his political organization was in reality de­
fending the noble heritage of Jeffersonian Democracy.122 
Yet lurking behind the scenes, where they were exerting 
real influence, were racist politicians like Senator James 
Eastland of Mississippi and former Alabama governor 
Frank Dixon, whose presence revealed the party's true char­
acter.123 The conference's platform exposed the States 
Eights party for what it was: a vehicle for privilege and 
prejudice.124 Thus the third political convention of 1948 
ended as the fourth was about to begin. 
On July 20 the Progressive party held its convention in 
Philadelphia; it was the one in which blacks played a promi­
nent role. Lankin Marshall Howard, a Negro attorney from 
Des Moines, was the convention's keynote speaker. There 
were approximately 150 other Negroes, including W. E. B. 
Du Bois and Paul Robeson, who attended the convention as 
delegates or alternates. (Robeson was later designated co­
chairman of the party.) Black delegates were among those 
who approved the party platform, which "was more detailed 
in proposals affecting Negroes than were those of the major 
parties, reflecting the Progressives' efforts to capitalize on 
Negro discontent." Evidently, the Progressive party's mili­
tant espousal of civil rights partly reflected the quasi-Com­
munist control of the party machinery. By working through 
the Progressive party, American Communists hoped to in­
122. New York Times, July 18, 1948, p. 3. 
123. Key, Southern Politics, p. 336. 
124. Ibid. 
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corporate Negroes into a coalition of "labor and the people 
against war and fascism." m 
Months before the Progressive party convention, Henry 
Wallace and Idaho's Senator Glenn Taylor, the party's nom­
inees, had been outspoken critics of Jim Crow. For this 
reason many Negroes considered them attractive candi­
dates. Whether Wallace and Taylor could enlist substantial 
numbers of Negroes and white liberals in "Gideon's Army" 
(as the movement was known) was another matter. Their 
party had been stigmatized by Truman and Dewey as a 
Communist front; and Wallace himself was labeled a "Com­
munist dupe." Still, Wallace's potential strength was such 
that he could materially weaken Truman's support in the 
big cities, thus enhancing Dewey's opportunity to win a 
landslide victory. 
On July 26, the day before Congress was scheduled to 
reconvene in special session, President Truman issued two 
executive orders pertaining specifically to civil rights.126 
Both orders—9980 and 9981—had been under careful con­
sideration by the White House for at least six months prior 
to July 26;127 in fact, an early version of 9980 had been 
125. Wilson Record, The Negro and the Communist Party (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1951), pp. 280-81. For a 
different view of the role played by the Communists at that conven­
tion, see MacDougal, Gideon's Army, II, 506-83. 
126. Executive Orders 9980, 9981, in F.R. 4311, 4314. Immediately 
following the Democratic convention, representatives of organizations 
such as the NAACP, the American Veterans Committee, and the 
American Jewish Congress renewed pressure on Truman by asking 
him to issue those orders; see, for example, Walter White to Harry 
Truman, July 23, 1948, Box 367, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
127. Author's interview with George Elsey on June 27, 1962, and 
Philleo Nash on June 29, 1962. Executive Order 9981 had been 
originally part of the omnibus draft bill which the White House failed 
to introduce; for evidence see Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. 
Armed Forces, p. 157. 
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available since March, 1948.128 Only Truman's signature was 
needed to authorize their release, and when that was forth­
coming, the Republican-controlled Congress would be under 
pressure, perhaps, to produce equivalent civil rights legisla­
tion. The Truman orders were timed perfectly, then, to 
focus attention on Congress, and, concurrently, to undercut 
Wallace's standing with many Negroes. In all probability, 
Executive Order 9981 was also designed to reduce the possi­
bility of an immediate confrontation between the adminis­
tration and A. Philip Randolph. Randolph had announced 
on June 26 that unless the president issued an executive 
order desegregating the armed forces before August 16, the 
day the new draft law went into effect (it contained no 
desegregation proviso), then he and his followers "would 
work in the big east coast cities in behalf of a campaign of 
civil disobedience, non registration, and non induction." 129 
Executive Order 9980 authorized the creation of a review 
board in each department and agency of the federal execu­
tive branch to whom government employees could appeal if 
they felt victimized by discriminatory employment prac­
tices. The Fair Employment Board, attached to the Civil 
Service Commission, was designed "to coordinate the prac­
tices and procedures of the various departments and 
agencies, to maintain overall supervision of their compli­
ance with the policy and to serve as a final review body to 
hear appeals from the decision of departmental heads on 
complaints of discrimination." 13° 
Executive Order 9981 provided the framework that could 
make possible a major breakthrough in race relations. 
128. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Apr. 3, 1948, p. 18. 
129. Pittsburgh Courier, July 3, 1948, p. 1. 
130. Philleo Nash Files, Box 6, HSTL. The FEB had no power to 
enforce its decisions; all it could do was appeal to the president. 
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It is hereby declared to be the policy of the President that 
there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for 
all persons in the armed services without regard to race, 
color, religion or national origin. This policy shall be put 
into effect as rapidly as possible, having due regard to the 
time required to effectuate any necessary changes with­
out impairing efficiency or morale.131 
It also authorized the creation of the President's Committee 
on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed 
Forces to study and resolve the problem of discrimination 
and segregation in the armed forces in accordance with the 
president's stated policy. Of the two orders, 9981 was con­
siderably more important, because if it were properly im­
plemented, its results would be more far-reaching. Profes­
sor Milton Konvitz does not exaggerate its significance 
when he suggests that "in the history of civil rights in the 
United States, this order ranks among the most important 
steps taken to end racial discrimination." 132 
Truman's action prompted criticism from different 
sources for a variety of reasons. The Baltimore Sun sug­
gested that "the timing of President Truman's executive 
orders against racial discrimination in civilian government 
employment and in the armed forces strongly suggests that 
they were politically inspired." 133 The Montgomery Adver­
tiser stated that "Truman's army program is of more raw 
and repugnant character than that urged for the civilian 
provinces." 134 The Shreveport Times accused the president 
of "grandstanding to try to get back some of the Roosevelt 
131. Freedom To Serve (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1950), pp. xi-xii. 
132. Milton Konvitz, Expanding Liberties: Freedom's Gains in 
Postwar America (New York: Viking, 1966), p. 260. 
133. July 27, 1948. 
134. July 29, 1948. 
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Negro vote which seems to be swinging to the Wallace-Com­
munist Progressive banner in some areas." 135 
Henry Wallace was also critical of the president's efforts 
to fight discrimination in the federal ranks: 
Mr. Truman's nightmares over the rapid growth of the 
Progressive party have forced him to face the issue of 
discrimination, but once again he has made only an 
empty gesture. He has written in the executive order the 
language of the South. He talks glibly of "equal oppor­
tunity" and "equal treatment," dodges always used to 
avoid action, but fails utterly to attack the heart of the 
matter—segregation. 
The President's order on equality of treatment in the 
armed forces says nothing, promises nothing, does noth­
ing—and leaves segregation intact.136 
Senator Richard Russell, a powerful member of the Sen­
ate Armed Services Committee, charged that Truman's ex­
ecutive orders were "articles of unconditional surrender to 
the Wallace convention, and to the treasonable civil disobe­
dience campaign organized by the Negroes, by A. Philip 
Randolph and Grant Reynolds." Russell further asserted 
that Truman was unwilling to prosecute those men who 
were defying the Selective Service Act because "such action 
would alienate the few Negroes who remain loyal to him in 
the present political campaign." 137 
Although General Omar Bradley, chief of staff, had not 
read the president's order, he declared at Fort Knox, Ken­
tucky, on July 28 that "the Army is not out to make any 
social reforms. The Army will put men of different races in 
different companies. It will change that policy when the 
135. Aug. 1,1948. 
136. New York Times, July 28, 1948, p. 4. 
137. Ibid., p. 8. 
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Nation as a whole changes it." 138 This startling statement 
had to be refuted at once if the president's order was to be 
taken seriously. In order to clarify the situation, Truman 
pointed out at his press conference of July 29 that the 
language of his executive order would compel the armed 
forces eventually to abolish the practice of segregation and 
discrimination.139 That the White House had no intention of 
equivocating on this issue was further reaffirmed by Sena­
tor McGrath, who told A. Philip Randolph and Grant Rey­
nolds on August 2 that the seven-man presidential commit­
tee, which was designed to supervise the program of 
desegregation, would "initiate its activities and functions 
on the basis of non segregation." 140 Randolph, apparently 
satisfied that the president was sincere in his advocacy of a 
non-Jim Crow military service, announced on August 18 
that the civil disobedience campaign he and Reynolds had 
organized was going to be terminated.141 
On July 27 the president addressed the special session of 
Congress, and near the end of his speech, he made a specific 
reference to civil rights. 
Finally, I wish to urge upon the Congress the measures I 
recommended last February to protect and extend the 
basic civil rights of citizenship and human liberty. A 
number of bills to carry out my recommendations have 
been introduced in the Congress. Many of them have 
already received careful consideration by Congressional 
committees. Only one bill, however, has been enacted, a 
138. Washington Post, July 29, 1948. 
139. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1948, pp. 
422-23. 
140. Grant Reynolds, "Triumph for Disobedience," Nation CLXVII 
(1948), 228. 
141. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Aug. 21, 1948, p. 1; Aug. 28, 1948, 
p. 2. 
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bill relating to the rights of Americans of Japanese ori­
gins. I believe that it is necessary to enact the laws I have 
recommended to make the guarantees of the Constitution 
real and vital. I believe they are necessary to carry out 
our American ideals of liberty and justice for all.142 
The Republican leadership—now on the spot—responded 
to the president's request by bringing to the floor of the 
Senate H.R. 29, the anti-poll tax bill, which had cleared the 
House on July 21, 1947, by a vote of 290 to 112.143 This bill 
immediately ran into that well-known verbal buzz saw, a 
southern filibuster. Moreover, it became the focus for an 
important procedural wrangle over Rule Twenty-two, a rule 
providing the only available means of terminating Senate 
debate. That rule authorized the limitation of discussion on 
a given issue if two-thirds of all those present and voting 
agreed to support cloture. 
On August 2 the Republican leadership presented a clo­
ture petition—requesting a cloture vote—to the Senate's 
president pro tempore, Michigan's Arthur Vandenberg. At 
this point Senator Richard Russell, the de facto leader of 
the southern bloc, raised a point of order, contending that 
according to Rule Twenty-two, cloture might only be in­
voked when a "pending measure," not a "motion," was 
before the Senate. He argued that the move to make the 
anti-poll tax bill the immediate business of the Senate came 
through a motion that automatically precluded the intro­
duction of a cloture petition.144 Although Senator Vanden­
berg spoke in favor of anti-poll tax legislation, he sustained 
Russell's point of order, predicating his decision on the fact 
142. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1948, pp. 
420-21. 
143. Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1948, XCIII, 
9551-52. 
144. Ibid., 80th Cong., 2d Sess., XCIV, Part 8, pp. 9598-9600. 
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that there was no existing authority to justify any other 
ruling.145 In other words, Vandenberg argued that Rule 
Twenty-two failed to specify whether cloture applied to 
motions. His ruling also meant that unlimited debate on the 
anti-poll tax bill could rightfully continue, and that there 
was no legal way for the Senate to terminate it until the 
rules under which the Senate operated were changed. On 
August 4 Nebraska's Senator Kenneth Wherry, the Republi­
can majority leader, announced that it was necessary to 
shelve the anti-poll tax bill. He also revealed that his party 
had decided to make a determined effort in the new session 
of Congress, beginning in January, 1949, to change Rule 
Twenty-two, thereby making it possible to deal with the 
problems raised by the Vandenberg ruling.146 On August 7 
the special session adjourned, with little accomplished. 
The fact that Congress produced next to nothing in the 
way of significant legislation gave President Truman a 
ready-made issue: the domestic record of the Eightieth Con­
gress. And once the campaign was in full swing, Truman 
constantly played on that theme. At the same time, he solic­
ited the support of labor, the farmer, the consumer, and the 
Negro. In other words, "though not a New Dealer at heart," 
wrote Walter Lippmann, Truman was a politician "who 
appreciates the voting strength of the Roosevelt 
combination." 147 Whatever hopes Truman had of victory 
depended largely on the support he would receive from that 
powerful political coalition. The question was: Would it 
remain intact for one more election campaign? 
By early September, Truman was solidifying his support 
among black voters. The southern walkout at the Demo­
145. Ibid., pp. 9603-4. 
146. Ibid., p. 9736. 
147. Cited in Abels, Out of the Jaws of Victory, p. 82. 
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cratic national convention had dramatized his differences 
with the Dixiecrats, hence convincing many Negroes that 
his advocacy of civil rights legislation was genuine. Execu­
tive Order 9981 also had made a distinct impression upon 
the Negro community, a fact confirmed by Donald Dawson, 
a White House aide, in a memo he sent to Truman on 
September 9: 
1) Since your executive order was issued all important 
opposition to the draft on the basis of the Army's race 
policy has disappeared. Philip Randolph and Grant Rey­
nolds have withdrawn from their Committee Against Jim 
Crow, and only a few C.O.'s and other war resisters 
remain in the movement. 
2) Negro leaders and their white friends have been 
universal in the praise of the order and in their support 
of the proposed committee. 
3) The Committee will have complete minority press 
support. The Negro press, which had been conducting a 
vigorous campaign against the Army's racial policy has 
now abandoned it.148 
In order to enhance further his position with Negroes, 
the president on September 18 designated the seven men 
who were to become members of the President's Committee 
on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed 
Services. They were Charles Fahy, former solicitor general 
of the United States; Lester Granger, executive secretary of 
the Urban League; John H. Sengstacke, editor of the influ­
ential Negro newspaper the Chicago Defender; Dwight Pal­
mer and Charles Luckman, industrialists; William Steven­
son, educator; and Alphonsus J. Donahue, a prominent 
Catholic layman.149 This committee, subsequently known as 
148. Memorandum to the President from Donald Dawson, Septem­
ber 9,1948, Philleo Nash Files, Box 6, HSTL. 
149. Philleo Nash Files, Box 28, HSTL. Luckman and Donahue 
contributed no work to the committee. 
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the Fahy Committee, was scheduled to begin its work in 
January, 1949, assuming, of course, that Truman was still 
in the White House. 
While Truman was reaping the benefits that accrued 
from the release of his executive orders, Henry Wallace 
toured the South and spoke before racially integrated audi­
ences, wherever possible, to convince Negroes of the sincer­
ity of his egalitarian convictions.150 It was a courageous 
effort which Truman had no intention of matching. During 
his campaign swing through Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, and 
Missouri in late September, Truman ignored the issue of 
civil rights, because, among other reasons, the Democratic 
leaders in the states he visited discouraged any discussion of 
the subject. They felt that it was "too hot"; its discussion 
would only succeed in driving many Democrats away from 
the regular organization into the "states' rights party," thus 
making it difficult for them to elect their own local candi­
dates.151 Finally, though, after arriving in Carbondale, Illi­
nois, on September 30, Truman did make brief mention of 
the fact that his administration had fought "to expand our 
civil liberties by new measures against discrimination."1M 
That Truman's measures were influencing Negro voters 
was also confirmed by Carl T. Rowan, a journalist for the 
Baltimore Afro-American. On October 2 he reported the 
results of a poll the Afro-American had conducted in four 
widely separated Negro districts in Baltimore: Truman re­
ceived 43.7 percent of the votes; Dewey, 26.5 percent; and 
Wallace, 22 percent.153 On the basis of this sample it could be 
150. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Sept. 4, 1948, p. 1; MacDougal, 
Gideon's Army, III, 707-44. 
151. Pittsburgh Courier, Oct. 2, 1948, pp. 1, 4. 
152. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 19t8, p. 
650. 
153. P. 11. 
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ascertained that Truman held a comfortable lead over his 
two rivals at least in the black wards of predominantly-
Democratic Baltimore. But Truman was not carrying these 
wards by a sufficiently large margin; Wallace was evidently 
still cutting into his strength. 
Truman was compensating for the inroads Wallace was 
making in the North by doing well in the South, because the 
Dixiecrat rebellion seemed to have jelled in only four south­
ern states: South Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi, and 
Louisiana.154 Elsewhere in the South, there was no real oppo­
sition to Truman's candidacy. Even Senator Richard Rus­
sell of Georgia, Dixie's candidate at the Philadelphia con­
vention, endorsed the Democratic standard-bearer a few 
days before the election because he felt the South was safer 
with Truman.155 As the chairman of the Democratic state 
committee of North Carolina suggested: "What can we ac­
complish? . . . The Republicans are committed to a more 
determined civil rights program than our party is and Gov­
ernor Dewey has already put into effect in the New York 
government many of the proposals to which we in the South 
most vigorously object." 156 
During the last few weeks of the campaign, Truman 
concentrated on the key industrial states in the North and 
East. While making that final swing, Truman at first com­
pletely muted the civil rights issue; but on October 23 he 
toured the Negro slums of Philadelphia, which no previous 
president had visited, and was well received. On October 25 
he informed an audience at the Chicago Stadium: 
Dangerous men, who are trying to win followers for their 
war on democracy, are attacking Catholics, Jews and 
154. For a preelection state-by-state survey, see Key, Southern 
Politics, pp. 337-44. 
155. Cited in Abels, Out of the Jaws of Victory, p. 219. 
156. Ibid., p. 220. 
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Negroes and other minority races and religions. . .  . We 
must do everything we can to protect our democratic 
principles against those who foment racial and religious 
prejudice. This evil force must be defeated. I shall con­
tinue the fight. And I pledge to you that I shall never 
surrender.157 
On October 26 Truman asserted in South Bend, Indiana, 
that the creed of the Democratic party was predicated on 
the idea "that all men are created free and equal, and that 
everyone deserves an even break. It is a respect for the 
dignity of men and women without regard to race, creed or 
color." 158 Later that same day, Truman spoke in Cleveland 
and reminded his audience that he had urged the special 
session of Congress to pass legislation to protect the "basic 
rights of citizenship and human liberty." But, asserted Tru­
man, the Republican party, which had been paying lip serv­
ice to this kind of legislation for years, never could quite 
manage to act upon it when the "showdown" came.169 
Climaxing Truman's drive to win the Negro vote was a 
speech he delivered in Harlem on October 29 (though the 
decision to speak there was made at the last minute). The 
first president ever to talk in Harlem, Truman was warmly 
welcomed by some 65,000 people who heard his remarks and 
saw him receive the first Franklin Delano Roosevelt Memo­
rial Brotherhood Medal from the Reverend Dr. C. A. John­
son.160 Addressing this assemblage on the first anniversary 
of the day he had been presented with the report of his civil 
rights committee, Truman discussed the meaning and sig­
nificance of To Secure These Rights. After praising the 
157. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1948, p. 
852. 
158. Ibid., p. 854. 
159. Ibid., p. 868. 
160. New York Times, Oct. 30, 1948, p. 6. 
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work and the recommendations of the committee, Truman 
proceeded to outline his administration's record on civil 
rights: 
After the Civil Rights Committee submitted its report, 
I asked Congress to do ten of the things recommended by 
the committee. 
You know what they did about that.

So I went ahead and did what the President can do,

unaided by Congress. 
I issued two executive orders. 
One of them established the President's Committee on 
Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed 
Services. 
The other covered regulations governing fair employ­
ment practices within the federal establishment. 
In addition to that, the Department of Justice went 
into the Supreme Court and aided in getting a decision 
oulawing restrictive covenants. 
Several states and municipalities have taken action on 
the recommendations of the Civil Rights Committee, and 
I hope more will follow after them. 
Today the democratic way of life is being- challenged 
all over the world. Democracy's answer to the challenge 
of totalitarianism is its promise of equal rights and equal 
opportunity for all mankind. 
The fulfillment of this promise is among the highest 
purposes of government. 
Our determination to attain the goal of equal rights 
and equal opportunity must be resolute and unwavering. 
For my part, I intend to keep moving toward this goal 
with every ounce of strength and determination I have.161 
Apparently, the Truman record on civil rights did not 
impress key opinion-molders within the Negro community 
for, ironically, Truman failed to receive the editorial en­
161. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1948, pp, 
923-25. 
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dorsement of any major black newspaper except the Chi­
cago Defender; the rest supported Dewey. For example, the 
Pittsburgh Courier, the most widely circulated Negro news­
paper, declared on October 30: "Put Governor Thomas E. 
Dewey in the White House where he can do for all Negroes 
of the nation what he has done for the Negroes of New 
York state." 162 Whether Negroes who read such newspapers 
as the Courier, the Baltimore Afro-American, and the New 
York Amsterdam News had been influenced by their edi­
torial stand would soon be determined on election day, Nov­
ember 2, 1948. 
The results of that election staggered millions of Ameri­
cans, including most Republicans, many Democrats, and 
practically all political pollsters. Truman achieved a certain 
political immortality because of his spectacular victory, 
which on the basis of hindsight was not quite so remarka­
ble.163 Although Truman had been harassed on both flanks 
by political defectors and challenged in the center by the 
leader of a formidable political organization, he successfully 
routed his enemies by battling on behalf of Franklin Roose­
velt's New Deal coalition, which in 1948 was still a potent 
political force in the United States. In the words of Clark 
Clifford, an architect of the 1948 campaign: "We had to be 
bold. If we had kept on plugging away in moderate terms, 
we might have reached mid-field when the gun went off, so 
we had to throw long passes, anything to stir up labor, and 
to get the mass votes of the great cities of the Middle West, 
New England and the East." 1M 
162. Cecilia Van Auken, "The Negro Press in the 1948 Presidential 
Election," Journalism Quarterly XXVI (1949), 431-35. 
163. Lubell, The Future of American Politics, p. 190. An exciting 
description and analysis of the 1948 campaign can be found in Ross, 
The Loneliest Campaign, pp. 163-271. 
164. New York Times, Nov. 4, 1948, p. 8. 
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Among the factors which contributed to Truman's 1948 
victory was the widespread prosperity that the country was 
experiencing. Many voters, urban and rural alike, felt that 
if Dewey won the presidency, a depression would surely 
follow.165 Truman exploited this issue during the campaign, 
and with it rallied to his banner millions of voters, espe­
cially from the middle and lower classes, who lived in the 
great cities and rural hinterlands of America. Included in 
the urban group were many black Americans, who discov­
ered in Truman a spokesman for both their political and 
economic interests. For these reasons, almost two-thirds of 
the Negroes who voted in 1948 cast their ballots for him. 
According to a post-election survey conducted by the 
NAACP, 69 percent of all Negro voters in twenty-seven 
major cities and communities across the country had voted 
for Truman. In fact, in some of these Negro districts, he 
received greater support than did Franklin Roosevelt in any 
of his elections.166 And it was fortunate for Truman that 
Negroes found him to be such an attractive candidate, be­
cause if a sizable number of black voters had opted for 
Dewey or Wallace in any two of the three key states of 
California, Illinois, and Ohio, Dewey would have won the 
White House.167 
To illustrate the crucial character of the Negro vote in 
these three states, it is necessary to examine the election 
returns in some detail. Truman carried California by 17,865 
votes; in one black district of Los Angeles he received 
165. For an analysis of the urban vote, see Lee, Taft-Hartley, pp. 
143-52; for an analysis of the farm vote, see Matusow, Farm Policies 
and Politics in the Truman Years, pp. 185-89. A reexamination of the 
farm vote is undertaken by Ross, The Loneliest Campaign, pp. 256-60. 
166. Henry Lee Moon, "What Chance for Civil Rights," Crisis LVI 
(1949), 42-45. 
167. Arnold Aronson and Samuel Spiegler, "Does the Republican 
Party Want the Negro Vote?", Crisis LXVIII (1949), 365. 
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30,742 votes as compared with Dewey's 7,146 and Wallace's 
4,092. Truman won Illinois by only 33,612; yet Chicago's 
Negroes provided him with a plurality almost four times 
the margin by which he carried the state. The election in 
Ohio was particularly close: Truman squeezed out a 7,107­
vote victory. Again, as in California and Illinois, his win­
ning margin was provided by blacks, this time from Cleve­
land and Akron, who gave him a 65,000-vote plurality over 
Dewey. Truman also did extremely well in Negro districts 
located in states he lost to Dewey. In New York's Harlem he 
polled 108,643 votes to Dewey's 34,076 and Wallace's 28,903. 
In New Jersey and Pennsylvania he carried black wards by 
2-to-l, 3-to-l, and sometimes by 4-to-l margins.168 
Dewey generally ignored Negro voters, a policy decision 
which did not help him on election day. In short, "while 
Truman made capital of his civil rights proposals, Dewey 
kept silent about his civil rights accomplishments."16B 
Dewey further damaged his standing with most Negroes by 
actively soliciting southern votes. The latter maneuver was 
especially self-defeating because few Southern Democrats 
voted for him, and most northern Negroes, offended by his 
ostensible disregard of their interests—especially economic 
—sided with Truman. On the other hand, it seems clear that 
Dewey carried Delaware, Indiana, and Maryland with the 
help of Negro voters. Dewey won Indiana by a margin of 
168. New York Times, Nov. 30, 1948, p. 22. Congresswoman Helen 
Gahagan Douglas confirmed the importance of the black vote in 
California. She suggested in a letter to Walter White, written after 
the election, that "whenever there was a block of minority votes in the 
state they went almost solidly for the President. I am convinced that 
the President's Civil Rights Program was one of the most important 
factors in the successful outcome of the election" (Helen Gahagan 
Douglas to Walter White, December 3, 1948, Douglas File, Box 419, 
NAACP Papers, L.C.). 
169. Aronson and Spiegler, "Does the Republican Party Want the 
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13,246 votes, and the 16,467 votes he received from Hoosier 
Negroes allowed him to carry the state.170 But in no state did 
Dewey and the Republican party receive a majority of the 
black vote in the 1948 election. 
Henry Wallace's apparent surge of the spring and the 
early summer faded completely by November 2, 1948. The 
existence of widespread prosperity, the total lack of support 
in the farm belt, the inability to rebut the "Communist 
front" charge, the partial preemption of the Progressive 
party's domestic program by Truman, the Stalinist coup 
d'etat in Prague—all these factors help to account for the 
rapid decline in Wallace's fortunes. Yet the 2.3 percent of 
the national vote which Wallace received was enough to 
deprive Truman of the electoral votes of several states. In 
New York, for example, Wallace picked up 509,559 votes, 
making it possible for Dewey to take the Empire State by a 
60,951-vote margin. And the same story was repeated in 
Michigan and Maryland.171 
Although Wallace prevented a Truman victory in New 
York, Michigan, and Maryland, he ironically contributed 
mightily to Truman's ultimate success. Long before the 
actual campaign began, Truman and his advisers—most 
notably, Clark Clifford—saw Wallace as such a serious 
threat that they devised a strategy to undercut his appeal 
with those voting blocs whose support was deemed vital to 
the hopes of the Democratic party. And not the least among 
them was the Negro bloc. 
During the campaign Wallace solicited Negro support, 
but failed to obtain more than 10 percent of that vote, a 
factor which counted heavily in Truman's favor, especially 
170. Norfolk Journal and Guide, May 10, 1952, p. 5. 
171. Karl Schmidt, Henry Wallace: Quixotic Crusader (Syracuse, 
N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1960), pp. 232-51. 
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in the states of California, Illinois, and Ohio.172 Most Ne­
groes refused to forsake the Democratic party, thinking 
that if they did, Truman's chances of winning would be 
severely reduced. They believed that a vote for a third-party 
candidate would benefit only Dewey, who, in their opinion, 
was the least attractive candidate. Thus, Wallace was given 
short shrift by the vast majority of voting Negroes, who 
supported Truman because they were sharing in the coun­
try's prosperity and because the Dixiecrat revolt had con­
vinced them that he was sincere in the advocacy of his civil 
rights program.173 
The Dixiecrats, too, had been convinced of the sincerity 
of Truman's commitment, so much so that they organized a 
political party for the purpose of depriving him of the 
electoral votes he needed to win, thus allowing the House of 
Representatives to decide the outcome. Their hopes were 
frustrated by the fact that they carried only four southern 
states: South Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisi­
ana. The relatively poor showing of the Thurmond-Wright 
ticket (which received just 12,000 more votes than the 
Wallace-Taylor combination) can be attributed to several 
factors: (1) a reasonably good Democratic party discipline 
that reinforced the ingrained voting habits of a substantial 
number of southerners; (2) fear on the part of Southern 
Democrats that if Truman won, he would punish the bolters 
in and out of Congress by denying them their party position 
and patronage privileges; (3) distrust of Dixiecrat motives, 
that is, a suspicion that the States' Rights party was really 
a vehicle for economic conservatism, which (at least in 
1948), many southern whites, the beneficiaries of the New 
172. Moon, "What Chance for Civil Rights," pp. 242-45. 
173. MacDougal, Gideon's Army, III, 678-80; Norfolk Journal and 
Guide, Nov. 27, 1948, p. 8. 
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Deal, rejected; (4) a growing southern liberalism as ev­
idenced in newspapers, magazines, and the lessening of 
hard-core racism, especially in the border states and the 
upper South, where blacks were beginning to vote in in­
creasing numbers.174 
The results of the 1948 election demonstrated that the 
politics of civil rights had become institutionalized on the 
national level. Negroes had at last crossed the threshold of 
influence, making it possible for them to "win a place at the 
table where Madisonian realists played the game of interest 
politics in the traditional American way: those who have 
are heard." 175 In other words, black political strength in the 
states with the largest electoral votes was now sufficiently 
great to determine the outcome of a national election in the 
event that that election was closely contested. As Henry 
Moon, voting analyst for the NAACP, suggested even before 
the 1948 election, Negroes, because of their strategic posi­
tion, were in a position to become a "balance of power" 
force in national politics.176 This development, of course, 
might require them to swing back and forth between the 
parties to obtain maximum political leverage. In 1948, how­
ever, the loyalty of Negroes to the Democratic party pro­
duced the same results. How significant or decisive that 
black vote would be in the context of a Republican landslide 
was another question. 
Subsequent to the election, civil rights remained a major 
domestic political issue. At a press conference on November 
174. Emile Ader, "Why the Dixiecrats Failed," Journal of Politics 
XV (1953), 356-69. 
175. William C. Berrnan, "The Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 
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Research Period, ed. Richard Kirkendall (Columbia: University of 
Missouri Press, 1967), p. 193. 
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16, President Truman was asked whether he was going to 
send another civil rights message to Congress. He an­
swered : "Yes, it will be in the Message on the State of the 
Union, and will follow the Democratic platform. It will take 
in the proposals agreed on in the Democratic platform." "7 
Alabama's Senator John Sparkman, in an attempt to blunt 
Truman's expected legislative efforts, suggested on Novem­
ber 24 that a joint congressional committee be created to 
study the social and economic problems of various minori­
ties.178 (The New York Times condemned this proposal as 
"another Southern delaying action," which would only du­
plicate the work of the President's Civil Rights 
Committee.) m On November 25 administration leaders in­
timated that in the forthcoming session of Congress an 
attempt would be made to modify Senate Rule Twenty-two 
in order to make possible the passage of civil rights legisla­
tion.180 Such legislation would receive the president's active 
support, reported Walter White following his November 28 
meeting with Truman at the White House.181 
177. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 19i8, p. 
974. 
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Notwithstanding Truman's professed desire to carry the battle for 
civil rights legislation to the Congress, his administration was pursu­
ing a racist policy in the burgeoning field of internal security. This 
practice was discussed by Walter White in a letter he wrote to the 
president on November 26, just two days before their scheduled 
meeting at the White House. White stated: "The NAACP is greatly 
concerned about an increasing tendency of the part of government 
agencies to associate activity on interracial matters with disloyalty. 
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people have been asked whether they entertained white people in their 
 135 The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration
On December 24, 1948, the New York Times disclosed 
that the Republicans were hoping to embarrass the Demo­
crats by pushing for civil rights legislation at the beginning 
of the new session of Congress.182 Specifically, Senate Re­
publicans planned to seek a slight change in the Senate rules 
so as to curtail the southern filibuster. Whether their pro­
posals would dovetail with the plans of the Democratic 
liberals, who wanted to end debate by a simple majority 
vote, was not yet clear. 
As the New Year approached, President Truman could 
look back at the fading year with a sense of satisfaction. He 
had been elected president of the United States because of 
the support given him by labor, farmers, and the various 
racial and religious minorities. But that support now obli­
gated him to present to the Congress a program including 
the major reforms he espoused during the campaign. The 
question facing Truman as the new Eighty-first Congress 
prepared to convene, with a solid Democratic majority, was 
whether it would be more sympathetic to civil rights legisla­
tion than its immediate predecessor had been. 
homes. In addition, there is considerable evidence before us that many 
colored government employees, who are now being1 charged with dis­
loyalty, have such accusations brought against them because they have 
actively opposed segregation and discrimination in their places of 
employment or in their communities" (see OF 252K, HSTL). 
182. P. 18. 

Chapter 4 
THE CONGRESS, THE COALITION, 
AND THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE 
On the eve of the first session of the Eighty-first Congress, 
it seemed that President Truman was in a good position to 
achieve his legislative program. The Republicans had been 
defeated in the November election, and the conservative 
congressional coalition appeared to be on the defensive. But 
the Democrats, even with substantial majorities in both 
houses, needed good organization and direction. Liberals 
assumed that Truman would provide exemplary executive 
leadership while, concurrently, his congressional lieuten­
ants would lead their legions with skill and imagination. 
Here, however, was the rub. There was little evidence in 
138 The Congress, the Coalition, and the Federal Executive 
Truman's presidential career that he had mastered or could 
master the art and technique of manipulation and persua­
sion needed to compel his former associates to do his bid­
ding on matters affecting domestic legislation.1 Further­
more, administration spokesmen in Congress, other than 
House Speaker Sam Rayburn, were not exceptionally quali­
fied to steer complex and controversial legislation through 
the congressional maze. For example, the new Senate ma­
jority leader was Senator Scott Lucas, "a downstate Illinois 
Democrat whose postures were liberal, but whose visceral 
instincts often tended to be conservative—particularly on 
matters concerning civil rights." 2 Lucas had fought against 
the tough civil rights plank at the 1948 Democratic national 
convention, a fact which undoubtedly helped to make his 
appointment as majority leader acceptable to Georgia's 
Richard Russell, an acknowledged leader of the de facto con­
servative coalition.3 The Senate Democratic whip was Fran­
cis Myers of Pennsylvania, who was renowned neither for 
his leadership abilities nor for his unswerving devotion to 
civil rights. Myers, like Lucas, had supported the adminis­
tration position on civil rights at the 1948 convention and 
had helped draft the mild civil rights plank which Truman 
wanted in the platform.4 
In the House the quality of leadership was better in terms 
of general legislative effectiveness. Sam Rayburn, its 
Speaker, was a gifted parliamentarian and a party manager 
of considerable astuteness and ability. Like Truman, with 
1. A critical analysis of Truman's leadership qualities can be found 
in Athan Theoharis, "The Truman Presidency," a paper read at the 
August 29, 1967, meeting of the Pacific Coast Historical Association. 
2. Roland Evans and Robert Novak, Lyndon B. Johnson: The 
Exercise of Power (New York: New American Library, 1966), p. 40. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Democracy at Work, p. 167. 
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whom he maintained a close friendship, Rayburn was an 
organization man, who spoke for the centrist faction within 
the Democratic party. But also like his southern counter­
parts in the Senate, Rayburn had no use for civil rights 
legislation, a point he made clear many times before and 
during the 1948 campaign.6 His assistant, John McCormack 
of Massachusetts, the House majority leader, served him 
with loyalty and respect. And Rayburn, aware that civil 
rights was a standing threat to the cohesiveness of the 
party, acknowledged and praised McCormack's skill in engi­
neering compromises on this matter.6 
As the Democratic congressional leadership girded itself 
for the battles to come, Congress convened on January 3, 
1949. On that first day of the new session, Speaker Sam 
Rayburn and Rules Committee Chairman Adolph Sabath, a 
liberal Democrat, successfully spearheaded a drive to 
weaken the power of the Rules Committee, the graveyard of 
liberal legislation. Under their direction the House voted 
275 (225 Democrats, 49 Republicans, and 1 independent) to 
143 (112 Republicans and 31 Southern Democrats) to allow 
committee chairmen to introduce committee-cleared legisla­
tion directly to the House floor when their bills had been 
blocked by the Rules Committee for twenty-one or more 
days.7 The new rule also empowered the Speaker to recog­
nize at his discretion those committee chairmen who were 
seeking to circumvent the trap of the Rules Committee. 
5. Richard Boiling, House Out of Order (New York: E. P. Dutton, 
1965), p. 74. 
6. As chairman of the platform committee of the Democratic 
national convention, McCormack arranged compromises on civil rights 
planks in 1944, 1952, and 1956 (ibid.). 
7. Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, Vol. XCV, 
Part 1, pp. 10-11. Evidently Rayburn was not happy with the adop­
tion of the twenty-one-day rule in later Congresses; see Boiling, House 
Out of Order, p. 207. 
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Thus, the administration found the means of bringing its 
program to the House floor, where at least a vote could be 
obtained on key legislation. 
Following this important procedural victory, President 
Truman went to the Congress on January 5 to deliver his 
State of the Union address. Calling for the enactment of a 
"Fair Deal" for the American people, Truman once more 
requested that Congress consider his civil rights program. 
He said: 
The driving force behind our progress is our faith in 
our domestic institutions. That faith is embodied in the 
promise of equal rights and equal opportunities which the 
founders of our Republic proclaimed to their countrymen 
and to the whole world. 
The fulfillment of this promise is among the highest 
purposes of government. The civil rights proposals I 
made to the 80th Congress, I now repeat to the 81st. They 
should be enacted in order that the Federal Government 
may assume the leadership and discharge the obligations 
placed upon it by the Constitution. 
I stand squarely behind those proposals.8 
The response to his message was predictably mixed. Wal­
ter White saw "a practicing as well as a talking about 
democracy." 9 Representative Eugene Cox of Georgia re­
marked : "It looks as though we are going the way England 
went, and without the restraint and caution the Britons 
exercised. An approval of the civil rights program will 
mean a creation of the greatest social disturbance the coun­
try has ever known." 10 New York Representative Emanuel 
Celler, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, said 
8. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 19h9 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 6. 
9. New York Times, Jan. 6, 1949, p. 6. 
10. Ibid. 
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that his committee would try to act on the civil rights 
program "within the first 100 days of the session." J1 
Though the president had cleared a major procedural 
hurdle in the House, he still faced what appeared to be an 
insuperable obstacle in the Senate, that is, a Senate filibus­
ter. Unless the filibuster rule was liberalized, the South 
would surely block passage of all civil rights legislation. To 
avoid a prolonged and perhaps costly fight, Arkansas Sena­
tor John McClellen suggested that Truman abandon his 
demand for an FEPC in order to facilitate a workable com­
promise on the other features of his civil rights program.12 
While Southern Democrats awaited further develop­
ments, leaders of both parties in the Senate were formulat­
ing plans which could have a significant bearing on the 
success or failure of any civil rights program in the Eigh­
ty-first Congress. Democratic Senator Carl Hayden of Ari­
zona, the chairman of the Senate Rules and Administration 
Committee—which was in no way comparable in power or 
function to the House Rules Committee—and Nebraska's 
Senator Kenneth Wherry, the Senate minority leader, de­
cided to sponsor jointly Senate Resolution Fifteen, authoriz­
ing the modification of Senate Rule Twenty-two so as to 
give the Senate greater power to limit filibusters.13 They felt 
the existing rule was inadequate because it failed to provide 
the Senate with the means of limiting filibusters directed at 
motions. In other words, any number of Senators could 
forestall action on a particular bill by merely filibustering a 
motion to take up the measure, thereby subjecting the Sen­
ate to a delaying tactic for which there was no remedy. The 
11. Ibid. 
12. American Jewish Yearbook, 19^9 (Philadelphia: Jewish Publi­
cation Society of America, 1950), p. 101. 
13. Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, Vol. XCV, 
Part 1, p. 59. 
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Hayden-Wherry proposal was designed to provide the Sen­
ate with a parliamentary rule allowing it to terminate de­
bate on both a motion and a measure if two-thirds of those 
present and voting in the chamber were willing to invoke 
cloture.14 It was possible that Resolution Fifteen could pass 
the Senate if a coalition of Republicans and northern Demo­
crats could coalesce long enough to overpower southern 
opposition; otherwise, the fight for civil rights legislation 
would end even before a specific program had been intro­
duced. 
As Hayden and Wherry sought support for their resolu­
tion, President Truman made it clear that he was not pre­
pared to let the civil rights issue slide into political oblivion, 
a point he emphasized on January 12 at a White House 
meeting with Herbert Bayard Swope, Robert Patterson, 
and Morris Ernst, members of a National Citizens Council 
on Civil Rights.15 Truman informed them that he was going 
to do something "right away" to translate his civil rights 
program into legislation. The administration, he announced, 
was already drafting bills to support and implement the 
recommendations contained in his February 2, 1948, mes­
sage to Congress.16 
If Truman submitted actual legislation to Congress, it 
would have certainly produced a struggle in both houses. 
But that struggle would have been in vain unless or until 
the Senate liberalized Rule Twenty-two. Oddly enough, Sen­
ate Democratic liberals refused to be drawn into the debate 
on this question as hearings on Resolution Fifteen were 
initiated in the Senate Rules Committee on January 24. 
Their silence was so conspicuous that on January 25 Walter 
White sent a telegram of protest to Truman: 
14. For the text of this resolution, see ibid. 
15. New York Times, Jan. 13, 1949, p. 13. 
16. Pittsburgh Courier, Jan. 22, 1949, pp. 1, 4. 
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We are gravely disturbed by strange apathy and silence 
of Democrats during hearings on amendment of Senate 
Kules. Not one Democrat has as yet fought for or even 
spoken out to end filibusters. We are perturbed. We trust 
our perturbation is premature, despite evidence to the 
contrary." 
White, representing the NAACP, wanted Democratic liberals 
to address the Senate Rules Committee on behalf of an 
amendment to Rule Twenty-two allowing debate to be ter­
minated by a simple majority of a quorum, that is, by 25 out 
of 49 votes, rather than by the two-thirds requirement of 
those present and voting as specified in the Hayden-Wherry 
resolution and Rule Twenty-two. A resolution calling for 
simple majority cloture had been introduced by Senator 
Myers and was before the Rules Committee, but there was 
only token support for it in the Senate.18 On the other hand, 
Republicans, such as Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts, 
William Knowland of California, Irving Ives of New York, 
and Homer Ferguson of Michigan, sponsored Senate Reso­
lution Thirteen (which was identical to the Hayden-Wherry 
resolution) because they thought it stood the best chance of 
winning acceptance from the South.19 
The hopes of these Republicans were dashed, for the 
South refused to accept the slightest change in the existing 
filibuster rule. How far the South was prepared to resist 
any compromise was indicated by Senators Richard Russell 
17. Telegram to the President from Walter White, January 25, 
1949, Truman Papers, OF 1827, HSTL. 
18. Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, Vol. XCV, 
Part 1, pp. B8-59. Myers later changed his position in support of a 
constitutional majority, the same stand that Lucas took; ibid., p. 
1584. For evidence that there was only slight support for Myers's 
original position, see New York Times, January 26, 1949, p. 6. 
19. Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, Vol. XCV, 
Part 1, p. 58; also see New York Times, Jan. 26, 1949, p. 6. 
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of Georgia and Spessard Holland of Florida in testimony 
they gave to the Senate Rules Committee on January 31. 
Senator Russell declared that he "hoped those in charge of 
Mr. Truman's general legislative recommendations in the 
Senate would stop and consider all the implications of 
trying to bring up the rule amendment at this time." If the 
administration leaders persisted in their efforts to change 
Rule Twenty-two, the South would fight with all of its 
time-honored weapons, warned Russell.20 Senator Holland 
revealed to the Rules Committee the contents of a letter he 
had written to Majority Leader Lucas about this issue. 
Pleading with Lucas to introduce those measures such as 
public power, reciprocal trade, "on which there is substan­
tial unanimty among Democrats," Holland warned him 
that any other approach would bring on "an early and 
prolonged fight and would greatly postpone action on many 
important measures." 21 
Lucas and Myers, the Democratic leaders, knew what a 
filibuster would do to the rest of Truman's legislative pro­
gram ; hence, they intended to prevent or postpone one in 
order to get action, first, on the Taft-Hartley repealer, then 
being hurriedly considered by the Senate Labor and Public 
Welfare Committee. Apparently organized labor, one of the 
major interest groups to whom President Truman was be­
holden, wanted the Taft-Hartley Act repealed before any 
other legislation was considered; and this probably explains 
why the Rules Committee hearings on the Hayden-Wherry 
resolution were delayed until January 24.22 Republican 
members of the Rules Committee wanted to commence hear­
20. U.S. Senate, Committee on Rules and Administration, Hearings 
before the Committee on Rules and Administration, 81st Congress, 1st 
Session, on S. Res. 11, 12, 13, 15, 19; pp. 176-88. 
21. Ibid., pp. 170-76. 
22. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Feb. 12, 1949, p. 8; and Sept. 24, 
1949, p. 8. 
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ings on January 14, but their efforts had been rebuffed by 
the Democratic leadership.23 Even after the conclusion of 
seven days of hearings Rules Committee Democrats refused 
to permit a vote authorizing the introduction of Resolution 
Fifteen on the floor of the Senate; such a move, they recog­
nized, would spark a filibuster tying the Senate in proce­
dural knots.24 
The Republicans, conversely, hoped to capitalize on the 
controversy by dividing the Democrats and, at the same 
time, by blocking moves to repeal the Taft-Hartley Act. 
They pressed, therefore, for immediate action on Resolution 
Fifteen. On February 3 Senator William Knowland intro­
duced a resolution calling on the Senate to relieve the Rules 
Committee of any further responsibility for the Hayden-
Wherry resolution on grounds of unjustified procrastina­
tion.25 On February 7, as the Senate was about to vote on the 
Knowland resolution, Lucas and Myers explained that it 
would be imprudent to take a matter from a standing com­
mittee of the Senate unless there was a legitimate reason 
for doing so. It was their opinion that this case did not 
require any particular need for "haste." 26 Republican Sena­
tor Wayne Morse of Oregon was irritated with such delay­
ing tactics and charged that the Democrats "are trying to 
keep civil rights in the background because they know it 
will split their party wide open." 27 The Senate rejected the 
Knowland proposal by a vote of 56 to 31, after 7 Republi­
cans joined 49 Democrats to defeat it.28 
23. Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, Vol. XCV, 
Part 1, p. 860. 
24. Ibid., p. 861. 
25. Ibid., p. 793. 
26. Ibid., p. 865. 
27. Ibid., p. 864. 
28. Ibid., p. 865; for an analysis of this vote, see Norfolk Journal 
and Guide, Feb. 12, 1949, pp. 1-2. 
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On February 9 the Senate Rules Committee voted 10 to 3 
to recommend the passage of the Hayden-Wherry reso­
lution.29 After it was submitted to the floor on February 
17, Lucas could no longer defer action. His problem was 
now to find enough votes to carry it in the face of organized 
southern opposition. As the showdown approached—by 
common consent the issue was to be introduced on February 
28—Senator Humphrey of Minnesota pointed to Lucas's 
difficulties in a letter he had published in the New York 
Times on February 22: "The political problem we face is 
whether or not the Republicans and the Democrats who say 
they are for civil rights and say they are for curbing the 
filibuster will really stand up and be counted when a roll call 
is made." 30 
On the morning of February 28, Senator Lucas discussed 
the filibuster issue with the president, who, it was reported, 
wanted to meet this problem "head on." 31 That afternoon, 
while speaking on the Senate floor, Lucas moved that the 
Rules Resolution—the Hayden-Wherry proposal—become 
the Senate's next item of business.32 His motion, as was 
expected, immediately sparked a southern filibuster, which 
George Galloway, a longtime student of congressional poli­
tics, considered to be "perhaps the bitterest in Senate 
memory." 33 
While Southern Democrats mobilized their forces to re­
sist any change in Rule Twenty-two, administration spokes­
men in the Senate planned to outflank them by submitting a 
29. Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, Vol. XCV, 
Part 18, Daily Digest, p. 47. 
30. P. 22. 
31. New York Times, Mar. 1, 1949, p. 1. 
32. Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, Vol. XCV, 
Part 2, p. 1584. 
33. George B. Galloway, The Legislative Process in Congress (New 
York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1953), pp. 561-69. 
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cloture petition to Alben Barkley, the president of the Sen­
ate.34 If Barkley ruled that this petition was valid, his deci­
sion would then have to be upheld by a voting majority of 
the Senate, since the existing rule did not provide for the 
application of cloture on filibusters directed against a mot­
ion. In the event a majority decided to sustain the ruling, 
Lucas then would be in a position to take a cloture vote to 
limit the southern filibuster. If two-thirds of all senators 
present at the time of the vote endorsed cloture, then the 
Hayden-Wherry resolution could be introduced as a meas­
ure, thereby giving the South another opportunity to launch 
a filibuster, and thus making it necessary for Lucas to ob­
tain cloture once more in order to bring the measure to a 
vote. The procedural pitfalls were numerous, but unless 
they were all negotiated, Truman's civil rights program 
would never clear the upper chamber. 
As Lucas prepared to make his move, he had to take into 
consideration the attitude of the Senate Republicans. Some 
Republicans were reluctant to endorse the contemplated 
Barkley ruling because they felt that such action would 
serve to repudiate one of their most respected colleagues, 
Michigan's Senator Arthur Vandenberg.35 Acting as presi­
dent pro tempore of the Senate on August 2, 1948, Vanden­
berg had ruled that a motion to consider a proposed anti-
poll tax bill was not a "pending measure" and hence not 
subject to a cloture vote.36 But despite his earlier stand 
Vandenberg counseled Senate Republicans on March 2 to 
vote on the issue as their consciences dictated, suggesting 
that he would not be offended if they supported Barkley.37 
Vandenberg may have inspired liberals to believe that 
34. New York Times, Mar. 1, 1949, p. 1. 
35. Ibid., Mar. 3, 1949, p. 1. 
36. Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1949, Vol. XCIV, 
Part 8, pp. 9603-4. 
37. New York Times, Mar. 3, 1949, pp. 22. 
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additional Republican support could be mustered for the 
all-important vote. But whatever hopes they had were 
quashed from an unexpected source: at a White House press 
conference on March 3, President Truman endorsed a 
change in Rule Twenty-two that would have permitted a 
majority of a senatorial quorum—that is, 25 votes out of 
49—to invoke cloture, thus making his public position ex­
actly the same as that of the NAACP and the Americans for 
Democratic Action.38 Whether through accident or design, 
Truman at once undermined the position of northern Demo­
crats, who were making a determined bid to win Republican 
support for a moderate change in Rule Twenty-two; and he 
further stiffened the resistance of the South to any thought 
of compromise. As Republican Senator Robert A. Taft later 
suggested: 
The effort to take up the Hayden-Wherry Resolution . . . 
was greatly handicapped by the President's declaration 
in favor of cloture by a majority of a quorum. This made 
the position of the southern senators still more unyield­
ing because the adoption of the Hayden-Wherry resolu­
tion would have provided cloture to support a later effort 
to change further the rules to meet the President's de­
mands for fifty per cent cloture.39 
The South was now jubilant, for, according to Arkansas's 
Senator J. William Fulbright, Truman's impolitic utterance 
meant that "we have gained a substantial number of 
38. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman 19i9, pp. 
158-59. Marquis Childs observed in the March 9, 1949, edition of the 
Washington Post that Truman's stand on cloture cost him the support 
of a number of southern moderates who might have made it possible 
for him to obtain passage of at least 60 percent of his civil rights 
program. 
39. Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, Vol. XCV, 
Part 2, p. 2664. 
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votes." 40 Senator Russell declared: "The President has now 
justified every statement that we have made that all this 
campaign was but a step toward simple majority cloture. I 
saw in the beginning that they were opening a Pandora's 
box. It is now clearly opened." 41 
Subsequent to the brouhaha created by Truman's re­
marks, Senator Wherry announced that he would not sign 
the cloture petition that Lucas had been circulating.42 Al­
though Senator Wherry proved to be recalcitrant, Senators 
Taft and Knowland, along with 14 other Republicans and 17 
Democrats, did sign the petition, which Lucas then submit­
ted to Vice-President Barkley on March 10, 1949.43 
The day of decision had finally arrived. Immediately 
after Barkley received the petition for the purpose of initi­
ating a procedural move to end the debate on the motion to 
take up Senate Resolution Fifteen, Senator Russell raised a 
point of order, contending, as he did on August 2, 1948, that 
according to Senate Rule Twenty-two, cloture might only be 
invoked when a "pending measure," not a motion, was be­
fore the Senate. Vice-President Barkley overruled Russell's 
point of order because, in Barkley's judgment, "a motion to 
proceed to the consideration of a bill is an absolutely indis­
pensible process in the enactment of legislation." Barkley 
also declared that "without a motion to proceed to the con­
sideration of a bill or resolution, the Senate cannot consider 
it, and therefore a motion to proceed is . .  . a necessary 
part of the process taken by Congress or any other legisla­
tive body in order that a bill may finally become a law." As 
40. Ibid., p. 1886. 
41. New York Times, Mar. 4, 1949, p. 1. 
42. Ibid., p. 7. 
43. Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, Vol. XCV, 
Part 2, p. 2166. 
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soon as Barkley made his unprecedented ruling, Russell 
appealed the chair's decision to the entire Senate." 
The Senate prepared to resolve the issue of the Barkley 
ruling on March 11. But before the vote was taken, Senator 
Vandenberg addressed his fellow senators about the matter 
at hand. Stating that he personally favored the Hayden-
Wherry resolution, Vandenberg, nonetheless, declared his 
opposition to the Barkley ruling because it was "an affront 
to due legislative process." It was Vandenberg's opinion 
that the Senate would have to reject Barkley's decision in 
order to preserve the integrity of the Senate. After a lengthy 
debate the Senate voted 46 to 41 to overturn Barkley's 
rule; 23 Republicans joined 23 Democrats (mostly from the 
South and the Mountain States) to give Dixie a very impor­
tant procedural victory.45 According to Walter White, Van­
denberg's speech had considerably influenced thefinal align­
ment on the question: "Mr. Vandenberg has cost us from 
five to seven votes. He has given an aura of respectability to 
those who wanted an excuse to vote to upset Mr. Barkley." " 
44. Ibid., pp. 2174-75. 
45. Ibid., pp. 2228-29. Several years later, Roy Wilkins was to 
suggest that this vote had been "the most crucial vote on civil rights 
in the past ten years." It was also his view that among the Republi­
cans "who should have been expected to sustain the chair, but who 
voted to overrule were; Bricker (Ohio); Capehart and Jenner (Ind.); 
Donnell and Kem (Mo.) ; Hickenlooper (Iowa); Reed and Schoppel 
(Kansas); Vandenberg (Mich.); and Thye (Minn.)." Of the Demo­
crats, Wilkins felt they had mustered all the "persons they could have 
reasonably have expected to muster except three, Hayden and McFar­
land of Arizona, and McCarran of Nevada." See Roy Wilkins to 
Archibald Carey Jr., November 10, 1952, Republican National Com­
mittee Folder, Box 444, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
46. See Minutes of the NAACP Executive Board, March 14, 1949, 
Box A-12, NAACP Papers, L.C. The NAACP Board also sharply at­
tacked the results of the March 11 vote and called on President Tru­
man and Senate Democrats "to break the filibuster by holding the 
Senate in continuous session regardless of how long the Dixiecrats 
may be able to hold out" (ibid.). 
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Not to be overlooked was the part President Truman played 
in the unfolding of this political drama. Suggested the New 
York Times: 
It is scarcely disputable, we believe, that Mr. Truman 
himself contributed to the causes of this defeat. His 
offhand statement that he favored the imposition of clo­
ture by a vote of a bare majority of the Senate, rather 
than by the two-thirds vote for which his own Senators 
were working, was another of those impromptu and 
somewhat imperious remarks which have cost the Presi­
dent heavily on occasion. This particular remark came at 
the least fortunate moment in the whole discussion, 
alarmed the moderates, stiffened the die-hards.47 
Nor did the Times ignore Republican complicity in the Sen­
ate's rejection of the Barkley ruling: 
No mistakes of judgment of attitude on the President's 
part, however, justify in our opinion the part played in 
this affair by a majority of Republican Senators. At Phi­
ladelphia last June the Republican party, in a bid for 
votes, pledged itself to abolish the poll tax, adopt an 
anti-lynching law and guarantee equal opportunity to 
employment, regardless of race. . . . They will have a 
hard time squaring this action (union with the South) 
with the brave promises made last year at Philadelphia.48 
The Senate's rejection of the Barkley ruling did not end 
the southern filibuster; the Lucas motion to take up the 
Hayden-Wherry resolution still remained on the Senate cal­
endar as the first order of business facing the Senate. Thus, 
the expectant renewal of the southern "talkathon" led, on 
March 13 and 14, to backstage efforts toward a compromise 
settlement. Those participating in its early stages included 
47. Mar. 16, 1949, p. 26. 
48. Ibid. 
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Senators Lucas, Wherry, Russell, and Hayden.49 Lucas's in­
volvement marked a sudden switch in his tactics; rather 
than continue the battle to overcome the filibuster, he now 
wanted an accommodation with the southerners to end the 
floor debate on Resolution Fifteen. In fact, as was later 
brought out in a floor colloquy involving Senators Knowland 
and Russell on March 17, Lucas had said at the time he was 
involved in the compromise discussions: "Gentlemen, as far 
as a change in rules is concerned, you can write your own 
ticket." 50 He was even prepared, Russell later averred, to go 
so far as to permit a change in Rule Twenty-two requiring a 
supporting vote of two-thirds or even three-fourths of the 
entire Senate to sustain cloture; and, if necessary, to in­
clude a provision in the agreement stating that "cloture 
would not even be applicable to a motion to change the rules, 
or a resolution to change the rules." 51 
Lucas's willingness to abandon the field to the enemies of 
civil rights legislation reflected his dismay over what was 
happening elsewhere to the Truman legislative program. 
Other legislation piling up behind the stalled Resolution 
Fifteen, included: a bill extending rent control, due to ex­
pire on March 31 unless the Senate acted beforehand; a bill 
continuing the European Recovery Program, facing termi­
nation on April 3 if the Congress failed to act in the in­
terim ; the Taft-Hartley repealer now in the final phase of 
clearance by the Senate Labor Committee; and an armed 
forces reorganization bill then blocked in Senator Russell's 
Armed Services Committee until the "heat was off" on civil 
rights.52 
49. Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, Vol. XCV, 
Part 2, p. 2673. 
50. Ibid. 
51. Ibid. 
52. New York Times, Mar. 15, 1949; and Norfolk Journal and 
Guide, Mar. 12, 1949, p. 16. 
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It was in this context, then, that the Southern Democratic 
and Republican coalition was able to seize the initiative and 
hammer out an amendment to the Hayden-Wherry resolu­
tion that was designed to make the southern position im­
pregnable to attack not only for the rest of the session but 
for future sessions as well. That amendment, drafted by 
Wherry, Hayden, and Russell, was similar to Resolution 
Fifteen in only one respect: it provided the Senate with a 
mechanism to halt filibusters directed at motions as well as 
measures. Other features found in the amendment, but not 
in the original resolution, raised the voting requirement for 
cloture from two-thirds of those present and voting in the 
Senate chamber—the existing requirement—to two-thirds 
of the entire body or sixty-four senators. The amendment 
also stipulated that cloture could not be invoked to halt 
filibusters directed against future motions to change Rule 
Twenty-two.53 
While final discussions were taking place pursuant to the 
"compromise" settlement, Senator Lucas announced to the 
press on March 14 that he thought it would be a good idea to 
drop the civil rights issue for a while. It was time, observed 
Lucas, for the Senate to move on to other business. For that 
reason, he declared his intention of adjourning the Senate 
in order to remove his motion from the top of the Senate 
calendar.54 In other words, an adjournment, as distinct from 
a recess, would make it possible not only to end the filibuster 
but also to deny the conservative coalition the chance to deal 
with the issue within the framework of the Hayden-Wherry 
resolution. (By March 14 Lucas had apparently backed 
away from any further participation in the continuing dis­
cussions regarding a possible compromise, for fear that his 
involvement could prove to be embarrassing both for the 
53. Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, Vol. XCV, 
Part 2, pp. 2509-10. 
54. New York Times, Mar. 15, 1949. 
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White House and the national Democratic party.) Also on 
March 14 Lucas expressed his desire for an adjournment 
but did not press the matter because, by his own admission, 
the votes were not available to sustain such a request.55 
On March 15 the conservative coalition showed its hand, 
and administration forces quickly realized that they had 
been outplayed. The southern filibuster was discontinued 
that day in order to allow the Hayden-Wherry resolution to 
come to a vote. By a 78 to 0 margin the Senate voted to 
make that much-debated resolution the immediate order of 
business facing the Senate. After that vote was taken, Sena­
tor Wherry introduced a petition signed by 52 senators, 
including 12 non-Southern Democrats, calling on the Senate 
to approve the Wherry amendment to the original resolu­
tion.56 
The formal introduction of the Hayden-Wherry resolu­
tion precipitated an intense Senate debate on a number of 
issues ranging from the nature and purpose of the Southern 
Democratic-Republican coalition to the future of civil rights 
and race relations in America.57 Senator Lucas made it clear 
that if the Senate adopted this amendment, it would be the 
equivalent to a "near funeral service for civil rights." He 
thought the issue should be dropped and that arrangements 
be made with President Truman to have a special session of 
Congress meet to deal exclusively with civil rights.58 Joining 
the debate, Senator Wayne Morse attacked his fellow Re­
publicans for having formed a coalition with Southern 
Democrats, whose policies and politics, in his opinion, did 
not have the support of the majority of the American 
55. Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, Vol. XCV, 
Part 2, p. 2420. 
56. Ibid., pp. 2462-2510. 
57. Ibid., pp. 2509, 2571-2613, 2719-20. 
58. Ibid., p. 2561. 
 155 The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration
people.59 Freshman Senator Hubert Humphrey of Minne­
sota declared that "this is only the first blow to the Truman 
program and the Fair Deal," and predicted that if "this 
alliance can be formed and made to stick, we shall have a 
great deal of trouble." 60 Illinois Democrat Paul Douglas, in 
his maiden speech on the Senate floor, noted that of the 30 
Democrats who joined the Republicans in signing the peti­
tion on behalf of the Wherry amendment, 20 were from the 
South, 4 from the border states and 6 from the area of the 
Rockies; of the 22 Republicans, who signed it, only 5 were 
from states east of the Alleghenies. In other words, this 
coalition's control of the Senate was formed at the expense 
of those states having more people and resources.61 
Supporters of the Wherry amendment, such as Senator 
Carl Hayden of Arizona, claimed that its adoption would 
provide "for the first time in 140 years an assured means of 
ending a filibuster." 62 In a strong defense of the amendment 
bearing his name, Senator Wherry claimed that its passage 
would actually make it easier to obtain cloture because the 
Senate would have clarified the ambiguity which existed on 
the question of whether cloture applied to a motion as well 
63 as a measure.
The deal which had been consummated in the cloakrooms 
of the Senate was now about to be approved by the Senate 
as a whole. On March 17, before voting on Wherry's amend­
ment to the Hayden-Wherry resolution, the Senate rejected 
57 to 29 Republican Senator Raymond Baldwin's amend­
ment calling for the continuation of the present two-thirds 
voting requirement. Also voted down even more decisively 
59. Ibid., p. 2595. 
60. Ibid., p. 2612. 
61. Ibid., pp. 2665-66. 
62. Ibid., pp. 2570-71. 
63. Ibid., p. 2588. 
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was Senator Morse's amendment permitting cloture to be 
invoked by a majority of a quorum—the position President 
Truman had supported. The Wherry amendment itself was 
approved by a vote of 63 to 23, with only 8 Republicans and 
15 Democrats opposing it.64 Thus was the will of the Senate 
expressed on this procedural matter; but in reality the vote 
meant that the Truman administration's civil rights pro­
gram had been scuttled. 
Referring to the events of March 17, the New York 
Times observed: "Last November Governors Thurmond and 
Wright, running on a States Rights ticket, received about 
2 !/2% of the votes cast for the President. . . . In the matter 
of federal action on civil rights we will continue to be ruled 
from Birmingham." 65 More to the point in terms of what 
actually happened in the Senate were the remarks of Sena­
tor Matthew Neely, a Democrat from West Virginia. He 
charged that the Republican-Dixiecrat combination, which 
had blocked moves to liberalize the Senate rules, also sought 
the defeat of efforts to repeal the Taft-Hartley law. "The 
vote on the Taft-Hartley repeal is," he suggested, "the pay­
off the Republicans will exact for the assistance G. 0. P. 
Senators gave the Dixiecrats in the civil rights fight." 66 
More than civil rights had been affected by the March 17 
vote; Truman's entire legislative program had been jeopar­
dized by the coalition's victory. During a press conference 
held at his vacation White House in Key West on March 18, 
Truman made mention of the recent controversy over rules 
in the spirit of a man who had been chastened by defeat: 
64. Ibid., pp. 2720-24. The opposition to the amendment was regis­
tered by liberals of both parties. Moderate and reactionary elements 
of the Senate supported it overwhelmingly. 
65. New York Times, Mar. 18, 1949, p. 24. 
66. Pittsburgh Courier, July 2, 1949, p. 3. 
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Q: Mr. President, Senator Morse of Oregon in this 
morning's paper has said that the Senate Democrats and 
Republicans agreed on not passing but one civil rights bill 
—that is, a new poll tax bill. Would you care to comment 
on that? 
A: No comment. He is in the Congress and I am not. I 
only advise the Congress on what I think is good for the 
country. Then they agree as they see fit. We have three 
independent prongs to the Government of the United 
States. . . . And neither of the others ought to interfere 
with the duties of the other two.67 
At another press conference a week later, Truman indi­
cated that he was still hopeful of getting a civil rights 
program through Congress.68 How he would achieve such a 
feat Truman did not say. 
Despite his defeat in the Senate, the president submitted 
civil rights legislation to Congress. On March 3 Representa­
tive Mary Norton introduced the administration's anti-poll 
tax bill, H.R. 3199. Senator McGrath presented the adminis­
tration's entire civil rights program to the Senate on April 
28, consisting of S. 1725, an omnibus civil rights bill; S. 
1726, an anti-lynching bill; S. 1727, an anti-poll tax bill; 
and S. 1728, an FEPC bill. Representative Adam Clayton 
Powell submitted the administration's FEPC bill, H.R. 4453, 
to the House on April 29. To complete the congressional in­
troduction of the administration's civil rights program, 
Representative Emanuel Celler of New York dropped the 
omnibus civil rights bill, H.R. 4682, and anti-lynching bill, 
H.R. 4683, into the House hopper on May 16.69 
The omnibus bill authorized a civil rights commission in 
67. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1949, p. 
169. 
68. Ibid., p. 182. 
69. See Clark Clifford's Civil Rights File, HSTL. 
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the executive branch; created a civil rights division in the 
Department of Justice, to be headed by an assistant attor­
ney general; provided for a joint congressional committee 
on civil rights; strengthened existing civil rights statutes; 
further protected the right of suffrage; and prohibited dis­
crimination and segregation in interstate transportation.70 
The anti-poll tax bill would abolish the poll tax as a 
prerequisite for voting in federal elections. The anti-lynch­
ing bill provided stiff maximum punishment amounting to 
twenty years imprisonment and/or a $10,000 fine for any 
member of a lynch mob and "any person who, whether or 
not a member of a lynch mob, instigates, incites, organizes, 
aids, abets, or commits a lynching by any means what­
soever." In addition, it authorized punishment amounting to 
five years imprisonment and/or a $5,000 fine for peace 
officers "who neglect or willfully fail to make diligent efforts 
to apprehend and hold in custody members of a lynch 
mob." 71 
The FEPC bill stated that the "right to employment with­
out discrimination is declared to be a right of all persons 
within the jurisdiction of the United States and the protec­
tion of the right of the individual to be free from discrimi­
nation is declared to be national policy." 72 The bill author­
ized the president to appoint a seven-member commission to 
implement that policy. The commission would have the 
power to issue cease-and-desist orders in order to prevent 
unlawful employment policies—defined as a refusal to hire, 
discharge of, or discrimination against, an individual be­
cause of race, religion, color, national origin or ancestry— 
by firms with fifty or more employees, recruitment agencies, 
70. Ibid. 
71. See Stephen J. Spingarn File, HSTL. 
72. Ibid. 
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and labor unions. Cease-and-desist orders would only be 
issued after they had been sanctioned by the courts, and any 
party affected by a final order from the commission would 
have the right of judicial review in the circuit courts.73 
By submitting actual civil rights legislation, Truman es­
tablished a historical precedent, but this action did not 
immunize his administration from criticism by the NAACP. 
On May 26, 1949, the NAACP informed Senator Lucas—who 
earlier announced that the administration had decided to 
abandon efforts to pass civil rights legislation during the 
first session—that millions of Negroes were "shocked by the 
failure of the Democratic Party to abide by its party plat­
form." Making specific reference to the debacle of March 
17, the NAACP declared that "the faint-heartedness and out­
right defection of some liberal Democrats was not antici­
pated." And because of what had happened, the NAACP now 
urged the president to call a special session of Congress to 
deal exclusively with the issue of civil rights.74 
This incipient Negro disenchantment with the Demo­
cratic party was carried directly to the White House itself 
by Roy Wilkins, who wrote David Niles, a White House 
aide, on June 20 that "there has been a considerable change 
in the mood of the colored since January 1." Wilkins himself 
did not hold Truman responsible for what had happened; 
rather, he blamed congressional leaders of both parties for 
the failure of Congress to act in thisfield.75 Wilkins's public 
willingness to absolve Truman of any blame for the events 
of the spring did not carry over to the NAACP. Holding its 
annual convention in Los Angeles in mid-July, 1949, the 
NAACP passed the following resolution: 
73. ibid. 
74. NAACP press release, May 26, 1949, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
75. To David Niles from Roy Wilkins, June 20, 1949, President's 
Personal File 293, HSTL. 
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It is our firm conviction that the 81st Congress of the 
United States presently in session has betrayed the man­
date given it by the American people in the last election 
in the field of civil liberties. President Truman and the 
Congress must share responsibility for this betrayal. 
Both failed to pursue with vigor, persistency and 
strength a course of action which would have put into law 
the comprehensive civil liberties program which the 
President promised the American people.76 
One of the leaders of the southern bloc who opposed the 
legislation that Wilkins and the NAACP wanted was Senator 
Richard Russell, who favored an accommodation with Tru­
man as long as appropriate terms could be arranged. A 
compromise might be reached, felt Russell, if Truman ac­
cepted as a starting point for further negotiations Arkansas 
Congressman Brooks Hays's civil rights program, consist­
ing of a voluntary FEPC (that is, one without enforcement 
powers), a constitutional amendment calling for the aboli­
tion of the poll tax, and an anti-lynching bill giving consid­
erably more power to the states than the Truman bill pro­
posed." Meeting with Russell at the White House in 
mid-July, Truman informed him that the Hays plan was 
unacceptable. The South thus failed to persuade Truman to 
weaken his civil rights program.78 
Evidently the president's position on FEPC proved to be 
the major stumbling block to any compromise with the 
South. Even before he had talked with Russell, Truman had 
learned from Clark Clifford that representatives of the 
NAACP, the ADA, the AFL, and the cio, with whom he had 
spoken on June 2, wanted the administration to give FEPC 
76. Resolutions Folder for the 40th Annual Convention, Box 387, 
NAACP Papers, L.C. 
77. Hays, A Southern Moderate Speaks, pp. 25-52. 
78. Washington Post, July 13, 1949. 
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the highest legislative priority.79 This was done with the 
consent of Senator Lucas, who promised on July 7 to place it 
at the top of the civil rights agenda in the Senate.80 It may 
have been a tactical error on the part of both Negro and 
white liberal organizations and labor unions, as well as on 
the part of the administration, to have insisted on FEPC at 
the expense of the Hays plan, especially since there was 
little likelihood of getting anything more out of Congress 
after the March 17 vote. In any event, Truman could not 
afford to ignore such liberal advice; but, at the same time, 
he knew that his continuing endorsement of FEPC made little 
difference legislatively, so his relationship with the South 
did not necessarily have to deteriorate any further. On 
August 30 he asked Congressman Sabath to include FEPC on 
a list of "must" legislation for the first session of the Eighty-
first Congress, but Sabath could not assure Truman that 
the House would act on this particular bill, even though it 
had cleared the House Education and Labor Committee on 
August 2.81 
If the situation was unpromising in the House, it was 
bleak in the Senate, not only because of the March 17 vote 
but because Senator Patrick McCarran, chairman of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, had appointed Mississippi's 
Senator James Eastland—a Thurmond supporter in 1948 
—to head the Judiciary subcommittee on civil rights.82 As 
chairman of this subcommittee, he could pigeonhole all of 
79. "American Rights for American Citizens," NAACP Annual Re­
port, 1949, p. 15. NAACP Papers, L.C. 
80. Ibid. 
81. New York Times, Aug. 31, 1949, p. 46; the committee's recom­
mendations can be found in U.S. House of Representatives, Report 
from Committee on Education and Labor to accompany H.R. M53, 
August 2, 1949 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949). 
82. Pittsburgh Courier, Sept. 24, 1949, pp. 1, 4. 
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Truman's civil rights program with the exception of FEPC 
and the anti-poll tax bill. Mississippi's other senator, John 
Stennis, headed a Rules Committee subcommittee that was 
responsible for anti-poll tax legislation.83 It now appeared 
that Mississippi was now in legislative control of all civil 
rights legislation—excepting FEPC—in the United States 
Senate. 
Eastland's promotion suggests that the national Demo­
cratic party had given up completely any intention it may 
have had to purge those congressional Democrats who had 
bolted the party to support Strom Thurmond in 1948. Alex­
ander Heard observes that "the Dixiecrats were given regu­
lar committee assignments as Democrats, including chair­
manships and any other sanctions imposed were 
considerably short of a purge." 84 Eastland's success in the 
Senate, for example, had been matched earlier in the House 
by the appointment of another Thurmond supporter, Con­
gressman William Colmer of Mississippi, to the important 
House Rules Committee. Although President Truman had 
approved the ouster of five Dixiecrat members of the Demo­
cratic National Committee and was prepared to deprive 
active Dixiecrats of patronage, his failure to press congres­
sional leaders to take action against bolters like Eastland 
and Colmer was evidence of his reluctance to engage in 
organizational conflict.85 
That civil rights had reached something of a dead end in 
the Senate was confirmed by Senator Lucas on October 3, 
when he declared that "it seems doubtful that a prolonged 
discussion of any civil rights bill at this session would be 
helpful." 86 Because of this legislative impasse, he won Tru­
83. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Sept. 3, 1949. 
84. Heard, A Two Party South?, p. 24. 
85. See Norfolk Journal and Guide, Sept. 3, 1949, p. 3. 
86. Ibid., Oct. 15, 1949, p. 11. 
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man's permission to postpone action on civil rights until the 
start of the next session, when a concerted effort would be 
made to pass the FEPC bill which had been reported out of 
the Labor and Public Welfare Committee without recom­
mendation on September 23. According to Lucas, various 
civil rights organizations favored the postponement "be­
cause they were aware that there would be a better chance 
for success in the next session than in the tail end of this 
one." 87 
The administration's decision to promote FEPC rather 
than other civil rights legislation angered the Republican 
minority leader, Senator Wherry, who charged that Lucas 
and his associates had selected "the one civil rights bill that 
they know will be the hardest to pass. They hope it will fail, 
and they hope they can go to the country in the campaign of 
1950 to claim that it was the Republicans who blocked it." 88 
It was Wherry's contention that if the administration was 
prepared to fight for anti-lynching or anti-poll tax legisla­
tion, there was a good chance to halt a filibuster with the 
new rule. He insisted that the priority given to FEPC by 
Lucas would prevent action on legislation "which has the 
best chance of passage." 89 Senator Humphrey agreed with 
Wherry's analysis; hence he urged that the Democratic 
leadership call up anti-poll tax and anti-lynching legislation 
87. Democratic National Committee Folder, Box 444, NAACP Pa­
pers, L.C. About the matter of the postponement, Thurgood Marshall 
reported to Roy Wilkins that Congressman Adam Clayton Powell 
learned that, subsequent to the announcement of the postponement, 
"Cox of Georgia and Colmar [sic] of Mississippi brought the Social 
Security Bill out of Committee so that it appears that the deal was to 
bring other legislation out in front of civil rights" (Memorandum to 
Roy Wilkins from Thurgood Marshall, October 5, 1949, Civil Rights 
Bills File, 1951, NAACP Papers, L.C). 
88. New York Times, Oct. 4, 1949, p. 7. 
89. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Nov. 19, 1949, p. 2. 
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before FEPC. "If we can get these bills through," he said, 
"we should be able to get a FEP legislation enacted." Lucas 
ignored these requests, and thus anti-lynching legislation, 
which had been on the Senate calendar since June 17, was 
not introduced on the floor during the first session. On the 
other hand, the FEPC bill was placed on the Senate calendar 
on October 17, preparatory to a renewed struggle in the 
second session beginning in January.90 
The impasse in the Senate seemingly failed to daunt 
President Truman, who reaffirmed his commitment to the 
cause of civil rights while delivering several speeches in 
mid-November, 1949. Addressing a luncheon on the Na­
tional Conference of Christians and Jews on November 11, 
the president remarked: 
I have asked that our Federal Government take an active 
part in this effort to achieve greater justice. I have called 
for legislation to protect the rights of all its citizens, to 
assure their equal participation in national life, and to 
reduce discrimination based upon prejudice. In view of 
the fundamental faith of this country and the clear lan­
guage of our Constitution, I do not see how we can do 
otherwise than adopt such legislation.91 
On November 15 the president spoke at the annual meeting 
of the National Council of Negro Women. Included in his 
prepared statement was the declaration that "we are awak­
ened as never before to the true meaning of equality—equal­
ity in the economic world. We are going to continue to 
advance in our program of bringing equal rights and equal 
opportunities to all citizens." 92 A more realistic appraisal of 
90. Ibid., Nov. 5, 1949, p. 2. 
91. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 19i9, p. 
562. 
92. Ibid., p. 566. 
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the situation was made by Alabama's Senator John Spark-
man. He did not think Congress would pass FEPC because it 
"would have an even greater impact in Northern industrial 
centers than in the South. For that reason, you are going to 
find many members of Congress voting against it along with 
the Southerners." 93 
While the administration experienced frustration in its 
dealings with Congress, it took steps on the executive level 
to combat discrimination and to advance the cause of black 
aspirations. Responding to pressure exerted by Negro news­
papers, President Truman on October 15,1949, nominated a 
Negro, William R. Hastie, the governor of the Virgin Is­
lands and formerly dean of the Howard University Law 
School, for a position on the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals.94 Truman's selection of Hastie marked at the time 
the highest position on the federal judiciary to which a 
Negro had been appointed. 
The administration also made other moves in its battle 
against discrimination. White House aide Stephen Spin-
gam, who drafted much of Truman's civil rights legislation, 
recommended in a memorandum to Clark Clifford that the 
Justice Department incorporate into its 1950 budget a re­
quest for fifteen additional lawyers and adequate clerical 
assistance for its civil rights section, which in 1949 had an 
authorized strength of only seven lawyers, one less than in 
1948, the year of Truman's civil rights message. Not only 
were the lawyers needed but, as Spingarn suggested, their 
addition "would be further assurance that the administra­
tion meant business in the civil rights field and would offset 
the legislative defeats in this field which we are likely to 
93. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Nov. 19, 1949, p. 2. 
94. The Negro press had been requesting such an appointment 
through the summer of 1949; see Norfolk Journal and Guide, Aug. 20, 
1949, p. 10. 
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receive in 1950." 95 When Clifford failed to answer the mem­
orandum, Spingarn turned to Charles Murphy, Truman's 
assistant special counsel, for support. Murphy felt that 
Spingarn's proposal was sound, so on November 28 he con­
tacted Attorney General J. Howard McGrath, a recent ap­
pointee, about the matter. The Justice Department quickly 
enlarged its budget to include appropriations for the under­
staffed civil rights section.96 Because of the imagination of 
Spingarn and the favorable responses of Murphy and 
McGrath, the Justice Department prepared to strengthen 
its legal arm at a time when civil rights litigation was 
becoming the most effective method of challenging and 
changing some of the discriminatory social patterns in 
American life. 
Another example of the administration's initiative in the 
civil rights field could be found in the area of housing. On 
December 2, 1949, Solicitor General Philip Perlman de­
clared in New York that "the Federal Housing Authority is 
amending its rules so as to refuse to aid the financing of any 
property the occupancy or use of which is restricted on the 
basis of race, creed, or color." 9r The next day Franklin D. 
Richards, the Federal Housing Authority commissioner, 
stated that very few of the nation's dwellings would be 
affected by the policy change announced by Perlman. "It 
will be the exceptional case," explained Richards, "where 
property cannot receive federal mortgage aid." 98 In other 
words, the Perlman announcement did not affect property 
on which agreements already existed "to prohibit sale or 
rental to, or occupancy by, colored persons or other racial or 
95. Memorandum to Clark Clifford from Stephen J. Spingarn, 
November 22, 1949, Stephen J. Spingarn File, HSTL. 
96. Stephen J. Spingarn File, HSTL. 
97. New York Times, Dec. 3, 1949, p. 1. 
98. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Dec. 10, 1949, pp. 1-2. 
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religious minority groups." On December 12, 1949, the Fed­
eral Housing Authority made it known that after February 
15, 1950, it "would no longer insure mortgages on homes 
whose deeds were to contain restrictive covenants." " This 
release confirmed the fact that all covenants existing prior 
to February 15, 1950, would remain unaffected by the new 
rules laid down by the Federal Housing Administration. 
Although the president may have hoped that administra­
tive measures would become a substitute for legislative suc­
cess, he could not ignore the political facet of the civil rights 
struggle, or else his political image in important northern 
states would be tarnished. Hence, as the new congressional 
session approached, Truman once more prepared to engage 
in another fruitless battle with Congress, if only to prevent 
the Republicans from exploiting the civil rights issue for 
their own benefit. Consequently, when the president went to 
Congress to deliver his fifth State of the Union address on 
January 4, 1950, he said: 
I again urge the Congress to enact the civil rights 
proposals I made in February 1948. These are proposals 
for the enactment of Federal statutes which will protect 
all our people in the exercise of their democratic 
rights. . . . 
Some of these proposals have been before the Congress 
for a long time. Those who oppose them, as well as those 
who favor them, should recognize that it is the duty of 
the elected representatives of the people to let these pro­
posals come to a vote.100 
On January 9 the administration submitted to Congress its 
budget message containing the suggestion that "a perma­
99. New York Times, Dec. 16, 1949, p. 1. 
100. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1950 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1965), pp. 
9-10. 
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nent Fair Employment Practices Commission should be es­
tablished. To keep minority groups economically submerged 
is not only unjust and discriminatory, but also prevents the 
best use of available manpower." 101 The administration re­
quested that Congress provide the proposed agency with a 
million dollars for operating expenses during fiscal year 
1951.102 
The major problem facing the administration, especially 
in the Senate, was finding the means of bringing FEPC to a 
vote. For the purpose of assisting the administration in this 
endeavor, over 4,000 delegates of the National Emergency 
Civil Rights Mobilization, which the NAACP had been organ­
izing since November, 1949, came to Washington in mid-
January, 1950. On January 16 Senator Lucas told the dele­
gates, who represented organizations like the NAACP and the 
American Civil Liberties Union, that the administration 
would push for the passage of FEPC, even though there was 
little chance that it would be enacted into law.103 The follow­
ing day a number of the delegates met with President Tru­
man, who told them "that every effort is being made to get a 
vote on these measures in the Senate. The leader of the 
majority and the Vice President assured me that they will 
eventually get a vote if it takes all summer." He then ad­
vised the group to continue to pressure Congress, since 
"that is possibly the only way we can get action." 1M Tru­
man himself, however, was reluctant to invest much execu­
tive capital in a legislative enterprise that could bankrupt 
the rest of his program. 
101. Ibid., p. 94. 
102. Ibid., p. 98. 
103. New York Times, Jan. 17, 1950, p. 8. 
104. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1950, pp. 
115, 128. 
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As far as civil rights legislation was concerned, the situa­
tion was indeed desperate. The administration's chances of 
carrying the Senate had been scuttled when it lost the fili­
buster fight. In the House, FEPC legislation had been ap­
proved by the House Education and Labor Committee by a 
vote of 14 to 11 on August 2, 1949; but, to the chagrin of its 
supporters, the bill fell into the clutches of the House Rules 
Committee, which failed to clear it for floor action.105 If the 
FEPC bill was to be rescued from the Rules Committee, the 
partisans of that bill would have to turn to the twenty-one­
day rule for procedural relief, making it possible for the 
Speaker to call to the House floor those committee-approved 
measures which had been retained by the Rules Committee 
for at least twenty-one days. But Congressman Eugene Cox, 
a member of the Rules Committee and a determined foe of 
civil rights legislation, recognized that House liberals would 
utilize the twenty-one-day rule in order to bypass his com­
mittee. Consequently, he sought to repeal the rule, but his 
efforts were rebuffed by the House on January 20, 1950, by 
a vote of 236 to 183.106 
The focus of the House was now on Speaker Rayburn, 
himself unsympathetic to FEPC legislation. Aware of Ray-
burn's antipathy, Harlem Congressman Adam Clayton 
Powell, a sponsor of the administration's FEPC bill in the 
House, sent a telegram to President Truman on January 19, 
1950, urging him to put pressure on Rayburn to recognize 
Congressman John Lesinski, chairman of the House Educa­
tion and Labor Committee, which had already approved the 
PEPC bill. As Powell said in his telegram, ". . . It is felt that 
unless this is done by you—he will not be recognized by the 
105. Congressional Quarterly Almanac VI (1950) (Washington: 
Congressional Quarterly News Features, 1951), 375-80. 
106. New York Times, Jan. 21, 1950, p. 8. 
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Speaker." And if Truman refused, asserted Powell, "it can 
only mean in the eyes of the American people that you are 
not for civil rights as much as you have proclaimed." 107 
On January 23,1950, Speaker Rayburn, the master of his 
domain, refused to recognize Congressman Lesinski, who 
sought to introduce the FEPC bill on to the House floor via 
the twenty-one-day rule.108 At his February 2 press confer­
ence Truman was queried as to whether he had instructed 
Rayburn to recognize Representative Lesinski. Said the 
President: "No I did not ask him to recognize anybody. I 
asked him to consider the passage of FEPC in both Houses. I 
did not ask him to recognize anybody. That is the business 
of the Speaker. He has been in charge of that, and nobody 
can tell him whom to recognize." 109 That was one side of the 
issue; Arthur Krock illuminated a different facet: "Very 
seldom do informed observers agree with Representative 
Marcantonio [New York], yet a good many did when he 
remarked: 'It is obvious to everyone that everybody wants 
civil rights as a campaign issue but not as a law and that 
goes for Harry Truman, the Democratic party and the Re­
publican party.'"110 
Rayburn's hostility notwithstanding, House liberals 
made one last attempt to introduce FEPC; they sought to 
force a showdown by a device known as Calendar Wednes­
day—a parliamentary rule which obligated the Speaker to 
call alphabetically the standing committees of the House on 
107. Telegram to the President from Adam Clayton Powell, Janu­
ary 19, 1950, Truman Papers, OF 1827, HSTL. 
108. Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950, Vol. XCV, 
Part 2, p. 722. 
109. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1950, p. 
143. 
110. New York Times, Jan. 26, 1950, p. 26. 
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successive Wednesdays in order to give them a chance to 
present legislation. On February 22 the House Education 
and Labor Committee was called, giving Representative 
Lesinski, its chairman, his opportunity to introduce the 
FEPC bill. The House immediately transformed itself into a 
committee of the whole to consider it.111 After fifteen hours 
of wrangling, Republican Representative Samuel K. McCon­
nell of Pennsylvania managed to introduce a substitute 
amendment calling for the creation of an FEPC without 
enforcement powers. The House approved his amendment 
by a vote of 222 to 178, as 104 Republicans joined 118 
Democrats to override liberal opposition.112 Thus the House 
passed an FEPC bill that Truman neither wanted nor, in 
good conscience, could accept. "The whole affair," wrote the 
New York Times, "has become a mockery of responsible 
legislative practice; the prospective filibuster awaiting FEPC 
in the Senate only adds to the hollowness of the entire 
procedure." 113 
As the Times noted, the House passage of FEPC, even with 
the crippling McConnell amendment, at least would have the 
effect of keeping the issue temporarily alive so far as the 
Senate was concerned. Because of the House action, FEPC 
had now become, in the words of Roy Wilkins, "the hottest 
thing on the Senate calendar," and he added, "it plagues the 
administration at every turn." In fact, the House, contended 
Wilkins, "has put the administration on more of a hot spot 
than it would have been if the House had not acted at all." 
But ever the realist, Wilkins knew that "in pragmatic poli­
tics all this means that the supporters of FEPC will have 
111. See Congressional Quarterly Almanac, VI (1950), 375-80. 
112. Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950, Vol. XCV, 
Part 2, pp. 2253-54. 
113. Feb. 24, 1950, p. 24. 
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records on both Representatives and Senators when the 
election comes around next November." 114 
The Negro press was indignant over what had happened 
in Congress. The Chicago Defender, the only major Negro 
newspaper to support Truman in 1948, published a front-
page editorial entitled "Promises versus Performances": 
"As we enter the 1950 election campaign, the Democrats, 
both locally and nationally, should do a little soul searching. 
The action promised by the Democrats in 1948 caught the 
imagination of the people. Now, two years later, we have 
more promises and few accomplishments." 116 
Although the Defender's bitterness was justified, the ad­
ministration was seeking relief through litigation. On April 
3 and 4, 1950, Attorney General J. Howard McGrath and 
Solicitor General Philip Perlman appeared before the Su­
preme Court to argue on behalf of Elmer Henderson, whose 
case challenging the legality of discrimination and segrega­
tion in interstate transportation was now being adjudi­
cated.116 Earlier, and without President Truman's fore­
knowledge, the Justice Department had submitted amicus 
curiae briefs to the Court not only in support of Henderson 
but G. W. McLaurin and Herman Sweatt as well. Their 
cases questioned the legality of discrimination and segrega­
tion in the field of higher education.117 The Henderson brief, 
114. Roy Wilkins to Addie L. Weber, April 24, 1950, McConnell Bill 
Pile, Box 408, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
115. Mar. 10, 1950. 
116. Pittsburgh Courier, Apr. 8, 1950, pp. 1, 5. Philip Elman, who 
was mostly responsible for drafting this brief for the government, 
wrote Thurgood Marshall that "while I am not too confident that the 
Supreme Court will go as far as we have (not in this case, at least), I 
think we have taken a long step in the right direction" (Philip Elman 
to Thurgood Marshall, October 19, 1949, Department of Justice 
Folder, Box 405, NAACP Papers, L.C). 
117. Konvitz, Expanding Liberties, pp. 247-51. 
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submitted by the Justice Department on October 5, 1949, 
was particularly noteworthy because in it the government 
advanced, for the first time, the argument that 
so long as the doctrine of the Plessy case stands, a barrier 
erected not by the Constitution but by the courts will 
continue to work a denial of rights and privileges and 
immunities antagonistic to the freedoms and liberties on 
which our institutions and our form of government are 
founded. "Separate but equal" is a constitutional anach­
ronism which no longer deserves a place in our law. . . . 
It is neither reasonable or right that colored citizens of 
the United States should be subjected to the humiliation 
of being segregated by law, on the pretense that they are 
being treated as equals.118 
While the Court considered these cases, politics as usual 
dominated the Congress and the White House. On April 11 
President Truman, after conferring with Vice-President 
Barkley and Senator Lucas, decided to postpone Senate ac­
tion on a committee-cleared FEPC bill in order to obtain a 
quick Senate vote on Marshall Plan appropriations.119 Roy 
Wilkins quickly assailed this decision, but at a White House 
press conference on April 13 the president defended it as a 
necessity, while promising, somewhat enigmatically, that 
FEPC would be carried to a "logical conclusion." 120 
118. Brief of the United States in Henderson v. United States, pp. 
65-66. 
119. New York Times, Apr. 12, 1950, p. 18. 
120. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1950, p. 
253. On this point the comment of Richard Longaker seems relevant: 
"It seems to have been a common legislative technique to give only 
half-hearted support to civil rights legislation, such as FEPC legisla­
tion, in return for Southern cooperation in the passage of foreign 
policy or welfare measures" (Richard P. Longaker, The Presidency 
and Individual Liberties [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 
1961], p. 41). 
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In line with Truman's promise, Lucas presented to the 
Senate on May 5 a motion calling for the introduction of the 
FEPC bill. Southern Democrats immediately began to filibus­
ter even though they knew, as did everyone else, that the 
entire affair was nothing more than a ritualistic exercise.121 
On May 19 the Senate terminated these proceedings when it 
voted to reject Lucas's cloture petition: 52 senators, consist­
ing of 19 Democrats and 33 Republicans, supported cloture; 
32 senators, including 26 Democrats and 6 Republicans, 
rejected it.122 Following this vote, Lucas and the Republican 
leadership quarreled over which party had been responsible 
for the petition's defeat.123 Given the poor Democratic show­
ing—only 36.5 percent of the Senate Democratic member­
ship voted for cloture—it would seem that the Republicans 
had the better of the argument. Later, Republican Senator 
Robert Taft, speaking off the Senate floor, noted that 
neither Truman nor the Democratic National Committee 
had brought pressure to bear on the nine absentee Demo­
crats whose votes might have helped Lucas obtain the neces­
sary 64 votes.124 
While President Truman watched his legislative program 
slowly disappear into a congressional quagmire, he was not 
without a victory or two in the civil rights field. On May 22 
the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and 
121. Ruchames, Race, Jobs, and Politics, p. 208. 
122. Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950, Vol. XCV, 
Part 6, pp. 7299-7300. Of the twenty-six Democrats voting against 
cloture, five were outside the South: Hayden and McParland of 
Arizona; Kerr of Oklahoma; McCarran of Nevada; and Johnson of 
Colorado (ibid.). 
123. Ibid., p. 7301. 
124. New York Times, May 20, 1950, p. 8. It was Wilkins's opinion 
that the Dixiecrats did not defeat cloture; it was defeated "by the 
non-Southern 'nay' votes plus the absentees" (Roy Wilkins to Walter 
White, May 23, 1950, FEPC Folder, Box 408, NAACP Papers, L.C.). 
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Opportunity in the Armed Forces, the Fahy Committee, 
submitted to Truman its report affirming the fact that seg­
regation had been formally abolished in the armed forces. 
The report, Freedom to Serve, spelled out in detail how the 
Pentagon, especially the Army, was finally persuaded that 
equality of opportunity would produce a "better Army, 
Navy and Air Force." 125 But what the report did not reveal 
was that notwithstanding the efforts of the Fahy Commit­
tee, a creation of the 1948 election campaign, the United 
States Army had been prepared to resist indefinitely at­
tempts to achieve desegregation. In short, only President 
Truman's active intervention made possible a resolution of 
this administrative imbroglio, thereby insuring compliance 
with Executive Order 9981.126 By strongly backing the com­
mittee he had appointed, Truman demonstrated his desire to 
fight for racial progress in an area where his administra­
tion could act without upsetting the precarious Democratic 
party balance in the Congress and the nation. Action re­
placed rhetoric, as politics and morality merged to produce 
justice. 
Although the Committee's goal of total desegregation had 
not yet been achieved in many Army units scattered around 
the globe, Truman expressed satisfaction with the progress 
that had been made: 
It is, therefore, with a great deal of confidence that I 
learn from the Committee that the present programs of 
the three Services are designed to accomplish the objec­
tives of the President; and that as these programs are 
carried out, there will be, within the reasonably near 
future, equality of treatment and opportunity for all per­
125. Freedom to Serve, p. 66. 
126. Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces, pp. 
197-200. 
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sons in the Armed Services, with a consequent improve­
ment in military efficiency. 
I attach the highest importance to the Committee's 
assignment. In the Committee's own words, equality of 
treatment and opportunity in the Armed Services is 
right, it is just, and will strengthen the nation.127 
In addition to praising the work of the committee, the 
president also included in his acceptance statement a refer­
ence to the FEPC struggle in the Senate: 
This report is submitted as the United States Senate is 
considering a motion to take up a FEPC bill. The work of 
the President's Committee . . . shows what can be accom­
plished by a Commission in this admittedly difficult field. 
I hope the Senate will take this Report into consideration 
as it debates the merits of FEPC, and that, as I urged in 
my State of the Union Message in January, it will permit 
this important measure to come to a vote.128 
Administrative initiative, as evidenced by the work of the 
Fahy Committee, represented one method of circumventing 
the legislative bog that was Congress; another viable alter­
native might be found in the courts. On June 6, 1950, the 
Supreme Court announced its decisions in the cases of 
McLaurin v. Oklahoma, Sweatt v. Painter, and Henderson 
127. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1950, p. 
431. It is important to note, however, that "the Fahy Committee won 
Army Secretary Gordon Gray's agreement to open up progressively 
more specialist jobs to Negroes in all army units, and to remove the 
Army's quota on Negro inductions, though Gray obtained President 
Truman's secret written agreement to go back to a quota if the Army 
received a disproportionate number of Negroes" (see Lee Nichols, 
Breakthrough on the Color Front [New York: Random House, 1954], 
p. 108). 
128. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1950, p. 
431. 
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v. The United States.129 With Justice Tom C. Clark disquali­
fying himself, the other eight justices unanimously agreed 
that the civil rights of the Negroes, whose cases they re­
viewed, had been violated. Although the justices refused to 
decide these cases within a broad constitutional context, as 
had been requested by the Justice Department, the position 
they advanced was sufficient to suggest that the Supreme 
Court was well disposed to reexamine race relations law 
more systematically than any other time in the twentieth 
century. The Pittsburgh Courier subsequently commented: 
"The United States Department of Justice deserves much 
credit, also, for the part it played in insisting that discrimi­
nation means segregation, and that segregation is 
illegal." 130 
As the Supreme Court moved into a new era in race 
relations law, the Congress remained as intractable as ever. 
The administration's last attempt to secure a Senate vote on 
civil rights was set for July 12, when Senator Lucas planned 
to submit another cloture petition on behalf of FEPC.131 TO 
prepare for this vote, Stephen Spingarn and Charles Mur­
phy drafted a memorandum which they submitted to Presi­
dent Truman on July 3 recommending that every effort be 
made to get a maximum vote in favor of the second cloture 
petition.132 According to a July 5 memorandum that Spin­
129. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) ; 
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) ; Henderson v. United States, 
339 U.S. 816 (1950). Apparently, the decision in the last-named suit 
did not produce immediate results in favor of Elmer Henderson. He 
was compelled to return to the federal courts again after it became 
clear that the Interstate Commerce Commission was ignoring the will 
of the court. For additional details pertaining to this case, see Norfolk 
Journal and Guide, Apr. 5, 1952, p. 3. 
130. June 17, 1950, p. 14. 
131. Stephen J. Spingarn File, HSTL. 
132. Memorandum to the President from Charles Murphy and 
Stephen J. Spingarn, July 3,1950, Stephen J. Spingarn File, HSTL. 
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gam wrote for his FEPC file: "The President told us to go 
ahead on this matter. Charlie is to call Senator Lucas and 
Bill Boyle and arrange for us to get together with them to 
coordinate our work." 133 This was the first time Truman 
had actively committed himself to support such a proposal 
in Congress; he was mindful of the coming congressional 
elections and America's new responsibilities in Korea. Thus 
having received Truman's permission, William Boyle, chair­
man of the Democratic National Committee, sent telegrams 
and letters on July 8 to party officials throughout the coun­
try asking them for their support. 
. .  . I call upon each party official to cooperate to the 
fullest extent to make certain of full attendance in the 
United States Senate in support of the President and the 
platform of the Democratic party in this important vote. 
. . . While the amended rule makes it more difficult to 
prevent unlimited debate, success can be obtained if all 
Democrats who supported the President on this vital 
issue are present and voting, and if the Republicans 
cooperate. . . .134 
The Senate vote, taken on July 12, fell 9 short of the total 
needed for cloture. This time, 55 Senators—22 Democrats 
and 33 Republicans—supported cloture; 33 Senators—27 
Democrats (including 6 non-Southern) and 6 Republicans 
—opposed it.135 Truman's active intercession made little dif­
ference in the final outcome; his civil rights program was 
now interred in the legislative graveyard of the Eighty-first 
Congress. 
Although FEPC had failed to pass Congress, the Korean 
War kept the issue alive as far as Negro leaders were 
133. Stephen J. Spingarn File, HSTL. 
134. New York Times, July 9,1950, p. 37. 
135. Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950, Vol. XCV, 
Part 8, pp. 9981-82. 
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concerned. On July 16, 1950, A. Philip Randolph, cochair­
man of the National Committee for a Permanent PEPC, 
wired Truman requesting that he issue an executive order 
similar to 8802 "as an integral factor in the mobilization 
of manpower against North Korean Communist ag­
gression."13B On September 8, 1950, the Urban League 
urged the President to cope with the manpower problem in 
a democratic manner.137 On September 10 Randolph again 
spoke out in favor of an emergency FEPC on grounds of 
"enlightened self-interest" and "moral necessity."13S In 
Congress, New York Senator Herbert Lehman also urged 
Truman to issue an executive order, similar to the one 
recommended by Randolph.139 Since the president was too 
involved with foreign affairs and was no longer subject to 
pressure from civil rights organizations, he ignored these 
requests. Suddenly, it seemed, civil rights was no longer the 
urgent political issue it had been. The postwar liberal tide 
was now receding, carrying with it the frustrated hopes of 
millions of American Negroes. 
The 1950 congressional election confirmed the fact that 
the Fair Deal was spent as a political force, for in that year 
a number of northern Democrats suffered crushing defeats; 
for example, both Senators Lucas and Myers—Truman's 
floor leaders in the Senate—were retired by the voters.140 
The Democrats retained control of Congress, but their ma­
jorities were considerably reduced, in the House from 261 to 
234, and in the Senate from 53 to 49.141 If the Eighty-first 
136. American Jewish Yearbook, 1952 (Philadelphia: Jewish Pub­
lication Society, 1953), p. 95. 
137. New York Times, Sept. 9,1950, p. 15. 
138. Ibid., Sept. 11, 1950, p. 15. 
139. Ibid., Oct. 16, 1950, p. 8. 
140. Evans and Novak, Lyndon B. Johnson, p. 41. 
141. New York Times, November 9, 1950, p. 1. 
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Congress had buried civil rights legislation, the Eighty-sec­
ond would not even think the issue worthy of consideration. 
Especially noteworthy in that regard were the post-election 
comments of Congressman Porter Hardy of Virginia, who 
pointed out that in the Eighty-second Congress Southern 
Democrats would hold a majority of Democratic seats in the 
House and would lack only one Democratic seat of holding a 
majority in the Senate. As Congressman Hardy suggested, 
"That speaks for itself as far as civil rights legislation is 
concerned." 142 
Although many voters had been bewitched by Senator 
Joseph McCarthy's manifold distortions and bothered by 
the enigmatic nature of the Korean War, black Americans 
were more concerned with employment problems and racial 
discrimination. Hence, they were not interested in the issues 
which the Republicans advanced in 1950. Negroes endorsed 
Democratic candidates, as is shown by an analysis of votes 
in black wards in ten widely scattered cities, including New 
York, Philadelphia, Chicago, and Los Angeles.143 Only in 
Baltimore did Negroes reject the Democratic candidate, in­
cumbent Senator Millard Tydings, because they found his 
racist views simply unacceptable.144 
Negroes had good reasons to remain with the Democratic 
party in 1950. Not only were they still benefiting from the 
post-World War II economic boom (though to a much lesser 
142. Norfolk Journal and Guide, November 25, 1950, p. 2. Or in the 
words of Clarence Mitchell, the Washington representative of the 
NAACP's national office: "So far as numbers are concerned, our 
position in the 82nd Congress will not be greatly different from what 
it was in the 81st" (Memorandum to Walter White from Clarence 
Mitchell, November 9, 1950, Congressmen and Senators Folder, Box 
419, NAACP Papers, L.C.). 
143. Lubell, The Future of American Politics, p. 165. 
144. Negro Yearbook, 1952 (New York: Wm. H. Wise, 1952), p. 
301. 
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extent than most whites), but they were also aware that 
President Truman had helped to make possible the desegra­
tion of the armed forces and that his administration had 
challenged Jim Crow jurisprudence. Thanks, then, to the 
Truman administration, American Negroes had achieved 
slight progress in their quest for racial justice; but that 
progress was still too limited and fragmentary. Practically 
all areas of American life remained blighted by a pattern of 
culture which had no place in a democratic society. 

Chapter 5 
PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS OF 
CIVIL RIGHTS: 1952 
When the Eighty-second Congress convened on January 3, 
1951, it was clear that any civil rights program advanced by 
President Truman would soon find itself in legislative 
limbo. Arizona's Senator Ernest McFarland, the new Demo­
cratic majority leader, and Lyndon Johnson of Texas, the 
new majority whip, were opposed to FEPC and to any major 
liberalization of Rule Twenty-two.1 Furthermore, the Sen­
1. Evans and Novak, Lyndon B. Johnson, pp. 39, 43. At the 
forty-first annual meeting of the NAACP, a resolution was passed 
attacking and deploring the elevation of McFarland and Johnson to 
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ate Democratic Policy Committee, which helped to deter­
mine legislative priorities, was controlled by Richard Rus­
sell of Georgia. The situation in the House was equally 
bleak, for on January 3, 1951, the lower chamber rescinded 
the twenty-one-day rule (thereby enhancing the power of 
the conservative Rules Committee) and voted to return to 
the rules which governed the House during the days of the 
Eightieth Congress.2 
On January 8, 1951, President Truman delivered to Con­
gress his State of the Union address, which dealt largely 
with problems created by the Korean War. He downgraded 
domestic issues and mentioned civil rights in a manner 
calculated to restore party harmony in a period of interna­
tional crisis, saying: "We must remember that the funda­
mentals of our strength rest upon the freedoms of the peo­
ple. We must continue our efforts to achieve the full 
relization of our democratic ideals. . . . We must assure 
equal rights and equal opportunities to all our citizens."3 A 
week later Truman included in his budget message a recom­
mendation that Congress pass FEPC legislation to prevent 
discrimination "during a period of defense mobilization."4 
The 1951 budget message, however, contained no specific 
allotment for the proposed agency's operating expenses. 
Civil rights leaders, like A. Philip Randolph, realizing that 
FEPC was a legislative dead letter, demanded that the presi­
dent issue an executive order to compensate for the lack of 
congressional action. To placate his critics, Truman an-
leadership positions in the Senate; see NAACP press release, January 
4,1951, Government General File, Box 1961, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
2. Congressional Record, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, Vol. XCVII, 
Part 1, p. 17. 
3. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1951 (Wash­
ington: United States Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 12. 
4. Ibid., p. 80. 
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nounced at a White House press conference on January 18, 
that he was considering new legal moves to cope with the 
employment situation created by the Korean War.6 Tru­
man's emphasis on the need for legality was predicated on 
the fact that Senator Russell had written into the 1945 
Independent Offices Appropriation Act, and all subsequent 
acts, a clause that specifically prohibited the president from 
using any emergency funds placed at his disposal by Con­
gress to finance the operation of an FEPC.6 For this reason, 
apparently, the White House ignored the Labor Depart­
ment's December, 1950, draft of an executive order author­
izing the establishment of an FEPC similar in design and 
operation to President Franklin Roosevelt's wartime 
7agency.
Nevertheless, President Truman could not pursue a pol­
icy of total inaction on this question since he was aware that 
the black vote could be as crucial in the 1952 election as it 
had been in 1948. Hence, on February 2, 1951, taking his 
first tentative step in the direction of establishing some kind 
of machinery to fight discrimination in industries handling 
defense contracts, he issued Executive Order 10210, which 
declared that "there shall be no discrimination against any 
person on the ground of race, creed, color, or national 
origin, and all contracts hereunder shall contain a pro­
5. Ibid., p. 112. 
6. This amendment was attached to Public Law 358, sec. 213, 78th 
Congress, 2d Session. On the other hand, there were those critics who 
argued that the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1951, which the 
Eighty-first Congress approved as Public Law 843 on September 27, 
1950, gave the president sufficient authority to issue that order; see 
Will Maslow to Arnold Aronson, March 12, 1951, FEPC File, Box 
1951, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
7. Philleo Nash Files, Box 17, HSTL. There is some evidence in the 
NAACP Papers suggesting that this particular order had been 
drafted with the help of the National Council for a Permanent FEPC; 
see PEPC File, Box 1951, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
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vision that the contractor and any subcontractor there­
under shall not so discriminate." 8 Despite its imposing lan­
guage, Executive Order 10210 was essentially meaningless 
because it lacked an enforcement clause. President Truman, 
in other words, would not create an PBPC unless or until 
Congress displayed a willingness to finance it. 
In a meeting with President Truman at the White House 
on February 28, Walter White and other Negro spokesmen 
made it clear that Executive Order 10210 did not go far 
enough and that they wanted stronger executive action. 
Consequently, they presented to him a six-point program 
that included a recommendation for an FEPC with an en­
forcement mechanism.9 Presumably, Truman promised 
them something, because on March 20 Walter White wired 
him in Key West: "Let us know when Executive Order for 
PEPC will be signed by you." 10 On April 4 White and Ran­
dolph wrote the president asking when they could expect 
him to act; he did not answer their letter.11 Truman had no 
intention of going beyond Executive Order 10210, as such a 
move would have precipitated a bitter row with Congress. 
8. Executive Order 10210, in 16 F.R. 1049. 
9. A copy of their demands can be found in the FEPC File, Box 
1951, NAACP Papers, L.C. With respect to that meeting, one of those 
who attended, Elmer Henderson, director of the American Council on 
Human Rights, observed that "the President was very cordial in his 
reception and listened attentively to all that was said . . . [but] it 
was very evident that the President was under considerable pressure 
by those not in sympathy with the civil rights program. I am con­
vinced that the conference alone was not sufficient to cause any of the 
points we raised to be acted upon" (Conference on Negro Leaders 
Folder, FEPC File, Box 1951, NAACP Papers, L.C). 
10. A copy of the telegram is in the FEPC File, Box 1951, NAACP 
Papers, L.C. 
11. Truman Executive Order Folder, Box 1951, NAACP Papers, 
L.C. 
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(In order to head off any possible future action by Truman, 
the House earlier had rejected on March 13, 1951, a bill 
allowing for the emergency reorganization of federal 
agencies, partly because of southern fears that the Presi­
dent would use this new authority to create an FEPC.) 12 
Truman's refusal to issue the order White and Randolph 
wanted added impetus to the growing Negro disenchant­
ment with him and his administration. Also contributing to 
the development of this mood was Truman's appointments 
of Millard F. Caldell, former governor of Florida as fed­
eral civil defense administrator, and Robert Ramspeck, for­
mer congressman from Georgia, as chairman of the United 
States Civil Service Commission. Both men were, in the 
view of Walter White, "outspoken and unabashed white 
supremacists." 13 
Now convinced that the evidence showed "an alarming 
administration trend toward appeasement of credited Dix­
iecrats and other reactionaries," the NAACP organized a 
conference to meet in Washington on May 22-23, 1951, "in 
order to formulate a program of action on behalf of civil 
rights in this emergency." u Speaking to representatives of 
thirty-one national organizations participating in the con­
ference, White said: "Truman, we all know, is hogtied by 
his opposition among his own party and Republicans. But 
sympathy for his plight must not blind us to the fact that 
his cessation of active support for civil rights legislation 
12. Congressional Record, 82d Congress, 1st Sess., 1951, Vol. 
XCVII, Part 2, p. 2174. 
13. Walter White to John Wilson, April 19, 1951, Box 1951, 
NAACP Papers, L.C. 
14. Ibid. See also Memorandum to Walter White from Henry L. 
Moon, April 30,1951, Civil Rights Conference File, Box 1951, NAACP 
Papers, L.C. 
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and his appointment of men like Caldwell and Ramspeck 
can be interpreted only as surrender on this issue." 15 
In addition to the speechmaking, the conference sought to 
rally nagging congressional support for civil rights legisla­
tion. During a meeting with Senator Kenneth Wherry, the 
Republican floor leader, a delegation from the conference 
obtained his promise to press for a Senate Rules Committee 
consideration of a Senate resolution which had been intro­
duced by Senator Herbert Lehman and others on March 22, 
1951 to liberalize Rule Twenty-two.16 Wherry kept his word 
and brought back the news to the delegation, while it was 
consulting with Senator McFarland, the majority leader, 
that the Rules Committee had agreed "to again take up the 
issue of changing the Senate rule on cloture." 17 This action 
convinced Walter White that "the civil rights issue is not 
dead but instead is going to be an important factor in the 
1952 elections." 18 
Subsequent to this two-day meeting in Washington, pres­
sure began to build up once more for President Truman to 
issue an executive order creating a federal FEPC. Governors 
of seven states, including Ohio, Michigan, and Minnesota, 
designated June 25, 1951—the tenth anniversary of Presi­
15. Civil Rights Conference File, Box 1951, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
White was more critical of Truman in a letter he sent to Venice T. 
Spraggs: "There were a few who thought we ought to have gone to 
the White House. But we deliberately and conspicuously avoided 
asking for another conference to hear Mr. Truman tell us that 'I am 
still for civil rights.' The time has come for him to do something about 
civil rights instead of telling us how he feels personally" (Walter 
White to Venice T. Spraggs, May 31, 1951, Civil Rights Conference 
File, Box 1951, NAACP Papers, L.C.). 
16. NAACP press release, May 24, 1951, Civil Rights Mobilization 
Folder, Box 1951, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
17. Ibid. 
18. Walter White to Venice T. Spraggs, May 31, 1951, Civil Rights 
Conference File, Box 1951, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
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dent Roosevelt's Executive Order 8802—as Fair Employ­
ment Day. Mayors of New York, Cleveland, and other cities 
asked Truman to issue a new executive order, as did leaders 
of sixteen national organizations, such as Patrick Murphy 
Malin of the American Civil Liberties Union and William 
Green of the American Federation of Labor. And on June 
25,1951, as if to highlight the symbolic significance of the 
day, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, Walter White, and A. Philip 
Randolph participated in a flower-placing ceremony at the 
gravesite of Franklin Roosevelt in Hyde Park.19 On the 
same day Senator Hubert Humphrey and eight colleagues, 
including Senator Wayne Morse, introduced an FEPC bill 
which more closely resembled the 1949 administration bill 
than the measure submitted earlier in the session by Repub­
lican Senator Irving Ives.20 There was little chance, how­
ever, that either bill would reach the floor, since Senator 
McFarland, the majority leader, later stated that he would 
not permit floor action on any FEPC legislation.21 
Earlier, Senator McFarland revealed that moves by party 
leaders, including President Truman, were under way in the 
spring of 1951 to heal the North-South breach in the Demo­
cratic party preparatory to the 1952 campaign. Conse­
quently, Truman restored to the Mississippi congressional 
delegation its patronage privileges, and, furthermore, held 
many conferences with individual senators at the White 
House.22 (It is possible that these maneuvers had been stim­
ulated by Guy Gabrielson, the chairman of the Republican 
National Committee, who, along with Senator Karl Mundt 
of South Dakota, was publicly calling in 1951 for a formal­
19. See July 16, 1951, Newsletter of the National Council for a 
Permanent FEPC, FEPC File, Box 1951, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
20. New York Times, June 26, 1951, p. 22. 
21. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Jan. 12, 1952, p. 14. 
22. Ibid., Mar. 31, 1951, p. 1. 
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ized grouping of Republicans and Southern Democrats into 
a single party structure prior to the 1952 election. The 
purpose of such a merger, it was rumored, would facili­
tate the selection of a Taft-Byrd or Eisenhower-Russell 
ticket.) 23 
But despite Truman's efforts to mollify the South, Dixie 
was still restless. And according to Arthur Krock, the 
threat of an internal party rupture was potentially greater 
and more serious in 1952 than it had been in 1948, because 
the leadership of the southern movement to prevent Tru­
man's renomination in 1952 now included such powerful 
and important figures as Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia 
and Governor James F. Byrnes of South Carolina.24 Byrd 
made his position clear in a rancorous speech he delivered in 
Selma, Alabama, on November 1,1951. After assailing Tru­
man and calling for the restoration of the two-thirds rule at 
the 1952 convention and the repeal of the "Humphrey civil 
rights resolution," Byrd counseled fellow southerners to 
come together and decide upon a course of action in the 
event the party refused to oblige the South.25 But while 
Senator Byrd fulminated against the White House, Senator 
Clinton Anderson of New Mexico, a respected member of 
the Senate Democratic establishment, predicted that a party 
compromise on civil rights for 1952 was a "good possibil­
ity." 26 And in line with that policy, Frank E. McKinney, the 
newly installed head of the Democratic National Committee, 
extended an olive branch to Dixie.27 
23. Baltimore Afro-American, Mar. 24, 1951. Senator Mundt 
thought this coalition was essential "not only for the Republican party 
and our two party system but also for the most effective fight possible 
against communism in America" (New York World Telegram and 
Sun, Aug. 11, 1951). 
24. New York Times, Oct. 14, 1951. 
25. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Nov. 10, 1951, p. 1. 
26. Ibid., Nov. 24, 1951, p. 1. 
27. Ibid., Nov. 10, 1951, p. 1. 
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But the olive branch concealed a thorn. The White House 
was not in a position to ignore completely those black voters 
who helped to make possible Truman's victory in 1948. But 
while administration supporters and friends sought to 
bridge the differences between the major factions of the 
party, President Truman maneuvered to keep his base of 
support as wide as possible, a tactic dictated by the fact that 
his own popularity was at an all-time low because of the 
frustrations generated by the Korean War. To this end on 
November 2, 1951, Truman vetoed H.R. 5411, which con­
tained a provision requiring integrated schools situated on 
federal property to conform "to the laws of the states in 
which such installations are located." In his veto message 
Truman declared: 
This proposal, if enacted into law, would constitute a 
backward step in the efforts of the Federal Government 
to extend equal rights and opportunities to all our people. 
During the past few years, we have made rapid progress 
toward equal treatment and opportunity in these activi­
ties of the Federal Government where we have a direct 
responsibility to follow national rather than local inter­
pretations of non-discrimination. 
Two outstanding examples are the Federal Civil Serv­
ice and our armed forces, where important advances have 
been made toward equalizing treatment and oppor­
tunity. . . . 
We have assumed a role of world leadership in seeking 
to unite people of great cultural and racial diversity for 
the purpose of resisting aggression, protecting their mu­
tual security and advancing their own economic and po­
litical development. We should not impair our moral posi­
tion by enacting a law that requires a discrimination 
based on race. Step by step we are discarding old discrim­
inations ; we must not adopt new ones.28 
28. Truman Papers, Bill File 107, HSTL. Evidently, the United 
States Army, at least in one instance, violated the spirit of this veto 
message. For evidence see the Norfolk Journal and Guide, Sept. 13, 
1952, p. 14. 
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Praising the Truman veto, the Pittsburgh Courier wrote: 
"By this forthright statement the President has made new 
friends who expect America to justify its moral leadership 
by practicing what it preaches around the world." 29 
But because of the civil rights deadlock in Congress, the 
accomplishments Truman cited in his veto message had 
been achieved by executive action; in this manner progress 
had been made in the period from 1948 to 1950. The Korean 
War, however, changed the domestic political climate from 
one of liberalism to one of reaction and made it more diffi­
cult for the administration to keep pace with its earlier 
moves. 
Yet, ironically, the Korean War was responsible for sev­
eral new developments. It provided General Matthew Ridge-
way, commander of American troops in Korea, with the 
opportunity to integrate black troops into white units.30 The 
war also forced President Truman to move beyond his ear­
lier executive order regarding discrimination in defense-
subsidized industries. Thus, on December 3, 1951, he issued 
Executive Order 10308 establishing a Government Contract 
Compliance Committee "to examine and study the rules, 
procedures, and practices of the contracting agencies of the 
Government as they relate to obtaining compliance with 
Government contract provisions prohibiting discrimination 
. . . [and] to determine in what respects such rules, proce­
dures and practices may be strengthened and improved."31 
29. Nov. 17,1951, p. 16. 
30. United States Civil Rights Commission Report S, Employment, 
p. 47. See also Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces, pp. 
204-10. 
31. White and Randolph, having learned beforehand that the pro­
posed order provided for "virtually no enforcement powers or machin­
ery," tried without success to prevent the release of the order in order 
to make suggestions to insure its effectiveness; see Telegram to Harry 
Truman from Walter White and A. Philip Randolph, November 30, 
1951, Executive Order Folder, Box 1951, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
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(That eleven-man committee, including six representatives 
from the public at large andfive from various governmental 
agencies, was later headed by Dwight Palmer, chairman of 
the board of the General Cable Corporation.) The creation 
of this committee, declared President Truman, was "one 
more step in the program I have undertaken to use the 
powers conferred on the Executive by the Constitution and 
the statutes to eliminate the practice of discrimination in 
connection with activities of the Federal Government." 32 
Although the New York Times stated that here was "a 
new FEPC," 33 the GCCC was no such thing, a point empha­
sized by Philleo Nash, a White House administrative assist­
ant, at a press conference the day the order was released. As 
Nash suggested, the GCCC could only advise the President 
how he might best obtain compliance with governmental 
requirements prohibiting discrimination in the execution of 
contracts between the government and private firms.34 
The issuance of the order may have had a beneficial effect 
on the country's foreign relations. Dr. Channing Tobias, a 
member of the United States delegation to the 1951 United 
Nations General Assembly meeting in Paris, wrote Presi­
dent Truman on December 12, 1951: "I think that I should 
say to you that the publication of the Executive Order in the 
Paris edition of the H. T. [Herald Tribune'] has had a very 
good effect on our Delegation and the delegations that are 
32. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1951, pp. 
640-41. This committee transmitted its report, Equal Economic Op­
portunity, to the president on January 16, 1953; see Equal Economic 
Opportunity (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 
1953); also see the letter of January 19, 1953, which President 
Truman wrote to President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower concerning 
the recommendations and proposals found in Equal Economic Oppor­
tunity: Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1952-1953 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 
1216. 
33. Dec. 4, 1951, p. 32. 
34. Ibid., p. 26. 
194 Presidential Politics of Civil Rights: 1952 
friendly to us." 35 On the other hand, Negro leaders ex­
pressed disappointment with Truman's order. Clarence 
Mitchell, the Washington representative of the NAACP'S na­
tional office, pointed to the fact that the order contained no 
enforcement mechanism.36 The Pittsburgh Courier declared 
that "even though we are not satisfied with this half-a-loaf 
committee, we must admit that it is better than nothing at 
all." 37 
Southern Democrats quickly sensed the political implica­
tions behind the release of this order. Georgia's Senator 
Walter George observed that Truman "may be preparing to 
run for President again." 38 Louisiana Representative F. H. 
Herbert remarked that "Mr. Truman is again thinking in 
terms of politics." 39 But then so was the South. Dixie Demo­
crats, anticipating a fierce struggle over civil rights in 1952, 
were hoping to nominate Senator Richard Russell as the 
party's presidential candidate; otherwise, their support 
would go to General Dwight Eisenhower, if he were availa­
ble and running either as a Democrat or Republican. 
During the first days of 1952 civil rights was again 
emerging as a potent political issue. President Truman 
made a specific reference to civil rights in his seventh State 
of the Union address, which he delivered to Congress on 
January 9, 1952. He asserted: 
As we build our strength to defend freedom in the 
world, we ourselves must extend the benefits of freedom 
35. Channing Tobias to Harry Truman, December 12, 1951, Tru­
man Papers, 526B, HSTL. 
36. FEPC File, Box 1951, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
37. Dec. 15,1951, p. 18. 
38. New York Times, Dec. 4, 1951, p. 26. Senator J. William 
Fulbright of Arkansas suggested that Truman's order was a "diver­
sionary movement to take the public spotlight off the tax collection 
scandals" (Pittsburgh Courier, Dec. 8, 1951, p. 5). 
39. New York Times, Dec. 4, 1951, p. 26. 
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more widely among all our own people. We need to take 
action toward the wider enjoyment of civil rights. Free­
dom is the birthright of every American. 
The Executive Branch has been making real progress 
toward full treatment and equality in the armed forces, 
in the civil service, and in private firms working for the 
Government. Further advances require action by the 
Congress, and I hope that means will be provided to give 
the members of the House and Senate a chance to vote on 
them.40 
With this statement Truman formally placed the civil rights 
question on the 1952 political agenda; but much to the relief 
of the South, his remarks, according to the New York 
Times, were cast in such a way as to avoid creating "new 
ire." 41 Avoidance of conflict was also the goal of the Senate 
Democratic leadership. For example, Senators McFarland 
and Johnson apparently had no intention of letting a Rules 
Committee resolution modifying cloture requirements 
from two-thirds of the entire Senate to two-thirds of those 
present and voting reach the Senate floor.42 (That resolu­
tion passed the Rules Committee on January 29, 1952, after 
several months of hearings, discussion, and deliberation.) "3 
To keep the civil rights issue alive, the NAACP organized a 
civil rights mobilization for a two-day meeting in Washing­
ton in mid-February, at which time representatives of fifty­
40. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1952-1953, 
p. 16. 
41. Jan. 10, 1952, p. 19. 
42. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Jan. 12, 1952, p. 14. See also U.S. 
Senate, Hearings before the Committee on Rules and Administration, 
82nd Congress, 1st Session, on S. Res. il, S. Res. 52, S. Res. 105, S. 
Res. 203. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951). The testi­
mony of Walter White can be found on pp. 34-46; and that of Senator 
Russell, pp. 250-67. 
43. Congressional Record, 82d Congress, 2d Sess., 1952, Vol. 
XCVIII, Part 13, Daily Digest, p. 101. 
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two national organizations heard speeches from Senators 
Humphrey, Lehman, Ives, and Benton.44 President Truman 
was invited to speak, but, according to Matthew Connelly, 
his appointments secretary, it was not possible "to commit 
the President at this time." 45 The minutes of the mobiliza­
tion later recorded that "President Truman, for some 
inexplicable reason, found himself too busy to greet the 
eight hundred and fifty key persons who had come at their 
own expense to Washington in support of the civil rights 
program which played a decisive role in his reelection in 
1948." 48 
Perhaps the reason Truman refused to attend had some­
thing to do with the fact that he was pondering his political 
future: he had to decide whether or not to seek another 
term, at a time when both the Korean War and McCarthy-
ism had greatly eroded the support and good will he had 
built up thanks to his dramatic victory in 1948. Certainly 
Negroes wanted Truman to remain another four years in 
the White House, as was made clear on March 8, when 
twenty-one Negro leaders urged him to run for reelection.47 
On March 29, however, Truman announced that he would 
not seek the office of the presidency again.48 His earlier loss 
to Tennessee's Senator Estes Kefauver in the New Hamp­
shire Democratic primary probably spurred him into that 
decision; Truman surely realized that his candidacy could 
have irrevocably split the party. After all, the South in 
44. Civil Rights Mobilization 1952, Box 1952, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
45. See Roy Wilkins to Philleo Nash, January 18, 1952; Matthew 
Connelly to Roy Wilkins, January 25, 1952; Civil Rights Mobilization 
Speakers and Speeches File, Box 1952, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
46. Minutes of the Civil Rights Mobilization, Civil Rights Mobiliza­
tion File, Box 1952, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
47. New York Times, Mar. 9, 1952, p. 58. 
48. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1952-195S, 
p. 225. 
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1952 would simply not tolerate him as many Southern 
Democrats had in 1948, as evidenced by the growing op­
position of such leading figures as Senator Byrd. Thus, 
being a good party man—that is, a centrist whose commit­
ments to the well-being of the organization transcended 
personal desire—Truman probably weighed the alterna­
tives to his retirement and found them wanting; hence he 
decided to pass the scepter to somebody whose views he 
found congenial and whose chances for election were per­
haps better than his own. 
The news of Truman's withdrawal evoked a mixed re­
sponse of praise and disappointment from the Negro com­
munity. Walter White remarked: 
No segment of the voters was more startled by President 
Truman's abdication from the presidential race than the 
Negro. Although he has appeared to soft-pedal the civil 
rights issue during recent months, no occupant of the 
White House since the nation was born has taken so 
frontal or consistent a stand against racial and religious 
discrimination as has Mr. Truman.49 
The Norfolk Journal and Guide titled its editorial discuss­
ing Truman's announcement "Something Vital Was Lost 
When Truman Withdrew." The editorial itself commented 
that "Mr. Truman stood for . . . the simple human rights 
that brought this nation into being, and for which the peo­
ples of Asia, Africa, and South America and all the islands 
of the seas are getting ready to fight." 50 
After March 29 the political spotlight shifted to other 
Democrats who could make a suitable standard-bearer. Illi­
nois Governor Adlai E. Stevenson soon found himself the 
center of attention because, in the words of James Reston, 
49. NAACP press release, April 3, 1952, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
50. Apr. 5, 1952, pp. 1-2. 
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New York Times columnist, he was "the man most likely to 
hold together the liberal-labor-Southern coalition that 
Franklin D. Roosevelt built into the most successful Ameri­
can political combination of modern times." 51 Yet Steven­
son's views on FEPC could prove to be something of a liabil­
ity in the North and West. Believing that the states ought to 
initiate action to abolish discrimination in employment, he 
opposed a "compulsory" FEPC bill; but he could justify fed­
eral intervention if the states shirked their responsibility.62 
Stevenson's views were such that he received a prompt 
endorsement from South Carolina's Governor James F. 
Byrnes, who had been a Truman foe since 1948.53 Unfortu­
nately, though, for President Truman, who had been en­
couraging Stevenson's candidacy for the reason Reston 
mentioned, the Illinois governor declined to make himself 
available for the nomination and made it clear in late April 
that his only political goal was to remain governor of Illi­
nois for another four-year term. 
Stevenson's decision came at a time when Senators Estes 
Kefauver of Tennessee and Richard Russell of Georgia were 
actively campaigning for the party's presidential nomina­
tion. Kefauver had gained national prominence in 1951 
through his televised investigation into the world of organ­
ized crime. Although that investigation brought Kefauver 
into the public limelight, it alienated President Truman, 
who would not forgive him for having called attention to the 
connection between crime and some big city Democratic 
machines. On the matter of civil rights, Kefauver as a 
senator had voted for the Barkley ruling; had supported the 
Wherry amendment; had opposed cloture on the FEPC bill; 
51. New York Times, Mar. 31, 1952, pp. 1, 9. 
52. Ibid. 
53. Ibid. 
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and had endorsed a voluntary "FEPC" and federal anti-lynch­
ing legislation in the absence of state legislation.64 In the 
words of Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois, who came out in 
favor of Kefauver after the Stevenson statement of late 
April, Kefauver "is the best available candidate. . .  . He 
has shown a readiness to meet the sentiments of the country 
more than half way. . . . He is not a southerner, he is an 
American." 55 
If Senator Kefauver was an unusually liberal southerner, 
Senator Russell, the other southern candidate, was Dixie's 
grand strategist in the Senate. Able and articulate, Russell 
was the choice of his fellow southerners for the nomination. 
In an interview with the Pittsburgh Courier in April, 1952, 
Russell restated his opposition to anti-poll tax and anti­
lynching legislation, and his rejection of a compulsory FEPC. 
He said: "My only serious difference with the Truman pol­
icies is compulsory FEPC. I am honest and practical in my 
differences while many of the civil rights advocates are 
emotionally shallow and insincere." 5e 
On May 6 Kefauver and Russell collided in the Florida 
primary for that state's twenty-four convention votes. Dur­
ing the campaign Russell declared that if he received the 
presidential nomination of the party, he would disavow any 
civil rights plank authorizing the creation of a "compul­
sory" FEPC. Conversely, Kefauver told the Florida voters 
that he supported a voluntary FEPC, but would be "morally 
bound" to support the party platform even if it featured a 
"compulsory" FEPC.57 Although Russell won nineteen of 
Florida's twenty-four convention votes, Kefauver still ran 
extremely well in the cities and, with the help of Negro 
54. Congressional Quarterly, December 16, 1955, p. 1284. 
55. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Apr. 26, 1952, pp. 1-2. 
56. Apr. 26, 1952, pp. 1, 4. 
57. New York Times, Apr. 28, 1952, p. 1. 
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votes, managed to pick up five convention votes of his own.58 
The results of the Florida primary deepened the diffi­
culties of the Democratic party. Russell was clearly unac­
ceptable to northern liberals, and Kefauver was already 
rejected by the big city bosses and the president. Thus, the 
split over civil rights, which President Truman had accen­
tuated in 1948, was still very much in evidence in the spring 
of 1952. Senator Humphrey, an outspoken liberal, declared 
that if the party backtracked on its 1948 platform pledges, 
it would be removed from office. He insisted that the Demo­
cratic party did not deserve to endure if it equivocated on 
the issue of civil rights.59 On the other hand, Senator Allen 
Ellender of Louisiana said that the South could not and 
would not accept a civil rights platform similar to the one 
contained in the 1948 platform. If the liberals had their way 
again, it was Ellender's opinion that the South had no 
choice but to present its own candidate for the presidency in 
1952.60 
President Truman, too, was busily articulating his civil 
rights views. Speaking to the convention of the Americans 
for Democratic Action in Washington on May 17, the presi­
dent declared that it was necessary for the Democratic 
party to nominate a liberal candidate and to draft a liberal 
platform. There was a good reason for such a position, 
suggested Truman: "I have been in politics for over forty 
years, I know what I am talking about and I believe I know 
something about the business. One thing I am sure of: 
never, never throw away a winning program." Referring to 
civil rights, the President said that the party had to stand 
58. Ibid., May 7, 1952, p. 1; also see Norfolk Journal and Guide, 
May 10, 1952, p. 14. 
59. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Apr. 5, 1952, p. 12. 
60. Ibid., June 7, 1952, p. 6. 
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firm on its 1948 pledges; as far as he was concerned, there 
was no room for compromise.61 
While these rhetorical exchanges were taking place, men 
whose commitments were more organizational than ideolog­
ical were attempting to find a middle position to which most 
Democrats could repair. To this end Frank McKinney, the 
Democratic national chairman, selected John W. McCor­
mack, the House majority leader, to head the platform com­
mittee responsible for drafting the 1952 civil rights plank. 
Also included on this committee were former senator Fran­
cis Myers, the chairman of the 1948 platform committee; 
Alabama Senator John Sparkman; Representative Brooks 
Hays of Arkansas, the author of the 1949 compromise civil 
rights package; and Negro Congressman William Dawson, 
the vice-chairman of the Democratic National Committee, 
who reportedly favored platform conciliation to prevent a 
party rupture, while placing more faith in the party's nomi­
nee than in its platform. Conspicuously absent from this 
committee was Senator Humphrey; he had been excluded 
by the party leaders, who hoped to prevent a repetition of 
1948 by keeping him as isolated as possible.62 
Word that a compromise on the civil rights plank was 
brewing was reported by Robert Spivack in the New York 
Post. Spivack suggested that party leaders were hoping to 
"tone down the 1948 plank on civil rights" by eliminating 
specific references to FEPC and other civil rights measures.63 
This news alarmed Walter White, who was already of the 
opinion that "none of the avowed candidates for the presi­
dency has an acceptable record on the vital issues of civil 
61. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1952-1953, 
pp. 341-47. 
62. Norfolk Journal and Guide, May 24, 1952, p. 7. 
63. May 15, 1952. 
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rights."64 Writing to Chairman McKinney on May 16, 
White informed him that twenty Negro organizations had 
met in New York on May 9 to draft their demands for the 
1952 campaign, which included, among other points, the 
modification or burial of Rule Twenty-two, voting rights 
legislation, and "welfare state aid in areas of housing, 
health, and education." White also noted that if the talk of a 
party compromise was correct, then "there will be wide­
spread repercussions among Negroes and other liberal vot­
ers against yielding to those who would perpetuate second-
class citizenship for Negroes and other minorities." 65 
In his reply to White's letter, McKinney defended those 
Democrats selected to serve on the drafting committee and 
suggested, in reference to Spivack's article, that he could 
not accept responsibility for the interpretation that "others 
may place on my words."66 Not consoled by McKinney's 
comments, White informed him that "the majority of the 
committee have records either of hostility or apathy to­
wards civil rights. This is causing great perturbation not 
only among Negro voters but many other Americans who 
are concerned with this fundamental question." 67 
Other moves in the direction of compromise were also 
undertaken on Capitol Hill. Senator McFarland was in con­
tact with the representatives of the NAACP in early May in 
64. The quote is from a speech White delivered on April 19, 1952, 
to an NAACP meeting in Atlanta; Box 444, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
65. Walter White to Frank McKinney, May 16, 1952, Democratic 
National Committee Folder, Box 444, NAACP Papers, L.C. A copy of 
the pamphlet What the Negro Wants, containing the demands of the 
NAACP and other Negro organizations, can be found in Box 444, 
NAACP Papers, L.C. 
66. Frank McKinney to Walter White, May 27, 1952, Democratic 
National Committee Folder, Box 444, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
67. Walter White to Frank McKinney, May 29, 1952, Democratic 
National Committee Folder, Box 444, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
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an effort to find some common ground between that organi­
zation and Senator Russell, who realized that his lack of a 
foothold in the liberal camp would probably cost him the 
nomination.68 Evidently the NAACP was offered an anti­
lynching bill in return for its cooperation.69 But the negotia­
tions collapsed, it seems, because the party's Senate leader­
ship refused to consider for floor action a Rules Committee 
resolution limiting debate by two-thirds of those present 
and voting.70 
Thus as June, 1952, approached, the Democratic party 
had not yet found a candidate around whom most Demo­
crats could rally. Of the declared candidates the most liberal 
was Averell Harriman, the Mutual Security Agency admin­
istrator, who appeared in the guise of a crusading Fair 
Dealer, embracing without equivocation the administra­
tion's civil rights program, including an PEPC with enforce­
ment powers.71 Nevertheless, Harriman failed to receive the 
backing of President Truman, probably because Harriman's 
advanced liberal views threatened to produce party division 
and turmoil. What centrist-oriented Democrats like Truman 
sought, in the words of Allan Sindler, "was . .  . a leader in 
the authentic tradition of the New Deal and Fair Deal who 
could both unify the party and appeal broadly to the voting 
citizenry." 72 
The Republicans also had their problems, for they were 
sharply divided between the supporters of General Dwight 
68. Norfolk Journal and Guide, May 24, 1952, p. 7. 
69. Ibid., May 10,1952, p. 5; Aug. 12,1952, pp. 1, 4. 
70. Ibid., May 24,1952, p. 14. 
71. Ibid., June 28, 1952, p. 13. 
72. Allan P. Sindler, "The Unsolid South: A Challenge to the 
Democratic National Party," in The Uses of Power: 7 Cases in 
American Politics, ed. Alan F. Westin (New York: Harcourt & Brace, 
1962), p. 232. 
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D. Eisenhower and a large bloc endorsing the presidential 
aspirations of Senator Robert Taft of Ohio. In Eisenhower, 
Taft met a contender of unquestioned popularity, even 
though his views on domestic issues were not well denned. 
To remedy that situation, Eisenhower, after resigning from 
the Army, held a wide-ranging press conference in Abilene, 
Kansas, his boyhood home, on June 5, 1952. During the 
conference Eisenhower was queried about such matters as 
PEPC. He replied: 
I do not believe that we can cure all of the evils in men's 
hearts by law and when you get to compulsory action of 
certain specific phases of this thing I really believe we 
can do more than to make it a Federally compulsory 
thing. And this is said with the utmost sympathy for 
anyone who feels himself to be a member of a group that 
has been depressed or unfairly treated." 
In other words, Eisenhower was opposed to federal FEPC 
legislation, a position which would endear him to moderates 
and conservatives around the country, particularly in the 
South, where he was contesting Senator Taft for delegates 
to the Republican national convention. 
Eisenhower was questioned also about his views regard­
ing racial segregation in the armed forces. He answered by 
saying that "I have been one of those who has tried to 
eliminate segregation in the armed services. We can no 
longer afford to hold on to the anachronistic principles of 
race segregation in the armed service organizations." 74 He 
added that additional progress ought to be made as rapidly 
as possible. In actuality, Eisenhower had argued differently 
in testimony he gave on April 2, 1948, to the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, then considering universal military 
73. New York Times, June 6, 1952, p. 1. 
74. Norfolk Journal and Guide, June 14, 1952, p. 2. 
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training legislation. He said at that time that he was pre­
pared to go no further than to permit the integration of 
Negro platoons into white companies. Complete integration, 
he warned, would mean that Negroes would lose opportuni­
ties for promotion to the higher non-commissioned posi­
tions.75 
Senator Taft, the other leading Republican contender, 
had a position which civil rights advocates could construe as 
far more enlightened and well denned than that of General 
Eisenhower. Taft, for example, favored the abolition of 
compulsory segregation in the use of public facilities or 
public accommodations; the establishment of home rule for 
Washington, D.C.; the enactment of anti-poll tax and anti­
lynching legislation; the application of cloture by a two-
thirds vote of those present and voting (Eisenhower did not 
know whether he approved this change) ; and the elimina­
tion of segregation in the public schools of Washington, 
D.C.7S On the volatile issue of FEPC, Taft opposed all legisla­
tion that included a "compulsory" enforcement mechanism, 
but he was willing to go along with a voluntary plan, which, 
apparently, was still too advanced for the general.77 
After Eisenhower and Taft revealed their positions on 
FEPC, the National Negro Press Association reported: 
With the two leading Republican candidates against com­
pulsory FEPC legislation, some members of Congress 
were of the view that there is no need for the Democratic 
National Committee to run the risk of another Dixiecrat 
walkout by adopting a strong civil rights plank, but the 
75. U.S. Senate, Hearings . . . on Universal Military Training 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 
995-96. 
76. Pittsburgh Courier, Apr. 26, 1952, p. 12; July 5, 1952, p. 13; 
and Norfolk Journal and Guide, July 5, 1952, p. 18. 
77. Pittsburgh Courier, Apr. 26, 1952, p. 18. 
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thing to do is to go back to the mild plank of 1944. Others 
said to keep the 1948 plank but drop from it commenda­
tion of President Truman for his fight for civil rights 
legislation.78 
And the New York Times disseminated the news that Sena­
tor Humphrey was prepared to stand on the 1948 civil 
rights plank without extending it.79 
At this point President Truman went on the attack. 
Speaking to a commencement audience of 15,000 at Howard 
University on June 13, Truman not only defended his civil 
rights record but explicitly challenged the position General 
Eisenhower had taken on the subject. He said: 
There has been a great working of the American con­
science. All over the land there has been a growing recog­
nition that injustice must go, and that the way of equal 
opportunity is better for all of us. 
The civil rights report and the civil rights program 
give voice and expression to this great change of senti­
ment. They are the necessary instruments of progress. 
They are the trumpet blast outside the Walls of Jericho 
—the crumbling walls of prejudice. 
After citing the improvement made in the fields of educa­
tion, housing, and employment, Truman added: 
Some of the greatest progress of all has been made in 
the armed services. Service in the armed forces of our 
country is both a duty and a right of citizenship. Every 
man or woman who enters one of our services is certainly 
entitled to equal treatment and equal opportunity. 
There has been a great deal of talk about the need for 
segregation in the armed services. Some of our greatest 
generals have said that our forces had to have segregated 
78. Norfolk Journal and Guide, June 14, 1952, p. 2. 
79. June 6, 1952, p. 1. 
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units. But our experience has proved that this was non­
sense. 
Near the end of his speech Truman declared that the re­
sources of the federal government had to be committed in 
the battle for civil rights if progress was to be made: 
I am not one of those who feel that we can leave these 
matters up to the states alone, or that we can rely solely 
on the efforts of men of good will. Our Federal Govern­
ment must live up to the ideals professed in our Declara­
tion of Independence and the duties imposed upon it by 
our Constitution. The full force and power of the Federal 
Government must stand behind the protection of rights 
guaranteed by our Federal Constitution.80 
President Truman's Howard University speech, politi­
cally motivated and partisan in tone, suggests that Truman 
had apparently decided to make an all-out rhetorical effort 
to hold the black vote for the Democratic party in 1952. 
Another indication of his decision is that on June 23 he 
wired the Forty-third Annual Conference of the NAACP, 
meeting in Oklahoma City, that "the ten-point program I 
sent to Congress in 1948 is still my civil rights program for 
the American people." 81 
While Truman was mending his political fences, the Sen­
ate was preparing to adjourn. Shortly before this happened, 
the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee approved 
on June 24 a compromise FEPC bill which had been jointly 
drafted by Senator Humphrey and Republican Senator Ir­
ving Ives of New York for the purpose of providing both 
80. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1952-1958, 
pp. 420-24. For editorial praise of this speech, see Pittsburgh Courier, 
June 28, 1952, p. 6. 
81. Truman Papers, President's Personal File 393, HSTL. 
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political conventions with a model FEPC plank.82 Although 
the Humphrey-Ives bill was not nearly as strong as the 
earlier Truman bill (the compulsory feature having been 
removed), the chances were not good that either convention 
would be prepared to support it. Both parties intended to 
keep the lid on the civil rights cauldron. 
The Republican convention opened in Chicago in early 
July. Though civil rights was not a major issue at that 
convention, the issue was still conspicuous enough to cause 
concern among the Republicans managing General Eisen­
hower's drive for the nomination. The problem first arose 
when Harold C. Burton and another Negro member of the 
New York delegation—which Governor Thomas Dewey had 
organized solidly behind General Eisenhower—announced 
in Chicago that they were shifting their votes from General 
Eisenhower to Senator Taft because it was their belief that 
Taft was more responsive to, and understanding of, Negro 
aspirations.83 Governor Dewey and others apparently ex­
erted considerable pressure to bring them back into line, for 
a few days later, Burton let it be known that he was once 
more supporting Eisenhower for the nomination.84 
Meanwhile, the Republican Resolution Committee, 
headed by Senator Eugene Milligan of Colorado, was draft­
ing a civil rights plank which represented a considerable 
retreat from the one the 1948 convention had approved.85 
The 1952 platform, including the much-weakened civil 
82. New York Times, June 25, 1952, p. 12. See also U.S. Senate, 
Report of Committee on Labor and Public Welfare to accompany 
S.S368, 1952. Republican Senators Robert Taft and Richard Nixon 
refused to support the majority position and reserved the right to file 
individual views at a later date; see p. 15 of the Report. 
83. Norfolk Journal and Guide, July 12, 1952, p. 12. 
84. New York Times, July 9, 1952, pp. 1, 18. 
85. Norfolk Journal and Guide, July 12, 1952, p. 12. Senators 
Nixon and Ives were also members of the Milligan committee. 
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rights plank, was scheduled to be read to the convention on 
July 10. Just before Senator Milligan made his report, the 
forty black delegates to the convention caucused among 
themselves and decided to introduce for floor consideration 
a minority-sponsored resolution which included a compul­
sory FEPC and a Republican pledge to seek a change in 
Senate Rule Twenty-two allowing a majority to impose clo­
ture.86 Burton, who had been prepared to lead the fight for 
the 1948 plank, was delegated the responsibility by his fel­
low Negroes to submit their tough resolution to the conven­
tion. 
Burton subsequently consulted with New York Congress­
man Jacob Javits, Senator Irving Ives (who promised him 
his support for the substitute measure), and Governor 
Alfred E. Driscoll of New Jersey.87 Driscoll advised him not 
to introduce this resolution because, in Driscoll's opinion, it 
had no chance of winning and "there were more effective 
ways of accomplishing the results" the Negroes wanted.88 
Following his conversation with Driscoll, Burton proceeded 
to inform the convention that he and his fellow Negroes 
approved the Milligan report. Although Burton was speak­
ing only for himself and not other Negro delegates (who did 
not approve of the Milligan report), his false and mislead­
ing statement made it possible for the Republican conven­
tion to skirt what could have been a damaging floor fight.89 
Thus the report that Milligan presented became the 1952 
Republican platform. 
The party's civil rights plank underscored the fact that 
its 1948 committment to federal action had been superceded 
by a renewed emphasis on state initiative, a shift designed 
86. Ibid., p. 1. 
87. Ibid. 
88. Pittsburgh Courier, July 19, 1952, p. 1. 
89. Ibid. 
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to help Republican efforts in the South. The plank read as 
follows: 
We condemn bigots who inject class, racial and reli­
gious prejudice into public and political matters. Bigotry 
is un-American and a danger to the Republic. 
We deplore the duplicity and insincerity of the party in 
power in racial and religious matters. Although they 
have been in office as a majority party for many years 
they have not kept nor do they intend to keep their 
promises. 
The Republican Party will not mislead, exploit or at­
tempt to confuse minority groups for political purposes. 
All American citizens are entitled to full, impartial en­
forcement of federal laws relating to their civil rights. 
We believe that it is the primary responsibility of each 
state to order and control its own domestic institutions, 
and this power, reserved to the states, is essential to the 
maintenance of our Federal Republic. However, we be­
lieve that the federal government should take supple­
mental action within its Constitutional jurisdiction to 
oppose discrimination against race, religion or national 
origin. 
We will prove our good faith by: 
Appointing qualified persons, without distinction of 
race, religion or national origin, to responsible positions 
in the government. 
Federal action toward the elimination of lynching. 
Federal action toward the elimination of poll taxes as a 
prerequisite to voting. 
Appropriate action to end segregation in the District 
of Columbia. 
Enacting federal legislation to further just and equita­
ble treatment in the area of discriminatory employment 
practices. Federal action should not duplicate state ef­
forts to end such practices; should not set up another 
huge bureaucracy.90 
90. Porter and Johnson, National Party Platforms: 1840-1964, p. 
504. 
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After approving the platform, the convention nominated 
General Eisenhower for the presidency and California Sen­
ator Richard M. Nixon for the vice-presidency. The conven­
tion then adjourned to await the results of the Democratic 
convention, which was scheduled to meet in Chicago during 
the third week in July. 
As the Democratic party faithful streamed into Chicago, 
they were faced with the prospect of another fierce floor 
fight on civil rights. Democratic party liberals, many of 
whom supported the presidential candidacy of either Aver-
ell Harriman or Senator Estes Kefauver, were determined 
to retain the 1948 civil rights plank or, possibly, to go 
beyond it. Senator Humphrey declared that he put "country 
above the party" in his civil rights stand and also contended 
that if the Democratic party abandoned its "winning posi­
tion," it would not only commit political suicide but would 
revert to its spineless condition of the 1920's.91 The chair­
man of Americans for Democratic Action, the former attor­
ney general Francis Biddle, said that if the platform com­
mittee reported out a plank weaker than that of 1948, a 
floor fight would surely ensue. He claimed 654 floor votes for 
a plank at least as strong as 1948.92 New York Senator 
Herbert Lehman, a member of the Platform Committee on 
Civil Rights, announced support for "a strong and for­
ward-looking platform which will be outspoken and unequiv­
ocal on the great issues of our time, including but not 
confined to civil rights." 93 Lehman intended to fight specifi­
cally for a resolution he and Connecticut Senator William 
Benton had introduced in the Senate calling for a major 
liberalization of Rule Twenty-two.94 Evidently Lehman's 
91. Norfolk Journal and Guide, July 26, 1952, p. 2. 
92. Ibid. 
93. New York Times, July 17,1952, p. 1. 
94. Ibid., July 18,1952, p. 8. 
212 Presidential Politics of Civil Rights: 1952 
views were shared by other members of the Platform Com­
mittee, including Senator Warren Magnuson of Washington 
and Rhode Island Senator Theodore Francis Green.95 
On July 18 Walter White addressed the Platform Com­
mittee on behalf of fifty-four civil rights organizations. He 
strongly endorsed a nine-point civil rights program that 
included a compulsory FEPC, anti-lynching legislation, and a 
modification of Rule Twenty-two along the lines of the Leh­
man-Benton resolution.96 Elmer Henderson, director of the 
American Council on Human Rights, informed the commit­
tee that, in his view, the Republican plank, though disap­
pointing, had some appealing elements in it, such as the call 
for the elimination of Jim Crow from Washington, D.C. 
Henderson also said that if the Democrats retreated from 
their 1948 plank "a number of people will not vote for the 
Democratic ticket in November." 97 
After having heard the recommendations of various 
groups and individuals, the Platform Committee settled 
down to write the party's 1952 civil rights plank, in which 
interest, according to the New York Times, also "stretched 
far beyond the hearing room . . . [and] appeared to be all 
over Chicago." 98 And because of the efforts of Senator John 
Sparkman of Alabama and Negro Congressman William 
Dawson of Chicago, the Platform Committee was able to 
reach agreement on the language and substance of the civil 
rights plank.99 On the evening of July 23, John McCormack, 
the chairman of the 1952 Platform Committee, presented 
95. Norfolk Journal and Guide, July 26, 1952, p. 12. 
96. A copy of White's testimony can be found in the Democratic 
National Committee Folder, Box 444, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
97. Norfolk Journal and Guide, July 26, 1952, p. 12. 
98. July 19, 1952, p. 6. 
99. For an illuminating discussion of how this plank was finally 
pieced together, see Hays, A Southern Moderate Speaks, pp. 70-80. 
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his committee's draft to the convention for its considera­
tion. The civil rights plank read as follows: 
IMPROVING CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES 
In order that the will of the American people may be 
expressed upon all legislative proposals, we urge that 
action be taken at the beginning of the Eighty-third Con­
gress to improve Congressional procedures so that major­
ity rule prevails and decisions can be made after reasona­
ble debate without being blocked by a minority in either 
house. 
CIVIL RIGHTS 
The Democratic Party is committed to support and 
advance the individual rights and liberties of all Ameri­
cans. 
Our country is founded on the proposition that all men 
are created equal. This means that all citizens are equal 
before the law and should enjoy equal political rights. 
They should have equal opportunity for education, for 
economic advancement, and for decent living conditions. 
We will continue our efforts to eradicate discrimina­
tion based on race, religion or national origin. 
We know this task requires action, not just in one 
section of the nation, but in all sections. It requires the 
cooperative efforts of individual citizens and action by 
state and local governments. It also requires federal ac­
tion. The federal government must live up to the ideals of 
the Declaration of Independence and must exercise the 
powers vested in it by the Constitution. 
We are proud of the progress that has been made in 
securing equality of treatment and opportunity in the 
nation's armed forces and the Civil Service and all areas 
under federal jurisdiction. The Department of Justice 
has taken an important part in successfully arguing in 
the courts for the elimination of many illegal discrimina­
tions, including those involving rights to own and use 
real estate, to engage in gainful occupations and to enroll 
in publicly supported higher educational institutions. We 
are determined that the federal government shall con­
tinue such policies. 
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At the same time, we favor federal legislation effec­
tively to secure these rights to everyone: (1) the right to 
equal opportunity for employment; (2) the right to secu­
rity of persons; (3) the right to full and equal participa­
tion in the nation's political life, free from arbitrary 
restraints. We also favor legislation to perfect existing 
federal civil rights statutes and to strengthen the admin­
istrative machinery for the protection of civil rights.100 
In the words of a New York Times editorial, the 1952 plank 
seemed similar to 1948 but lacked the "fighting words that 
would have immediately caused another full-scale Southern 
bolt." 101 
Immediately after the reading of the platform, Speaker 
Sam Rayburn, the chairman of the 1952 Democratic na­
tional convention, ignoring the vocal objections of Governor 
Hugh White of Mississippi and Governor Herman Tal­
madge of Georgia, rammed the platform through by voice 
vote. Once the platform was approved, Rayburn allowed the 
Georgia and Mississippi delegations to record their opposi­
tion to it.102 
For the most part the reaction to the civil rights plank 
was favorable. Senator Humphrey felt it was "stronger and 
more comprehensive than in 1948." "I am particularly 
pleased," he said, "with the section we have adopted on 
changing the Senate Rules." 103 Roy Wilkins, too, felt it was 
100. Porter and Johnson, National Party Platforms: 1840-196t, p. 
487. 
101. July 25, 1952, p. 16. 
102. Ibid., p. 12. For a balanced and perceptive analysis of the 
"loyalty" issue, which was far more volatile and troublesome a prob­
lem in 1952 than civil rights, see Allan Sindler, "The Unsolid South: 
A Challenge to the Democratic National Party," pp. 230-81. 
103. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Aug. 2, 1952, p. 7. Humphrey may 
have prevailed upon Senator Lehman not to take the issue of the civil 
rights plank to the floor of the convention; see Hays, A Southern 
Moderate Speaks, pp. 73-79. 
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a definite improvement over the 1948 plank because of the 
adoption of the paragraph titled "Improving Congressional 
Procedures." 104 Solicitor General Philip Perlman, who was 
President Truman's special representative on the Platform 
Committee, remarked: "It is my plank, I ought to think a 
lot of it. It has cloture in it. It has everything in it for which 
we have been fighting." 105 Southerners thought they could 
live with this plank because, in the words of Senator Spark-
man, "You can't find FEPC mentioned in it, and there is no 
word of compulsion." 106 
Although the platform passed in the spirit of harmony, 
and although it was generally well received by the delegates, 
there were a number of delegates who were piqued by what 
had happened. Congressman Adam Clayton Powell was par­
ticularly incensed with developments inside the Platform 
Committee. He said: 
I am disappointed at the liberal bloc for not bringing 
out a minority report, which they had promised to do 
until the last minute, and to me it smells like a sell out. I 
think a deal was made that they (the liberals) would not 
bring a minority report and Sparkman would keep the 
Dixiecrats quiet. 
Sparkman told me personally, Emanuel Celler told me 
personally, Senator Lehman told me personally that Wil­
liam Dawson's speech (in the platform committee) killed 
all the amendments which we brought forward by var­
ious members of the liberal bloc to strengthen civil rights 
sentiment. I was shocked when Lehman told me that he 
offered a substitute FEPC plank, and Dawson voted 
against it.107 
104. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Aug. 2, 1952, p. 7. 
105. Ibid. 
106. Pittsburgh Courier, Aug. 16, 1952, p. 6. 
107. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Aug. 2, 1952, p. 2. Congressman 
Powell also had a private reason for venting his spleen on Dawson. 
Ever since October, 1945, the Chicago-based Dawson was receiving 
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Congressman Dawson defended himself by attacking 
"disrupters." He insisted that 
our people must trust their leaders. The people must have 
confidence in me. The committee's job was to work out a 
good plank that would be effective and hold our great 
party together. My job was not to disrupt and split the 
party. That platform is a great achievement—the strong­
est civil rights plank we ever had. It was accepted unani­
mously by the convention. I am proud of what we accom­
plished.108 
The unity for which Dawson was working was designed 
to enhance the presidential buildup of Illinois Governor 
Adlai E. Stevenson. Stevenson had become, at the last min­
ute, a reluctant candidate for the presidential nomination. 
He was not, however, the favorite of most black delegates. 
They supported Averell Harriman because of his strongly 
expressed Fair Deal views, and Senator Kefauver was their 
choice for Harriman's running mate.109 
Once Governor Stevenson had received the blessings of 
President Truman and other party moguls, his nomination 
was assured, and he easily secured on the third ballot what 
he had earlier in the year declined to seek. Stevenson was 
nominated because he was the only candidate who could 
presidential patronage for Harlem that normally would have been 
given to Powell. The White House made this arrangement with 
Dawson after Powell had referred to Mrs. Bess Truman, the presi­
dent's wife, as "the last lady of the land." Powell made this remark 
about Mrs. Truman because she refused to resign from the Daughters 
of the American Revolution after that organization had denied Pow­
ell's wife, pianist Hazel Scott, permission to perform in Constitution 
Hall in Washington, D.C. See Norfolk Journal and Guide, Sept. 6, 
1952, p. 2. 
108. Pittsburgh Courier, Aug. 2, 1952, p. 1. 
109. Norfolk Journal and Guide, July 5, 1952, p. 18; July 26, 1952, 
p. 14. 
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unite both factions of the party: his welfare state orienta­
tion won him the support of the liberals; his moderate 
racial views did not alienate the South. In this respect he 
was the man in the middle, very much like Senator Truman 
at the 1944 Democratic national convention. 
After Governor Stevenson's nomination was endorsed by 
the convention, party leaders, including President Truman, 
met in Chicago to select a vice-presidential candidate. They 
decided to strengthen the North-South axis of the party by 
tapping Alabama Senator John Sparkman for the nomina­
tion.110 A loyal party worker and a welfare state liberal of 
sorts, Sparkman had played an important role in drafting 
the 1952 civil rights plank of the party. 
Although Sparkman was acceptable to the party profes­
sionals, he was a persona non grata with most of the con­
vention's Negro delegates and an unhappy choice for some 
liberals. In response to his nomination, sixty Negro dele­
gates, led by Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, marched 
off the convention floor rather than vote for a candidate 
whose civil rights views they found abhorrent. Powell, in 
explaining and justifying this action, asserted that "they 
[can] cram a candidate down our throat but they cannot 
make us vote for him. I personally will not campaign for the 
national ticket." m Walter White, who had practically made 
the NAACP an informal affiliate of the national Democratic 
party, said: "It will be difficult if not impossible for the 
Democratic party to sell to Negro voters, as well as to many 
other civil rights advocates, any nominee whose voting rec­
ord has been one of consistent opposition to the civil rights 
objectives of the Democratic party as stated in the 1948 
platform and reaffirmed and extended in the platform 
110. Truman, Memoirs, II, 497. 
111. New York Times, July 27, 1952, p. 1. 
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adopted here only two days ago." m Senator Lehman re­
marked that Sparkman had to embrace the civil rights 
plank of the Democratic party without any reservations. "If 
he does not," said Lehman, "there is no question but that it 
will weaken the ticket in New York." 113 
Black newspapers, too, were highly critical of Senator 
Sparkman's nomination. "Sparkman Wrong Guy" read the 
front page headline of the August 9,1952, Pittsburgh Cour­
ier. Also displayed prominently on this front page was 
Sparkman's civil rights voting record, which the Courier 
characterized as "0-0." The August 9, 1952, Norfolk Jour­
112. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Aug. 2, 1952, pp. 1-2. After the 
convention, Clarence Mitchell interviewed Sparkman and discovered 
that he fully supported the platform and that he felt the chances of 
getting civil rights legislation through Congress had been improved 
because the words "FEPC" and "filibuster" were not included in it. 
Sparkman also said that, in the words of Mitchell, "a candidate for 
Vice President must appeal to an electorate that is vastly different 
from the electorate that a Senator must appeal to in Alabama." As 
for addressing that enlarged constituency, Sparkman said, again in 
the words of Mitchell, "that at this time he must weigh his statements 
on civil rights carefully because there is still a possibility that some of 
the Southern states will support Eisenhower by way of retaliation 
against the civil rights plank" (Clarence Mitchell to Walter White, 
August 1, 1952, Democratic National Committee File, Box 444, 
NAACP Papers, L.C.). 
Also of interest are the comments dispatched to Walter White by a 
well-known and respected southern liberal, Aubrey Williams: "I was 
disturbed over reports that you felt you could not support the Steven­
son-Sparkman ticket because of Sparkman's record on civil rights 
legislation. I regret that record just as you do. But Sparkman is 
better than that record. You and I know he would most probably not 
be in the Senate today if he had voted the way you and I would have 
liked him to vote. The real McCoy in the situation is that John is 
hated by every Dixiecrat in Alabama. In fact, every Dixiecrat and 
white supremacist . are all out for Eisenhower and are tearing at 
Sparkman with everything they got" (Aubrey Williams to Walter 
White, August 1,1952, Democratic National Committee File, Box 444, 
NAACP Papers, L.C.). 
113. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Aug. 2,1952, pp. 1-2. 
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nal and Guide published a Sparkman statement which had 
been delivered in Mobile, Alabama, on April 17, 1950: "21 
Southern Senators are banded together and pledged to use 
every parliamentary device possible to defeat civil rights 
legislation." 114 But in spite of this adverse publicity, the 
Democratic party could take solace in the fact that an Au­
gust Associated Press survey of twelve southern states 
showed that the vast majority of over a million registered 
Negroes planned to vote the Democratic ticket in Novem­
ber.115 
In the North the situation was somewhat different be­
cause there, Adam Clayton Powell continued, even after the 
Democratic convention, to attack Congressman Dawson and 
the Democratic ticket. On August 3, at a press conference in 
Harlem, Powell stated that Dawson was responsible for 
sabatoging the party's liberal civil rights plank. Then after 
declaring that Negro Americans "cannot swallow" the Ste­
venson-Sparkman and Eisenhower-Nixon tickets, Powell 
announced that he and other Harlem Negroes had accepted 
an invitation from Governor Stevenson to meet with him in 
Springfield, Illinois, in two weeks.116 
Meanwhile, Governor Stevenson was doing little more to 
mitigate the blow the blacks had received because of the 
party's nomination of Sparkman. At a press conference on 
August 4, the Illinois governor, in response to a question on 
civil rights, made it abundantly clear that he did not favor 
"compulsory" PEPC legislation, nor did he sympathize with 
114. P. 14. 
115. New York Times, Aug. 11, 1952, p. 9. The NAACP had 
organized a campaign in April to register black voters in the South. 
Apparently this drive had met with some success; see Memorandum to 
Walter White from Henry L. Moon, August 20, 1952, Presidential 
Campaign File, Box 444, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
116. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Aug. 9, 1952, pp. 1-2. 
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the proposal in the Democratic platform calling for a ma­
jority cloture. It was his impression that "it would be a very 
dangerous thing indeed to limit debate in a parliamentary 
body in a democracy." 117 
But almost overnight, it seems, Stevenson changed his 
position. On August 7, in the company of Averell Harriman, 
he conferred for almost two hours with Roy Wilkins of the 
NAACP and gave him assurances that he would support 
changes in Senate Rule Twenty-two making it easier to 
terminate filibusters and, furthermore, would support the 
Humphrey-Ives FEPC bill, which the Senate Labor and 
Public Welfare Committee had passed in the waning days of 
the Eighty-second Congress. Stevenson also expressed the 
belief that he could do business with the South on the 
matter of civil rights; and in order to get something done, 
he would be prepared to take a "half loaf or even a quarter 
loaf" to the "whole loaf" which the NAACP wanted. On the 
subject of Sparkman, Wilkins learned in an off-the-record 
comment from Stevenson that he "did not actually pick 
Sparkman, but he thought Sparkman was the best man for 
the job of maintaining a cooperative attitude on the part of 
the Senate and getting legislation through." Stevenson also 
confided to Wilkins, in the words of Wilkins, that "Spark­
man was better in this regard than any of the others men­
tioned for the post." In his meeting with Wilkins, Stevenson 
did not say "he opposed Sparkman, but only that the story 
that he had picked him was not accurate." 118 
Obviously, something had happened between August 4 
and August 7 to cause Stevenson to shift his position so 
abruptly. It can be assumed that his remarks to Wilkins 
were predicated on his sudden realization (induced perhaps 
117. New York Times, Aug. 5, 1952, p. 12. 
118. Roy Wilkins to Walter White, August 13, 1952, Democratic 
National Committee File, Box 444, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
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by the presence of Averell Harriman) of the importance of 
the Negro vote to the Democratic party in the face of the 
ominous challenge from General Eisenhower. Wilkins, of 
course, was delighted with Stevenson's conversion; he now 
felt that "Stevenson seems to be definitely our man in the 
sense that he believes, basically, in the objectives we seek. 
. . . He is with us on the substance; he may part with us 
occasionally on tactics." 119 
Several weeks later, on August 26, 1952, Wilkins met 
with General Eisenhower in New York to discuss the mat­
ter of civil rights. Once more the general made it clear that 
"he could not support" the enactment by Congress of what 
he called "compulsory PEPC legislation." On the matter of 
filibusters, Eisenhower stated his opposition to them, but 
"he could not promise to do anything about changing the 
Senate Rules." On a more positive note, Eisenhower de­
clared that he was in favor of ending segregation in the 
District of Columbia and that, if elected, "he will eliminate 
discrimination wherever it exists in Federal employment 
under his control."12° 
Following his interview with the Republican candidate, 
Wilkins concluded: 
General Eisenhower is friendly and gracious. He appears 
honest and sincere in his declared opposition to discrimi­
nation, but he speaks always in general terms. He sees 
nothing inconsistent, apparently, in his opposition to a 
Federal FEPC and the sponsorship of such a bill by leading 
Republican Senators, including Senator Ives of the key 
state of New York. Eisenhower wants merely to survey 
119. Ibid. 
120. Memorandum to the Board of Directors from Roy Wilkins, 
September 8, 1952, Democratic National Committee File, Box 444, 
NAACP Papers, L.C. 
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discrimination in employment, not exact a law to correct
the condition.121 
While General Eisenhower remained firm in his position, 
Governor Stevenson, after having made his commitment to 
Wilkins, now had to convince voters of New York State that 
his credentials were impeccably liberal. Addressing the New 
York Democratic party state convention on August 28, Ste­
venson made public the position he had earlier disclosed to 
Wilkins.122 That Stevenson speech, plus the one he delivered 
the same day to the New York Liberal party convention, 
impressed twenty-six black spokesmen, who, led by Powell, 
met with Stevenson a day later. At that time Powell an­
nounced that he was entirely satisfied with Stevenson's civil 
rights stand and "would be going all out for him now."123 
And less than two weeks later, the NAACP declared that "the 
most forthright position taken by any of the Presidential 
and Vice Presidential candidates of the two major parties 
has been that of Governor Adlai E. Stevenson. We commend 
the clarity and courage of his pronouncements." m 
While Stevenson was consolidating his position with 
Negro voters, he was losing ground in the South. There, in 
mid-September a New York Times survey revealed that the 
question of civil rights and states rights was the major 
question on the minds of most voters.125 And in light of 
Stevenson's New York speeches, South Carolina Governor 
James F. Byrnes announced on September 18 that he would 
121. Ibid. 
122. Major Campaign Speeches of Adlai E. Stevenson, 1952 (New 
York: Random House, 1953), pp. 23-29. 
123. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Sept. 6, 1952, p. 2. 
124. NAACP press release, September 11, 1952, NAACP Papers, 
L.C. 
125. Ibid., September 14, 1952. 
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support General Eisenhower for the presidency.128 By join­
ing Governor Robert F. Kennon of Louisiana, who had 
already bolted the Democratic party, Byrnes's disaffection 
was augmenting Republican party chances in the South, 
once the bastion of the Democracy. 
Hoping to establish himself as a candidate worthy of 
southern support, Stevenson spoke in Richmond, Virginia, 
on September 20. After having endorsed the Democratic 
party's civil rights plank, he said: "I should justly earn 
your contempt if I talked one way in the South and another 
elsewhere." m Stevenson reaffirmed his commitment to civil 
rights with a speech in New Orleans on October 10.128 
General Eisenhower, Stevenson's opponent, also went 
South in the quest for votes. As reported in the October 1 
Charleston News and Courier, Eisenhower, in the company 
of Governor James F. Byrnes of South Carolina, had been 
greeted a day earlier by an estimated 50,000 faithful sup­
porters in Columbia, South Carolina. The news story con­
tinued : "Then the University of South Carolina band on the 
other side of the steps broke into Dixie. Ike had said he was 
one who could stand when the band played Dixie. He and 
Byrnes clapped through most of it." 129 Speaking in Wheel­
ing, West Virginia, on October 1, Eisenhower declared that 
he favored an end to segregation in Washington, D.C., in 
the armed forces, and any remaining restrictions on the 
basic American right to vote. He added: 
We seek in America a true equality of opportunity for all 
men. I have no patience with the idea of second class 
126. Ibid., September 19, 1952. 
127. Major Campaign Speeches of Adlai E. Stevenson, 1958, pp. 
149-56. 
128. Ibid., pp. 235-44. 
129. P. 1. 
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citizenship. For many years the administration has been 
pointing to a promised land where no Americans could be 
subjected to the indignities of discrimination. But their 
promised land has always proved to be a political mirage. 
In his campaign swing through Virginia and North Caro­
lina, the General made no references to the civil rights 
issue.130 
As the tempo of the campaign began to pick up at the 
beginning of October, the Democratic high command was 
becoming increasingly aware that it was in trouble not only 
in the South but, for different reasons, in the North as well. 
This point was made amply clear in a message Walter 
White transmitted to Wilson Wyatt, Stevenson's campaign 
manager.131 Included in that message was a copy of a memo­
randum White had just received from Henry L. Moon, the 
director of public relations of the NAACP. Moon informed 
White of the poor impression that Senator Sparkman was 
making on northern voters, who "were generally supporters 
of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations and want to 
130. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Oct. 4, 1952, p. 2. A documented 
indictment of the racist tactics employed by Eisenhower supporters in 
the South during the campaign was presented by Walter White to 
Lessing J. Rosenwald. Wrote White: "On the Monday night before 
election leaflets were showered from airplanes on Southern cities 
containing some of the most vicious racist propaganda against the 
Negro we have seen since the days of Bilbo. Governor Sherman Adams 
wrote me on behalf of General Eisenhower saying of course he did not 
approve such tactics, but marked the letter personal and confidential. 
When I repeatedly sought permission to make clear General Eisen­
hower's rejection of such tactics, Governor Adams sent me a batch of 
General Eisenhower's speeches already made, saying they should be 
sufficient answer" (Walter White to Lessing J. Rosenwald, November 
7,1952, Box 444, NAACP Papers, L.C.). 
131. Walter White to Wilson Wyatt, September 30, 1952, Demo­
cratic National Committee File, Box 444, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
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vote for Stevenson." It was Moon's opinion, based on con­
versations he recently had with friends and members of the 
NAACP, that Sparkman's utterances on civil rights subse­
quent to the Democratic national convention were greatly 
damaging the prospects of holding in line "civil rights advo­
cates" whose support the Democrats had to have if "they 
hope to win the election." 132 Given Moon*s bleak report, 
"What do you suggest be done?", White asked Wyatt.133 
This, then, was the context in which the Democrats, led 
by President Truman and Governor Stevenson, now decided 
to make a concerted effort to hold the Negro vote in the 
North in order to compensate for the possible loss of some 
southern states.134 Truman himself carried the burden of the 
campaign for that vote. On October 11, at the request of 
Stevenson's campaign managers, he made a major address 
on civil rights to Negroes in Harlem.135 In his speech Tru­
man attacked the Republicans as the opponents of civil 
rights legislation, described the (Republican) McConnell 
FEPC amendment "as a toothless substitute for FEPC," and 
pointed to the Wherry Amendment as another example of 
Republican obstructionism. Truman followed this descrip­
tion with a discussion of the various measures he had initi­
ated on the executive level: the abolition of segregation in 
the armed forces; the creation of a Fair Employment 
132. Memorandum to Walter White from Henry L. Moon, Septem­
ber 29, 1952, Democratic National Committee File, Box 444, NAACP 
Papers, L.C. 
133. Walter White to Wilson Wyatt, September 30, 1952, Demo­
cratic National Committee File, Box 444, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
134. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Oct. 11, 1952, p. 1. Congressman 
William Dawson now implored White to work hard on behalf of the 
black vote; see William Dawson to Walter White, October 9, 1952, 
Democratic National Committee File, Box 444, NAACP Papers, L.C. 
135. Phillips, The Truman Presidency, p. 426. 
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Board; and the administration-sponsored briefs in the var­
ious court cases which affected Negro rights.136 
At this point Truman warned his audience "to expect a 
return to the dark days of the depression" if the Republi­
cans won. After raising the specter of "Hooverism," he 
proceeded to attack Eisenhower's civil rights position. The 
president declared: 
The Republican candidate . .  . is the front man for the 
party that adopted the Wherry rule in the Senate . . . 
and a watered-down version in the House. His is the 
party that beat a retreat this year in the civil rights 
platform. That's the lousiest plank you ever read on the 
subject. 
And while the Republican candidate was in uniform, 
he told the Armed Services Committee of the Senate that 
a certain amount of segregation is necessary in the Army. 
You and I know that is morally wrong. And what is more, 
it's even militarily wrong. Our troops are demonstrating, 
every day, that Americans can stand side by side—re­
gardless of color—and fight better because of it. . .  . 
I am afraid, my friends, that the Republican candidate 
does not offer you much hope so far as civil rights are 
concerned. 
Truman concluded his speech by mentioning that Adlai Ste­
venson had fought hard for a state PEPC, even though the 
Republican-controlled Illinois Senate was opposed to it, and 
had desegregated the Illinois National Guard.137 
Apparently Eisenhower was stung by President Tru­
man's remarks about his 1948 stand on desegregation of the 
armed forces. In a speech on October 17 in Newark, Eisen­
hower attacked Truman for having voted as a senator in 
1942 against waiving state poll tax requirements for mem­
136. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1952­
195S, pp. 798-99. 
137. Ibid., p. 800-801. 
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bers of the armed forces. Eisenhower, in that same speech, 
made it clear that he supported FEPC in forty-eight states 
and would use his influence, if elected President, to get 
every state to pass FEPC laws.138 In other words, he still 
opposed federal FEPC legislation. 
The next day, speaking in Brooklyn, President Truman 
responded to the Eisenhower speech with a sharp blast of 
his own. He asked: 
Has the general come forward with a single, new con­
structive program? Has his leadership done a single 
thing to change the policies of the Republican party? 
Take civil rights for example. 
Here is an issue on which new leadership might try to 
bring the Republican party back to its great—but almost 
forgotten—tradition of freedom and human rights. But 
nothing like that has happened. The Republican candi­
date has just uttered crass equivocations designed to win 
the votes—and the contributions—of the Dixiecrat mil­
lionaires. He is still opposed to using the powers of the 
Federal Government for an effective FEPC law.139 
On October 21 the president continued his assault on Eisen­
hower's civil rights position, with speeches in Newark and 
Philadelphia. In Newark he heaped scorn on Eisenhower's 
FEPC-states rights position.140 And in Philadelphia, Truman 
suggested that Eisenhower "is in favor of civil rights but 
he's against enforcement by the government," a position 
which Truman felt would not end race discrimination in 
jobs.141 Clearly, he was now campaigning as hard, if not 
harder, for black votes as he did in 1948. 
138. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Oct. 25, 1952, p. 1. 
139. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1952­
195S, p. 887. 
140. Ibid., p. 897. 
141. Ibid., p. 909. 
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Truman's barrage must have worried General Eisenhow­
er's managers, because the Republican candidate went to 
Harlem on October 24 in quest of Negro votes. Speaking to 
a crowd of about 5,000 people, Eisenhower vowed to fight 
segregation in Washington, D.C. He then accused President 
Truman and the Democratic party of making false promises 
to Negro voters for the past seven years. After assuring his 
audience that there would be no depression if he took office, 
Eisenhower added: 
So I cannot come before you with the competition of 
promises, but I do come before you with a pledge. If you 
want to put this crusade at the helm of your government; 
if you want to substitute 22 caliber men who are trying to 
hold 45 caliber jobs with the finest men and women that 
we can draw from all sections of this country from every 
walk of life—and let me say plainly, based upon merit 
and without respect to color or creed; if you want to have 
a government of that kind, then you belong in this cru­
sade.142 
Governor Stevenson arrived in Harlem on October 27 and 
received an enthusiastic greeting from over 100,000 people. 
He spoke for ten minutes, but refused to dwell on civil 
rights, since, as he told his audience, his position was well 
known. Nevertheless, he did declare that "if I promised you 
everything, I would deserve your contempt." After pointing 
to the "cruel difficulties" involved in achieving his program, 
Stevenson praised Senator Sparkman as a candidate "who 
would work to the limit of his abilities" in order to fulfill 
the Democratic party program." 143 
In the last days before the election President Truman 
carried the civil rights issue to the Negro voters of Chicago 
142. New York Times, October 22, 1952, pp. 20-21. 
143. Ibid., October 28,1952, pp. 1-2. 
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and Detroit, where he once more attacked Eisenhower, his 
party, and his program. On October 29 Truman told 35,000 
blacks on Chicago's South Side that Senator John Spark-
man of Alabama, Governor Stevenson's running mate, had 
helped to write the 1952 Democratic civil rights plank, and 
that Sparkman had pledged to support it. In describing that 
platform Truman said: 
[It] is the strongest civil rights stand ever taken by a 
major political party in this country. It favors effective 
Federal action on civil rights, including PEPC; and it 
urges a change in the rules of procedure in Congress so 
that a handful of men can't stand in the way when others 
want to vote.144 
In another Chicago speech Truman charged that the leader­
ship Eisenhower promised to exert in the civil rights strug­
gle would also be provided by Dixiecrats like Governors 
Byrnes of South Carolina, Shivers of Texas, and Kennon of 
Louisiana. "And if you think that is a funny kind of leader­
ship in the fight for civil rights," remarked Truman, "you 
are just a low down mudslinger—like I am." 145 
Truman closed out his campaign to keep Negroes in the 
Democratic fold with a speech in Detroit on October 30. 
Once more, he insisted that Senator Sparkman was a loyal 
Democrat and would work hard to carry out the Democratic 
platform; once more, he recommended the election of Gov­
ernor Stevenson; and once more, he spoke of his own deep 
commitment to racial justice and human equality.1*6 
What lay behind Truman's speechmaking efforts was his 
realization that the black vote could prove as decisive in 
144. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1952-1953, 
p. 987. 
145. Ibid., p. 990. 
146. Ibid., pp. 1006-7. 
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determining the outcome of the 1952 election as it had in 
1948. Thus Truman worked diligently to convince Negroes 
that the Democratic party and Governor Stevenson were 
their true benefactors. Unable, however, to produce any­
thing in 1952 as dramatic as Executive Order 9981, which 
had created the Fahy Committee in 1948, Truman had to 
resort to rhetoric as a way of reminding Negroes of his 
party's past accomplishments and its continuing good faith. 
On the eve of the 1952 election, black Americans seemed 
safely in the Democratic camp. Few could agree with the 
position taken by the Pittsburgh Courier: "If a Republican 
is elected president and is accompanied by a Republican 
control of Congress, all of the important Congressional com­
mittees will be headed by Republicans, and all of them will 
be outside the South." 14T Most Negroes agreed with the 
observation of the Norfolk Journal and Guide that the pres­
ence of so many states-righters in General Eisenhower's 
crusade was reason enough to support the Illinois Gover­
148 nor.
Neither the Democratic party's strong defense of its New 
Deal and Fair Deal heritage nor the attractive personality 
of Governor Adlai Stevenson was enough on election day to 
overcome the national frustrations caused by the stalemated 
Korean War, the savagery of McCarthyism, and the appeal 
of General Eisenhower.149 All in all, the Democratic party 
was dealt its worst drubbing in any national election since 
the 1920's, as the Republicans captured both the White 
House and the Congress. 
The black vote in 1952 was preponderantly Democratic, 
but, unfortunately for Stevenson, the overwhelming Eisen­
147. Oct. 25, 1952, p. 6. 
148. Oct. 4, 1952, p. 15. 
149. Allen J. Matusow, Farm Policies and Politics in the Truman 
Years, p. 250. 
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hower victory nullified its impact. Ironically, more Negroes 
voted for Stevenson in 1952 than for Truman in 1948; 
Stevenson received 73 percent of the Negro vote as com­
pared with the approximately 66 percent given to Tru­
man.150 (It would appear that many blacks who voted for 
Henry Wallace in 1948 returned to the Democratic party in 
1952, thereby accounting for the greater Stevenson percent­
age.) A 1952 NAACP survey of forty-five widely scattered 
cities across the country showed that Stevenson swept 
Negro wards in all of them.151 Another survey indicated that 
Negro voters in Louisiana, South Carolina, Kentucky, Ar­
kansas, and West Virginia kept those states in the Demo­
cratic column.152 Thus, in 1952, black voters, both in the 
North and the South, appeared to be among the most loyal 
Democrats in the United States. 
After the election battle was over, the president met with 
representatives of the National Newspaper Association who 
came to the White House on November 14 to present him 
with a plaque for his services to the cause of civil rights. At 
that ceremony the following statement was read to Tru­
man: 
Out of your courageous efforts . . . has come among us: 
A new freedom from fear and intimidation. A new oppor­
tunity for millions of our fellow citizens to register and 
vote for the first time in fifty years. The first chance since 
the Revolution and the war of 1812 to become entirely 
integrated in the Army and Navy.153 
President Truman responded by remarking that he was in 
"dead earnest" about the civil rights proposals he had made, 
150. Crisit LIX (1952), 616. 
151. Ibid. 
152. Henry Lee Moon, "The Negro Vote in Presidential Election of 
1956," Journal of Negro Education, August, 1957, pp. 219-30. 
153. Norfolk Journal and Guide, Nov. 22, 1952, p. 2. 
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and that he would work for their adoption as long as he 
lived.154 
The Justice Department, on its own initiative, backed up 
the president's words with action that was fraught with the 
highest significance. On December 2, 1952, after having 
waited until the election had passed so as to eschew the 
charge of playing partisan politics, the new attorney gen­
eral, James P. McGranery, representing the United States 
government, submitted to the Supreme Court an amicus 
curiae brief supporting five cases litigated by Negro 
plaintiffs challenging the validity of the "separate but 
equal" doctrine in the field of education.155 The administra­
tion brief raised the point that the issue of racial discrimi­
nation had to be viewed in the context "of the present world 
struggle between freedom and tyranny." It was the admin­
istration's judgment that "racial discrimination furnishes 
grist for the Communist propaganda mills and it raises 
doubts even among friendly nations as to the intensity of 
our devotion to the democratic faith." 158 To emphasize the 
seriousness of the situation, the brief quoted from a letter 
which Secretary of State Dean Acheson had written to the 
attorney general: 
The continuance of racial discrimination in the United 
States remains a source of constant embarrassment to 
this government in the day-to-day conduct of its foreign 
relations; and it jeopardizes the effective maintenance of 
our moral leadership of the free and democratic nations 
of the world.157 
154. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1952­
195S, p. 1050. 
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Then referring specifically to the cases at hand, the gov­
ernment stated its position: 
In the briefs submitted by the United States in Hen­
derson vs. United States, 339 U.S. 816, and in Sweatt vs. 
Painter, 339 U.S. 629, and McLaurin vs. Oklahoma State 
Regents, 339 U.S. 637, the Government argued that racial 
segregation imposed or supported by law is per se uncon­
stitutional. We renew that argument here. Without re­
peating in detail the grounds stated at length in those 
briefs, for the conclusion that the doctrine of "separate 
but equal" is wrong as a matter of constitutional law, 
history and policy, the United States again urges the 
Court, if it should reach the question, to re-examine and 
overrule that doctrine. 
The Government submits that compulsory racial segre­
gation is itself . . . unconstitutional discrimination. 
"Separate but equal" is a contradiction in terms. Schools 
or other public facilities where persons are segregated by 
law, solely on the basis of race or color, cannot in any 
circumstances be regarded as equal. . . . 
Whatever the merits in 1896 of a judgment as to the 
wisdom or reasonableness of the rule of "separate but 
equal," it should now be discarded as a negation of rights 
secured by the Constitution.158 
If the Court decided to overturn the "separate but equal" 
doctrine in the field of public education, the government 
suggested: 
That. . . the Court should take into account the need, 
not only for prompt vindication of the constitutional 
rights violated, but also for an orderly and reasonable 
solution of the vexing problems which may arise in elimi­
nating such segregation. 
A reasonable period of time will obviously be required 
to permit formulation of new provisions of law governing 
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the administration of schools in areas affected by the 
Court's decision. 
To the extent that there may exist popular opposition 
in some sections to abolition of racially-segregated school 
systems, we believe that a program for orderly and pro­
gressive transition would tend to lessen such antagonism. 
An appropriate tribunal to devise and supervise execu­
tion of such a program is a district court, which could 
fashion particular orders to meet particular needs.159 
With this action the Justice Department broadened its 
efforts to shape a new judicial policy for what was fast 
becoming the most crucial domestic problem confronting 
the American people at mid-century. 
As President Truman was preparing to leave office, he 
received on January 12, 1953, a letter from Roy Wilkins. 
After noting Truman's accomplishments in the field of civil 
rights, Wilkins concluded with the following observation: 
"Mr. President, you have been responsible through the pro­
nouncements from your high office, for a new climate of 
opinion in this broad area of civil rights." 16° Truman re­
plied to Wilkins's letter on January 14, 1953. Perhaps think­
ing of how history would judge his performance, he wrote: 
It was good of you to write as you did. The progress in 
equal rights that has been made in the past seven years is 
a source of satisfaction to me and I am very glad to have 
your confirmation of what I feel is a substantial change. 
It is most gratifying to me to have you say that there is a 
new climate of opinion on civil rights. . . .161 
159. Ibid., p. 28. 
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On January 15, 1953, President Truman delivered his 
farewell address to the American people. Referring to civil 
rights, he said: 
We have made progress in spreading the blessings of 
American life to all of our people. There has been a 
tremendous awakening of the American conscience on the 
great issue of civil rights—equal economic opportunities, 
equal rights of citizenship and equal educational oppor­
tunities for all our people, whatever their race, religion 
or status of birth.162 
There had indeed been an "awakening of the American 
conscience," for which President Truman could take con­
siderable credit. His actions and policies, made necessary 
by political and moral demands, did much to shape and 
advance the civil rights struggle in America in the years he 
occupied the White House. 
162. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1952­
1953, p. 1202. 

CONCLUSION 
The politics of civil rights became nationally prominent at 
approximately the time Harry Truman became president of 
the United States. Both challenged and threatened by this 
issue, President Truman responded to it in such a way as to 
obtain maximum political benefit for him and his party. 
Personal wariness and political canniness characterized his 
modus operandi in handling an issue which could have pro­
duced lasting division within the Democratic party. 
President Truman had already worked his way through 
the civil rights maze in the years he served as a senator 
from Missouri. That is, he gave evidence in his senatorial 
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years that he appreciated the power of the black vote in 
Kansas City and elsewhere. Like most of his fellow white 
Missourians, Truman opposed social equality; but he was 
also a political realist who acknowledged that the interests 
of his Negro constituents needed protection. Hence, as a 
senator he could support civil rights proposals, knowing 
that they would not clear the Senate and come back to haunt 
him in his home state. 
This ambivalence, a respect for the traditional order com­
bined with a recognition of political realities, Truman car­
ried with him into the White House in April, 1945. Operat­
ing on a national level, where political hazards were so 
much greater, Truman employed the same tactics in dealing 
with the FEPC controversy that had worked so well in Mis­
souri. He raised the art of civil rights advocacy to new 
heights while shying away from anything that resembled a 
substantive program, which could have alienated the South, 
the section that had supported him in the showdown fight 
with Henry Wallace at the 1944 Democratic national con­
vention. Later, of course, the development of new and more 
subtle tactics led to the establishment of the President's 
Civil Rights Committee and the dispatching of the Febru­
ary 2,1948, civil rights message to Congress, which, in turn, 
precipitated a furious southern reaction. 
The evidence adduced in this study would suggest that 
President Truman's sponsorship and endorsement of a civil 
rights program from 1948 on was not synonomous with 
active support for its passage. He, his supporters, and his 
opponents in Congress were participants in a civil rights 
drama in which ritualized action characterized the role per­
formances of the players from the White House down. Thus, 
southerners who took umbrage at President Truman's legis­
lative commitment to civil rights mistook his rhetoric for 
the real thing. Surely, the leading House Democrat, Sam 
Rayburn, and even Senator Richard Russell, knew that Tru­
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man was not about to smash the Democratic party for the 
sake of a dubious congressional victory. It must be remem­
bered that the men who controlled the national Democratic 
party were centrists, whose role was to preserve the party 
as a viable political organization, come what may, by mak­
ing concessions to key interest groups only when necessary 
and by preventing potentially disruptive internal struggles 
from becoming embarrassingly manifest. 
Truman's willingness to make such a concession to Negro 
voters led him to issue Executive Order 9981 creating the 
Fahy Committee. It should be noted, then, that this order 
was not simply an exercise in good will, but rather the 
product of political pressure applied by A. Philip Randolph, 
Walter White, and others at a time when a presidential 
incumbent needed all the support he could muster in states 
with the greatest votes in the electoral college. Like Execu­
tive Order 8802, which President Roosevelt had issued to 
create an FEPC, 9981 was further recognition of the growing 
political influence of northern Negroes and their white al­
lies. 
Ironically, then, an authoritarian military establishment, 
itself no model for theorists of the good society, was altered 
somewhat to accommodate the ethos of democratic man. 
Here was the beginning of a controlled experiment that was 
hardly applicable to civilian society at large, but which for 
Negroes represented a breakthrough of sorts and a chal­
lenge to the stereotypes of many whites who never thought 
of black Americans except in terms of servitude based upon 
assumptions of biological and cultural inferiority. 
That racial breakthrough was undoubtedly President 
Truman's greatest civil rights achievement—and it illus­
trates the intelligent use of executive power to change, 
within admittedly narrow limits, a racist social structure. 
This emphasis on executive action, an extension of prece­
dents developed by the Roosevelt administration, included 
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the issuance of executive orders and the drafting of amicus 
curiae briefs which the Justice Department submitted to the 
Supreme Court, as in the important case of Brown v. Board 
of Education. Thus, President Truman recognized his re­
sponsibility to hold the country together. But centrist politi­
cian that he was, Truman moved only because he had no 
choice: Negro votes and the demands of the cold war, not 
simple humanitarianism—though there may have been 
some of that—produced whatever token gains Negroes were 
to make in the years Truman inhabited the White House. 
In the 1940's the Truman administration, whose liberal 
rhetoric was well ahead of the country, at least did not have 
to worry about a political reality which developed in the 
mid-1960's: the wrath of the northern backlash. In the 
Truman years the economy was still able to provide jobs for 
most everyone, thereby reducing the psychological tensions 
and economic fears of lower-middle-class whites. Further­
more, memories of the depression tended to unite Negroes 
and whites in the North along class lines, preventing divi­
sion solely along lines of race. Also, the black population in 
the northern cities was not as large in the Truman years as 
it was to become in the 1960's. For these reasons, then, 
Truman's stance in favor of civil rights did not jeopardize 
the northern urban Democratic party coalition. 
If the Truman administration failed to resolve America's 
most tragic and dangerous domestic problem, it was not 
because of political indifference. The problem was too vast 
and too complex for even the most politically skilled and 
popular of presidents, which admittedly Harry Truman was 
not. Nevertheless, President Truman helped to move the 
issue of civil rights into the forefront of American life, 
where it has been ever since. His legacy was humane, his 
commitment to federal action sound. Because of him and a 
number of key figures within his administration, the politics 
of civil rights had become a primary issue of concern for the 
American people. 
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Democratic party, and assesses the contributions 
of the president and his aides on behalf of Negro 
aspirations for freedom and justice. He concludes 
that if the Truman administration failed to solve 
America's most tragic and dangerous domestic 
problem, it was notably successful in bringing the 
issue of civil rights to the forefront of American 
life, where it has been ever since. Truman's legacy 
was humane, and his commitment to federal action 
sound. Because of him and certain key figures 
within his administration, Mr. Berman contends, the 
politics of civil rights became and has remained 
a legitimate issue of grave concern to the American 
people. 
William C. Berman is associate professor of 
history at the University of Toronto. 
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